PARIS-BASED HARIRI ADVISOR ON LEBANON INTERNAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001428

SIPDIS

NOTE: BY CIB:"DO NOT/NOT PROCESS, GIVE TO EAO FOR GUIDANCE."

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/20/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV SY LE EG SA FR
SUBJECT: PARIS-BASED HARIRI ADVISOR ON LEBANON INTERNAL
DEVELOPMENTS, PROSPECTS FOR LAHOUD RESIGNATION

REF: A. PARIS 1188 (EXDIS)


B. PARIS 327

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: During a recent discussion, Basile Yared, a
leading Paris-based advisor to Sa'ad Hariri, praised the
Secretary for delivering the right message in Beirut on the

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need for a peaceful, constitutional presidential transition
in Lebanon. Yared speculated that it would take two to three
months before President Lahoud can be replaced, and advocated
seeking a Lahoud resignation as a "less costly" option than
seeking the support of Hizballah or Michel Aoun to amend the
constitution. Yared stressed that Saudi Arabia and Egypt
could play a useful role in convincing Damascus to ask Lahoud
to step down. He conceded that Syria would likely seek
political and financial incentives from Saudi Arabia in
return for withdrawing support for Lahoud, but he claimed,
unconvincingly, that such gestures would not diminish
international pressure on Syria to comply with its UN
obligations. While reiterating total opposition to an Aoun
presidency, Yared suggested that seeking Aoun's support for
amending the constitution might be the second-best option, if
Lahoud refused to resign. Yared opined that Aoun's support
within the Christian community would diminish, if he was
increasingly viewed as blocking the democratic process to
replace Lahoud, and that Aoun could eventually accept someone
else being President if his party secured a bigger role in
the GoL. Yared praised Sa'ad Hariri as a force for Sunni
moderates in Lebanon with potential to reassure Christians,
and criticized PM Siniora for not tackling economic reform
and security issues quickly enough. Yared expressed
confidence that GoF support for Lebanon would continue after
Chirac's presidential term ends in 2007, and cited strong
public backing in France for Lebanese sovereignty. End
summary.


2. (C) During a discussion with poloff February 24,
Paris-based Hariri family advisor Basile Yared praised the
Secretary's February 23 visit to Beirut for passing exactly

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the right messages on the need for a Lebanese-led, peaceful
and constitutional process to replace President Lahoud.
Yared commented that Walid Jumblatt needed to hear this
message most; although Sa'ad Hariri was still trying to "push
Lahoud against a wall" publicly, in order to get him to
soften, he had become more measured in his approach. Yared
judged it a mistake for Hariri to set a March 14 deadline for
dumping Lahoud, and judged it would take two to three months
for the process to reach its conclusion.

LAHOUD RESIGNATION, WITH SAUDI, EGYPTIAN, AND SYRIAN HELP
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Yared saw three options to replace Lahoud: a Lahoud
resignation, or Hizballah or Aoun providing the votes to
secure the two-thirds majority necessary to amend the
constitution. Of the three options, Yared saw a Lahoud
resignation as the "least costly." To convince Lahoud to
resign, Yared judged that Lahoud needed guarantees that Syria
won't kill him," and promises of immunity for corruption
cases. Yared agreed that it was out of the question to offer
Lahoud immunity for the Hariri assassination, but speculated
further that Lahoud would never ask, since such a request
would implicate him. Yared expressed his personal hunch that
Lahoud was not an active participant in the Hariri
assassination plot, though, after the fact he thwarted the
investigation.


4. (C) In Yared's view, the best way to facilitate a Lahoud
resignation would be to convince Bashar al Asad to tell
Lahoud to step down -- an area where Saudi Arabia and Egypt
could play a helpful role. In Yared's view, the Saudis and
Egyptians should, without U.S. or French involvement, try and
convince Bashar that it was in his interest to dump Lahoud,
in order to have a more stable relationship with Lebanon.
The March 28-29 Arab League summit would be an opportunity
for a Saudi-Egyptian approach to Bashar. Asked what the
Syrians might demand in return, Yared speculated that the
SARG would seek political contact as well as financial
incentives, which Saudi Arabia should be willing to offer.
When poloff, in response, observed that such incentives ran
contrary to U.S.-French-led efforts to isolate Syria, Yared
stressed his view that this would be the "least bad" option

and that France and the U.S. need not be associated with the
Saudi-Egyptian efforts. He added that Syria would likely
seek assurances that the next Lebanese president would not
seek to destabilize Syria, and said this could be doable,
without giving Syria a say in who the next president should
be.

SECOND BEST OPTION: GETTING AOUN'S SUPPORT
--------------


5. (C) Yared observed that the price for securing Hizballah
support for dumping Lahoud would be too high -- Hizballah's
exemption from 1559. He concluded that the next best option,
if resignation did not work, was securing Aoun's support.
Yared described an Aoun presidency as an unacceptable option,
citing Aoun's February 6 understanding with Hizballah as an
example of Aoun's treachery and long track record of bad
judgment calls. Although Aoun, up to now, had remained
inflexible in his insistence on the Presidency, Yared
speculated that if Aoun continued to block replacement of
Lahoud as momentum grew throughout Lebanon for a new
President, Aoun would risk losing his support in the
Christian community. This in turn could compel Aoun to
renounce his claim on the presidency, and to support Lahoud's
removal in exchange for a bigger ministerial presence and
role in the GOL for his supporters.

HOW A NEW PRESIDENT COULD HELP DISARM HIZBALLAH
-------------- --


6. (C) On disarming Hizballah, Yared noted that forcible
disarmament by the LAF or foreign forces was not an option.
He cited a breakthrough on Sheb'a farms as a remote
possibility worth pursuing, noting that an Israeli
withdrawal, with sufficient security guarantees, would remove
Hizballah justification for being armed. He also noted that
removal of Lahoud would be an important step towards 1559
implementation, as Hizballah had reached its peak of
influence and military capacity under Lahoud. If Lebanon had
a new president, the more cohesive GOL could move towards
targeting sources of Hizballah financing, via enforcement of
existing money laundering laws on the books. Yared stressed
that curbing financing was essential, and key to this would
be strengthening Lebanon's judicial capacity, for instance
investigative magistrates and their staffs. He cited the
judicial sector as a good target for U.S. aid, and noted that
Lebanon needed more than guns. Yared was not enthused about
a possible arms embargo targeting Hizballah, and questioned
what means of enforcement were available.

COMPARING SA'AD HARIRI AND PM SINIORA
--------------


7. (C) Yared commented that the February 5 mob demonstrations
in Ashrafiyeh left Lebanon's Christian community in shock,
due to the large presence of Lebanese Sunni extremists. He
described Sa'ad Hariri's return to Lebanon as having calmed
the situation, and stressed that Sa'ad represented an
important pole for moderation and respect for Lebanese
Christians, who felt increasingly surrounded by both Shi'a
and Sunni extremists. In contrast, Yared criticized PM
Siniora for moving too slowly at the outset of his mandate to
launch economic reforms and address security problems, while
downplaying the obstacles put in Siniora's place by Lahoud
and others. Yared concluded that the GOL needed a "second
wind," but implied that Siniora would not be the one to
provide it.


8. (C) On French internal politics, Yared remained confident
that the end of Chirac's presidency in 2007 would not
diminish French engagement in Lebanon. He described the
French public and political class as emotionally attached to
Lebanon's quest for independence. At the same time, he
judged the Socialists and center-right/Gaullists as having
different orientations in the NEA region. The socialists,
historically, gave emphasis to France's strategic relations
with the Maghreb, and, in Yared's view, were afraid of
"burning their fingers" in the Middle East (defined as
Levant/Arabian Gulf). Chirac's center-right party, on the
other hand, put an emphasis on maintaining a French foothold
in the Middle East to project French influence throughout the
region -- hence the importance of Lebanon to Chirac's Middle
East policy.

COMMENT:
--------------


9. (C) Yared's emphasis on the need to secure SARG support
for a Lahoud resignation contrasts with the uncompromisingly
tough stance on Damascus he evinced in our first meeting (ref
b). We did not find convincing his assertions that possible
Saudi-Egyptian incentives to Damascus for a Lahoud
resignation would not dilute international pressure on Syria.
At the same time, while his logic may be flawed, Yared
clearly seems to be a privileged interlocutor for the GOL and
the Elysee, and echoed Elysee lines to an uncanny degree (ref
a) on the need to enlist Saudi and Egyptian support for
replacing Lahoud. End comment.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

Stapleton