MFA OFFICIAL DOWNPLAYS U.S. CONCERNS REGARDING

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000131

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2016
TAGS: MARR MASS PARM FR VE
SUBJECT: MFA OFFICIAL DOWNPLAYS U.S. CONCERNS REGARDING
POSSIBLE SUB SALES TO VENEZUELA

REF: A. 05 PARIS 8460 AND PREVIOUS


B. PARIS 104

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) In a January 5 meeting with Deputy Political
Counselor and PolOff (discussion of Bolivia and Colombia ref
B),DAS-equivalent for Latin America Michel Pinard downplayed
U.S. concerns about rumored discussions regarding the sale of
Scorpene submarines to Venezuela. While acknowledging that
preliminary talks had begun between Venezuela and unspecified
French entities, Pinard stated that the issue was still at a
stage of "internal reflection" by the GoF. Venezuela wished
to modernize its navy, Pinard said, and the Scorpene was one
of the options being explored, but the two sides were a long
way from a formal deal.


2. (C) Pinard insisted that any potential sale to Venezuela
would pose no risk to the U.S. or to regional stability,
specifically ruling out a Venezuelan "expansionist doctrine"
or designs on Curacao. Pinard underlined that any sale would
also incorporate considerations of quality and quantity. On
the former, the Scorpene submarine could be equipped in
different ways, and the GoF "had no intention of giving
Venezuela attack capabilities." As for the second,
discussions concerned 2-3 submarines, "but not four."
Alluding to worries that such sales could spark an arms race
and destabilize the region, Pinard repeated GoF arguments
that Chavez was more interested in the submarines to placate
military leaders whose allegiance he wished to secure rather
than to launch any attack against his neighbors. Referring
to GoF interest in cooperation with the Venezuelan navy,
Pinard maintained that there were also legitimate
counter-narcotics and maritime surveillance needs that new
submarines would help meet. In sum, Pinard affirmed, the GoF
had heard and understood our concerns, assuring us that
France "would never do something that would threaten an ally."


3. (C) Comment: Despite his insistence that talks with the
Venezuelans are only in the preliminary stages, Pinard's
responses to our inquiries seemed aimed at preparing us for
the inevitable; in fact, he began by justifying the sales in
principle and only later assured us that talks were only
beginning. The French strategy appears to be convince
themselves, if not others, that their commercial interest in
sales of the submarine falls below the threshold of concern
to the U.S. and/or other regional players so long as
capability and numbers are limited. What they conveniently
overlook, of course, is that red-carpet receptions in
European capitals and arms sales by allies may only further
embolden Chavez. End Comment.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

Hofmann