(C) MFA RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE TO EU-3 ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001296

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/1/2016
TAGS: PREL SY LE FR
SUBJECT: (C) MFA RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE TO EU-3 ON
SYRIA/LEBANON: FRENCH REMAIN NEURALGIC ABOUT SANCTIONS

REF: A. STATE 29048


B. PARIS 1293

C. PARIS 1188

D. DAMASCUS 702

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In a preliminary reaction to the U.S. white
paper on Syria/Lebanon (ref A),MFA A/S-equivalent for NEA
Thibault sought to emphasize the positive, while offering a
variety of legalistic arguments on why EU sanctions on Syria
were inadvisable or unachievable at this juncture. Thibault
described the U.S. and France as in agreement on the need for
a peaceful, constitutional process to replace Lebanese
President Lahoud, while expressing concern about efforts to
eject Lahoud via mass demonstrations or by a March 14
deadline. On Syrian facilitation of arms trafficking to
Lebanon, Thibault reiterated the GoF's full support for UNSCR
1559, but suggested more concrete information was needed and
that the issue should be a major focus for UNSYG envoy
Larsen. On proposed joint actions to be employed against the
SARG, Thibault suggested that the GoF would not support any
sanctions, UNSC or EU, in the absence of a finding of Syrian
non-cooperation by UNIIIC and the UNSCR 1636 sanctions
committee. MFA officials concluded that the GoF's first
preference remains to pursue Syria sanctions within the UNSC,
with EU sanctions remaining a secondary option which could be
more difficult to achieve than UN sanctions. Thibault
stressed GoF aversion to bilateral sanctions in general, and
described the scope for such sanctions as limited to travel
bans. On a more positive note, Thibault affirmed that the
GoF could do more to speak out on Syria human rights; the GoF
has invited former prisoner/MP Riad Seif to France for
medical treatment, though so far, he declined the offer.
Thibault also blamed the UK for delays in issuing a visa to
Khaddam, and defended GOF entreaties to Khaddam to stop
commenting to the press from France. End summary.


2. (C) MFA A/S-equivalent for North Africa/Middle East
Jean-Francois Thibault offered a preliminary reaction to the
U.S. white paper on Syria/Lebanon (ref A) during a February
28 meeting with Pol M/C. (Note: We provided Thibault a
courtesy copy of the paper February 23, after delivering the
paper and U/S Burns cover letter to MFA Political Director de
Laboulaye.) Thibault was joined by MFA DAS-equivalent for
IO/UN Political Affairs Jean-Hugues Simon-Michel and MFA
DAS-equivalent for Egypt/Levant Herve Besancenot. Thibault's
comments on the issue of EIB loans to Syria is reported ref B.

AGREEMENT ON SEEKING LAHOUD RESIGNATION BY PEACEFUL MEANS
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Reviewing our paper in chronological order, Thibault
stressed U.S.-French agreement on the need to replace
President Lahoud by peaceful, constitutional means, adding
that Saudi Arabia and Egypt were on the same line. Thibault
concluded that near-term prospects for a Lahoud resignation
appeared slim for several reasons: Michel Aoun's continued
refusal to support a Lahoud departure unless he becomes the
next president (an unacceptable outcome in the GoF view);
Patriarch Sfeir's continued reluctance to more openly
advocate a Lahoud resignation; and Lahoud's continued
alliances with Nabih Berri, Hizballah and others. Thibault
viewed Sa'ad Hariri's decision to establish a March 14
deadline for a Lahoud departure as unrealistic, and
emphasized that the March 14 movement should not seek such an
outcome by destabilizing Lebanon internally. Although
Thibault assessed that it would be difficult for the Hariri
bloc to obtain the two-thirds majority necessary to amend the
constitution, he concluded that the U.S. and France should
continue to support such an outcome behind the scenes,
including by delivering messages to Aoun on the need to be
more constructive. France, for its part, had made similar
approaches to Aoun and had privately urged Maronite Patriarch
Sfeir to be more forward-leaning on the issue.

SYRIAN ARMS TRAFFICKING: YES, BUT NEED MORE INFORMATION
-------------- --------------


4. (C) On Syrian facilitation of arms trafficking, Thibault
reaffirmed the GoF's full support for UNSCR 1559
implementation, including disarmament of militias. He
reiterated GoF concerns over Syrian trafficking of arms to
Hizballah and Palestinian camps, and commented that the UNSC
should have better exploited the last Larsen report's

conclusions on this issue. Thibault stressed the need for
Larsen to explore the issue in greater detail, especially
during his upcoming regional tour, which the GoF felt was
long overdue and should include Damascus. Thibault added
that Larsen's assertions so far on arms trafficking were
fairly general and needed greater precision; the
international community needed a clearer picture of Syrian
arms trafficking efforts, and the complicity of certain
elements of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) which remained
close to Syria.

JOINT ACTION: KHADDAM, HUMAN RIGHTS
--------------


5. (C) On possible joint actions to be employed against the
SARG immediately (ref A),Thibault agreed with the U.S. view
that efforts should focus on the regime, while sparing the
Syrian people to the greatest degree possible. That said,
Thibault defended the GoF decision to ask former VP Khaddam
to cease public statements from France, and gave no
indication France would support giving Khaddam or other
former regime figures a platform for speaking in France.
Thibault asserted that France had a "tradition" of welcoming
political exiles in France, in exchange for their respecting
a certain "reserve" in avoiding public comments which
embarrass the GoF. According to Thibault, Khaddam was being
treated no differently than other former political exiles,
including Michel Aoun. On Khaddam's possible travel to the
UK, Thibault suggested that London was still reflecting on
whether to issue the visa, and said the GoF had confirmed to
the UK that Khaddam would be able to re-enter France. (Note:
The local UK emboff responsible for Syria/Lebanon issues told
us March 1 he was unaware of any GoF message to the HMG that
Khaddam would be allowed to re-enter France, and commented
that such a development could help weigh in favor of issuing
Khaddam's UK visa. The same contact told us that when the
Khaddam UK visa request first surfaced a few weeks ago,
initial messages he received from senior French MFA officials
suggested that France might not allow Khaddam to re-enter
France. End note.)


6. (C) On the U.S. appeal for France to be more vocal in
criticizing human rights abuses in Syria (ref A),Thibault
conceded that this was one area where France could do and say
more, in an effort to increase pressure on the SARG. MFA
DAS-equivalent for Egypt/Levant Besancenot commented that the
MFA often prepared press guidance critical of Syrian human
rights abuses, but found that the local press rarely posed
questions on human rights in Syria, so the points were never
deployed. In response to poloff asking why, then, the MFA
didn't issue statements on Syria human rights abuses, as
opposed to relying on "if asked guidance," Besancenot took
the point, and said that the MFA was considering modifying
its approach. He added that, after Riad Seif's recent
detention and release by the SARG (ref D),the French embassy
in Damascus had conveyed an invitation to Seif to come to
France for medical treatment. According to Besancenot, Seif
declined the offer, citing the need to remain in country and
defend his cause, though the GoF offer remained an "open
invitation." (Comment: Ref D reported Seif's stated interest
in traveling to France for medical treatment, but did not
mention the GoF offer. End comment.)


7. (C) Thibault agreed on the need to keep Arab governments
on board in efforts to pressure Syria to comply with its
international obligations. He conceded that our principal
Arab partners, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, remained reticent on
moving forward, and affirmed that France faced similar
difficulties as the U.S. in keeping them on message. That
said, Thibault concluded that Egypt and Saudi Arabia remained
essential partners in our efforts to pressure Syria and that
no progress would be possible without them.

JOINT ACTION: CAUTIONS ON SANCTIONS
--------------


8. (C) Commenting on possible EU financial sanctions and
travel bans on Syrian officials, Thibault stressed three
points from the outset: 1) the GoF did not oppose Syria
sanctions in principle; 2) sanctions should be decided upon
in a legitimate framework, either the UN or EU (and not
bilaterally); and 3) for sanctions to be effective, they
should target specific individuals and the regime itself, and
not the Syrian public. In the case of the Hariri
assassination investigation, the international community
already had an agreed framework through which sanctions could

be considered, specifically the UNSCR 1636 sanctions
committee. MFA IO/UN DAS-equivalent Simon-Michel commented
that with the UN mechanism already identified, it would not
be credible to seek EU sanctions against Syria based on the
Hariri investigation, in the absence of a UNIIIC
non-compliance finding and a 1636 committee decision. The
alternative, he continued, would be to seek EU sanctions
based on Syrian non-compliance with UNSCR 1559, but, in his
judgment, we would need a much stronger case for Syrian
non-compliance in order for such EU sanctions to be accepted
by the EU's 25 members. Simon-Michel concluded that it could
be as difficult to secure EU sanctions at 25 as obtaining
UNSC approval of Syria sanctions at 15. Therefore, in the
GoF point of view, UNSC sanctions were preferable to EU
sanctions, in that the EU would automatically be obligated to
comply with UN sanctions, without having to secure a new EU
decision at 25.


9. (C) Thibault questioned further the urgency of pursuing EU
sanctions at this juncture, and sought to spin the current
situation in a positive light. Thibault described the recent
visit of UN Legal Counsel Nicolas Michel to Beirut as a
success, and commended UN Secretariat efforts to implement
aspects of UNSCR 1644 pertaining to the international
tribunal and assistance to the GOL on other assassination
investigations. The 1644 angle, in Thibault's view, opened
up a new line of pressure on Damascus. He conceded that
UNIIIC Chief Brammertz had a different approach than Detlev
Mehlis, but expressed confidence in Brammertz as an
experienced judge seeking to build a case which will hold up
in court. In Thibault's view, Brammertz was continuing
UNIIIC's work, though in a discreet fashion, so there
remained the possibility that UNIIIC could find an opening in
the investigation soon. He concluded by questioning again
whether sanctions were appropriate now, and stressed the GoF
view that we lack a legal basis now to pursue sanctions
within the EU or UN.


10. (C) Thibault and Simon-Michel downplayed prospects for
bilateral French sanctions on Syria, noting traditional GoF
aversion to such measures. According to Simon-Michel, the
GoF had ceded most competencies for sanctions to the EU, with
the exception of visa issuance/travel bans. Simon-Michel
conceded that there was a possibility for bilateral decisions
on freezing assets, but he added that such a GoF move would
require a domestic judicial basis as well as adoption of
legislation, which would entail additional hurdles in
convincing members of the French national assembly.

11. (C) Thibault and Simon-Michel were similarly negative on
prospects for investment and financial transactions with
Syria in a later phase. Simon-Michel emphasized that such
moves, independent of a new UNSCR, would require EU approval
at 25, for which a judicial basis was currently lacking.
They withheld substantive comment on a possible UNSCR calling
for an arms embargo on Syria, again questioning on what
substantive basis (i.e. the April Larsen report?) such a
draft text would be based and what the dynamics would be
within the Security Council.


12. (C) Thibault concluded discussion by stressing the need
to continue to focus on sanctions via the UNSC, rather than
the EU or bilateral options. Pol M/C countered that such an
approach left us entirely dependent on the efforts of UNIIIC
Chief Brammertz, in light of continued SARG defiance of its
international obligations, non-cooperation with UNIIIC,
repression of its people, and destabilization of Lebanon.
Thibault admitted that perhaps the GoF was "overly
legalistic" in its approach, but reiterated that the GoF
could not move forward on UN or EU sanctions without a legal
basis to do so.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

Stapleton