PRESIDENCY MIDDLE EAST ADVISOR ON SYRIA/LEBANON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000128

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/4/2016
TAGS: PREL SY LE EG SA FR
SUBJECT: PRESIDENCY MIDDLE EAST ADVISOR ON SYRIA/LEBANON
STRATEGY, UPCOMING GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE VISIT TO WASHINGTON

REF: A. PARIS 105


B. PARIS 40

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Presidential Middle East/Americas advisor
Dominique Boche previewed the upcoming visit of Presidential
Diplomatic Advisor Gourdault-Montagne to Washington,
stressing the need to reassess U.S.-GoF efforts to pressure
Damascus, without suggesting that such pressure be eased.
Boche described U.S.-GoF efforts on Syria/Lebanon as
hamstrung by the need to sustain international consensus, in
the face of growing Lebanese sentiment that Syria can
destabilize Lebanon with impunity. Boche questioned the
depth of international support for U.S-French efforts to
pressure Syria, and expressed concern that, barring sudden
breakthroughs by UNIIIC, resorting to further UN action would
expose our limitations. Boche expressed support for U.S.
thinking on UNIFIL renewal, and suggested that France will
press the GoL to adopt a supportive position. Boche voiced
caution on recent statements by former Syrian VP Khaddam,
which, while adding momentum to UNIIIC efforts, had raised
unfounded suspicions of French backing. Boche dismissed
Khaddam as a potential alternative to Bashar al-Asad and
described the former Syrian VP as directly responsible for
French losses in Lebanon. Boche also expressed concern that
other Arab governments, namely Saudi Arabia, view Khaddam as
a Sunni alternative to Bashar, a point of vivid speculation
among local Lebanese journalists. Boche voiced caution on
moving forward to seek replacement of Lebanese President
Lahoud, concluding that Lahoud's likely demand for immunity
in exchange for stepping down remained a non-starter for the
GoF. Boche echoed U.S. concerns on a possible GOL compromise
to bring Hizballah back into the cabinet by offering it
exemption from UNSCR 1559, and concluded that the GOL should
remain firm and negotiate from a position of strength, given
Hizballah's strong desire to stay in the government. End
summary.


NEED TO REASSESS POLICIES
--------------


2. (C) During a January 6 meeting with Pol M/C and poloff,
Presidential Middle East/Americas Advisor Dominique Boche
stressed that the January 13 Washington visit by Diplomatic
Advisor Gourdault-Montagne would be an opportunity to
reassess U.S.-GoF efforts to pressure Syria, despite renewed
momentum generated by former VP Khaddam's anti-SARG public
statements. Boche clarified that he was not suggesting that
the U.S. and France ease pressure on Damascus, but stressed
the needed to look realistically at the difficult situation
which we were in. In Boche's view, U.S.-French efforts to
pressure Syria faced a difficult dilemma: our efforts to
preserve unanimity had resulted in UNSCR's which were weak
(as seen in UNSCR 1644) and viewed as victories by the SARG,
while stronger measures would lose Arab support and break
international consensus, therefore depriving our actions of
legitimacy. The end result, in Boche's view, was increasing
sentiment in Lebanon that the SARG was acting with impunity,
and could assassinate opponents and use proxies in Lebanon to
launch rocket attacks against Israel and bring the cabinet to
a standstill, while the international community "lacked
resolve" to stop it.


3. (C) Boche added that the international community did not
support the U.S. and France completely on Syria/Lebanon,
which limited our maneuvering room and contributed to SARG
sentiment of impunity. In Boche's view, Egyptian President
Mubarak, while reaffirming a firm approach during his January
4 meeting with Chirac, remains focused on "saving the head"
of Bashar al-Asad. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand,
advocated a tougher approach more in line with the GoF view.
Asked about wavering German support for UNIIIC Chief Mehlis,
Boche (protect) opined that the Merkel government's lack of
enthusiasm for UNIIIC had contributed to Mehlis' departure.
Boche added that the Merkel government had been marked by its
first foreign policy crisis, the kidnapping of a German
archeologist in Iraq, and wondered openly whether her release
was linked to Berlin's near-simultaneous liberation of a
Hizballah terrorist.


FURTHER UN ACTION: PRST, UNIFIL
--------------


4. (C) Boche cautioned that unless UNIIIC produced
"spectacular" results soon, further UNSC action against Syria
would expose the limitations of our approach and further
boost Syrian confidence. He cited as an example a possible
PRST endorsing the latest Larsen report, which Boche
characterized as a "mediocre" response at best. On renewal
of UNIFIL later this month, Boche described the Gof as
supportive of U.S. proposals to stress UNIFIL's interim
nature, and call for the GOL to fully deploy in the south.
The GoF would encourage the GOL to assist the debate on
UNIFIL by taking concrete measures to increase its presence
in the South, for which there had been little progress so
far, in the GoF view.


CAUTION ON KHADDAM
--------------


5. (C) Revisiting recent public statements by former Khaddam,
Boche described the GoF as taken aback by Khaddam's
self-assurance and the fact that he had raised the level of
his invective to the point of open revolt against the SARG.
Boche noted bullish comments by Khaddam to "Al Hayat" and
other Arab dailies, to the effect that the Syrian regime
would fall in a few weeks. Boche concluded that although
Khaddam's statements were a major boost to UNIIIC, they had
put the GoF in a difficult position, as many had wrongly
concluded that he was being manipulated by France. (GOF
officials continue to deny any contact with Khaddam, and the
MFA told us they are investigating his visa status.) Boche
assessed that Khaddam is not an alternative to Bashar, as he
was totally associated with the Hafez al-Asad regime and was
directly responsible for all that had befallen the U.S. and
France in Lebanon, including assassination of French
nationals.


6. (C) Boche also expressed concern that Khaddam's Sunni
status could prompt further solidarity among Alawites, or
result in his being embraced by Arab governments looking for
a Sunni to break the "Shi'a crescent" from Iran through
southern Lebanon. Boche cited a Saudi-Sa'ad Hariri
connection to Khaddam as evidence of the latter trend. He
cited Khaddam's close ties to the late Rafik Hariri, who had
helped Khaddam's sons in business in Saudi Arabia and helped
the former Syrian VP build his fortune. (Note: Other Lebanese
media contacts have offered more forward-leaning speculation
that Khaddam is being backed by the Saudi government, at the
instigation of Sa'ad Hariri. One of our best-informed
Lebanese journalist contacts told us he viewed it as
inconceivable that the original December 30 Khaddam interview
was not approved at the highest levels of the Saudi
government, given that "Al Arabiya" is essentially an
official Saudi channel. The same journalist told us that
three weeks prior to the "Al Arabiya" interview, Khaddam
sought an interview with "Al Hayat" to make similar
statements, but was turned down, due to trepidation on the
part of the paper's Saudi owner. End note.)

AND CAUTION ON LAHOUD
--------------


7. (C) Boche voiced caution when asked about prospects for
supporting a Lebanese-driven process to replace President
Lahoud. While conceding that the issue had come to the
forefront again in Lebanon, Boche said the GoF understood
that Lahoud would not step down without a promise of immunity
-- a non-starter for the GoF, as it would be contrary to the
spirit of the UNIIIC investigation to give a potentially
guilty party immunity. Boche noted that Lahoud is not in the
clear, and that Khaddam's statements had raised scrutiny on
Lahoud's involvement in the Hariri assassination. Boche
concluded that the U.S. and France should discuss the issue
further during the Gourdault-Montagne visit.

GOL CABINET STANDOFF, POSSIBLE 1559 COMPROMISE WITH HIZBALLAH
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Boche echoed U.S. concerns on a possible Sa'ad
Hariri-brokered compromise with Shi'a parties allowing for
Hizballah to remain exempt from UNSCR 1559. Boche described
Sa'ad as "too sensitive" to Hizballah's influence, and not
sufficiently cognizant of the need to ally with Christians.
Boche opined that Sa'ad had inherited from his late father
the tendency to look excessively to Hizballah for support.
At the same time, Boche reiterated that the GOL had not
accepted Hizballah's terms, and expressed hope that progress
would be made during Sa'ad's meetings with PM Siniora and
other GOL officials on the margins of the Hajj in Saudi
Arabia. The GoF would continue to urge the GOL to "keep the
bar high" on letting Hizballah back into the government.
Since Hizballah had not walked away completely, it was clear
that it wanted to keep its ministers in the government, and
the ruling majority had the ability to stay firm on the
terms. That said, Boche added that the GoF would discourage
a rupture between the majority and Hizballah/Amal. In
Boche's view, the GOL would lose legitimacy without a Shi'a
component. The GoF would continue to advocate resolution of
the cabinet standoff, based on a firm negotiating position by
the majority coalition.

COMMENT
--------------


9. (C) Despite the positive momentum generated by the Khaddam
remarks, our GoF contacts are not in an overly optimistic or
triumphalist mood on efforts to sustain pressure on Damascus.
We consider Boche a straight-shooter who offers Gof
positions without sugar-coating, and view his emphasis on the
need for U.S.-GoF continued dialogue as constructive, despite
the pessimism contained in many of his conclusions. End
comment.


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

Hofmann