GOF REAFFIRMS QUARTET CONDITIONS, NO-CONTACT WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001130

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/20/2016
TAGS: PREL KPAL IS PTER EUN FR
SUBJECT: GOF REAFFIRMS QUARTET CONDITIONS, NO-CONTACT WITH
HAMAS, BUT NO DECISIONS YET ON ASSISTANCE TO HAMAS-LED PA

REF: A. STATE 27174


B. PARIS 945

C. PARIS 853

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: MFA and Elysee contacts continue to reiterate
GoF attachment to the Quartet conditions and that the GoF has
no intention of seeking contacts with Hamas. At the same
time, GOF contacts remain reluctant to prejudge the
consequences of Hamas refusal to meet Quartet conditions on
EU assistance, and continue to caution against threats to cut
off aid to the PA prior to formation of a new Palestinian
government. Rather than accept that Hamas rejection of the
Quartet conditions should result in withdrawal of
international support, GoF contacts are emphasizing the need
to find creative ways to continue EU assistance, including
possibly making a distinction between PA President Abbas and
a Hamas led-government. GoF contacts also stress that no
decisions on future assistance have been taken (consultations
with FS Straw on the issue will take place in Paris February
27-28) and that the international community should not let
the Palestinian territories slip into chaos. End summary.


2. (C) We discussed ref A points discouraging contacts with
Hamas with MFA Cabinet Advisor for the Middle East Christophe
Guilhou and MFA DAS-equivalent for Egypt/Levant affairs Herve
Besancenot. Presidential Technical Advisor for Middle
East/Americas Dominique Boche, during a February 21 meeting
with Staffdel Talwar, also reviewed GoF policy on Hamas, in
addition to other topics. (Septel reports on Staffdel
Talwar's discussions with Boche and other GoF officials on
Iran, Iraq, Middle East reform, and NATO/Darfur.)


3. (C) Responding to reftel points February 21, Guilhou
reaffirmed that the GoF had no intention of following
Russia's example of initiating contact with Hamas. He
conceded that the MFA spokesperson had mishandled the initial
GoF reaction to the Russian Hamas initiative on February 10
by overemphasizing the positive (ref b); this misstep,
coupled with false press reports of GoF meetings with Hamas
representatives in the Arabian Gulf had fueled erroneous
speculation that France was seeking, or had already
initiated, contact with Hamas. Guilhou reiterated that the
conditions for GoF contact and cooperation with the new PA
government remained those of the Quartet: 1) renunciation of
violence, 2) recognition of Israel, and 3) recognition of
past accords with Israel. Guilhou reported that FM
Douste-Blazy had emphasized these points in a meeting with
visiting members of the American Jewish Committee February
20, while PM Villepin had emphasized a similar message in a
speech to the annual dinner of France's leading Jewish
organizations that same evening. Guilhou clarified that the
EU terrorism designation of Hamas remained an additional bar
to GoF contact with Hamas, independent of the Quartet
conditions.


4. (C) At the same time, Guilhou cautioned against threats to
cut off aid to the PA prior to formation of the new
government, which he warned could lead the Palestinian people
to believe they were being punished for exercising their
democratic choice, and further rally Palestinian public
support for Hamas. He warned that attempts to "strangle" the
PA by cutting off all international support could backfire,
and push the Palestinian territories into chaos. Poloff
responded by dismissing allegations that the U.S. and Israel
were seeking to destabilize the new PA government or punish
the Palestinian people. The requirements which we and the
GoF were asking of Hamas were applicable to any Palestinian
government, and it was up to Hamas, as the majority party in
the PLC, to bear responsibility for the decisions it makes.
Guilhou concluded that the EU was unlikely to reach a common
position on future assistance during next week's GAERC, and
that the issue would be a major topic of discussion during FS
Straw's February 27-28 visit to Paris.


5. (C) In a separate discussion with poloff, MFA
DAS-equivalent for Egypt/Levant affairs Herve Besancenot
reiterated the GoF's firm attachment to the Quartet
conditions, noting that France had been the first to
articulate the three conditions which were later reflected in
the EU and Quartet statements. At the same time, Besancenot
warned against precipitous decisions or warnings of an aid
cutoff to the PA prior to formation of the new Palestinian
government. Instead, Besancenot advocated a "wait and see"
approach in the weeks leading to formation of the new
government, giving Hamas time to "gain maturity" and fulfill
the international community's conditions without losing face.
Besancenot conceded that while the chances that Hamas would
meet the Quartet conditions were slim, it was still "worth a

PARIS 00001130 002 OF 002


try."


6. (C) Besancenot added that the threat of financial
repercussions should be wielded carefully, and not in a way
that gave Palestinians the impression they were being
punished for the election results, or that resulted in unpaid
security forces taking to the streets. Besancenot suggested
finding creative ways to continue EU assistance in the event
of a Hamas-dominated government which refused the Quartet
conditions; he cited, as a possible idea under consideration,
making a distinction between the PA led by Abbas and a
Hamas-led Palestinian government, in a way that would allow
the EU to continue to help Abbas implement his programs.
Another option could be payment of PA debts owed to Israeli
creditors, for example PA debts to Israeli companies for
electricity provision in Gaza. Poloff cautioned Besancenot
that the Quartet statement articulated clear expectations of
the new Palestinian government without exceptions, and
reiterated the importance of international unity on the
consequences Hamas must face if it refused to abandon
terrorism and accept the two-state framework. Besancenot
concluded that the GoF was trying to advance ideas within the
EU, but the decisionmaking process remained difficult at 25.
He cited the upcoming FS Straw visit as a key opportunity to
develop a common French-UK position on assistance.


7. (C) In a separate discussion with Staffdel Talwar
(septel),Elysee advisor Boche stressed that France had no
part in the Russian initiative on Hamas; the GoF had accepted
Russian dialogue with Hamas only to the extent to which it
would push Hamas towards acceptance of Quartet conditions.
He added that the GoF was not seeking dialogue with Hamas and
would not copy the Russians. While the GoF had supported
Hamas' participation in the Palestinian elections to give
Palestinians a true choice, Boche asserted that Hamas would
have to "change its nature totally" if it wanted to be an
interlocutor for the international community. That said,
Boche stressed that the Hamas election victory presented two
dilemmas: how the international community would deal with the
new PA, and the impact on international assistance. On
contacts, Boche asserted that that Hamas majority represented
one part of the PA; President Abbas remained the PA's elected
President, with whom the GoF would maintain full contact, and
he retained key constitutional powers on defense and foreign
policy. Without offering further explanation, Boche added
that the PLO also had a competency for Palestinian issues
beyond that of the PA. Boche asserted that any assistance to
the Palestinian government should be in accordance with the
behavior of that government. He refrained from pronouncing
further on possible assistance cut-offs, noting that we
should wait until formation of the new PA government.


8. (C) Comment: While the GoF appears on board on refraining
from contact with Hamas, French officials' disquiet on the
negative impact of an assistance cut-off to the PA and their
"wait and see approach" to formation of the PA government
suggests a troubling inclination towards softening the impact
of the likely Hamas rejection of the Quartet conditions. We
will continue to press the GoF to adhere to the Quartet
conditions and remain united in our demands of the new
government, stressing that the burden of compliance and
responsibility for the consequences rests with Hamas. The
expected visits to Paris next week by FS Straw and Israeli FM
Livni should also help to keep the French on message. End
comment.


9. (U) This message was cleared by Staffdel Talwar.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

Hofmann