MFA, PRESIDENCY ADDRESS UPCOMING MORALES VISIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000104

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2016
TAGS: PGOV FR BO CO
SUBJECT: MFA, PRESIDENCY ADDRESS UPCOMING MORALES VISIT

REF: A. STATE 1353

B. BOGOTA 78

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In a January 5 discussion of ref A demarche,
an MFA official indicated that President Chirac would urge
Bolivian president-elect Morales January 7 to govern
responsibly and inclusively. Chirac will counsel prudence in
moving forward with stated plans to nationalize the natural
gas industry to assure transparency and a reliable legal
framework under which to operate. Chirac would also stress
the significance of dedicating coca production to cultural,
non-cocaine related use. Finally, Chirac would impress upon
Morales the need to develop a good working relationship with
the U.S. In return, the MFA emphasized the importance of
international assistance to Bolivia to provide Morales with
other alternatives than Castro and Chavez. A presidential
diplomatic adviser told us separately that the GoF would seek
to sensitize Morales on four key points: the need to respect
democracy and the unity of the Bolivian people; the need to
assure legal certainty for foreign investment; the need to
continue the fight against narco-trafficking even if there is
a depenalization of coca growing; and the need to preserve
dialogue with the U.S. Separately, the MFA official
confirmed that Foreign Minister Douste-Blazy would travel,
primarily for domestic political reasons, to Colombia between
January 23 and February 23, the anniversary date of the
kidnapping of FARC hostage and dual Franco-Colombian citizen
Ingrid Betancourt. End Summary.


2. (U) Deputy PolCouns and PolOff met January 5 with MFA
DAS-equivalent for Latin America Michel Pinard to discuss ref
A demarche. PolMinCouns and PolOff also addressed the issue
in a separate meeting January 6 with Presidential diplomatic
advisor for the Americas Dominique Boche (discussion of
Middle East subjects septel).

Important Precedent, Need for Unity
--------------

3. (C) In a January 6 meeting with Deputy Political
Counselor and PolOff, DAS-equivalent for Latin America
Michel Pinard expressed French surprise at Morales' first
round victory, adding that the unprecedented win in an
election seen as free and fair made Morales the uncontestable
president of Bolivia. His election as the first indigenous
leader of Bolivia also marked an important precedent in the
country's history, but one that brought with it an
additional, special burden. According to Pinard, Chirac
would impress on Morales the importance of being a
responsible leader, so as not to discredit indigenous
populations throughout Central and South America, and to
respect a diversity of viewpoints among fellow Bolivians.
Additionally, given the importance of maintaining Bolivia's
territorial integrity, Chirac would encourage Morales to
pursue a dialogue with all regions of the country in the
interest of national unity. Pinard stated that the
indigenous culture from which Morales came, while somewhat
autocratic in nature (in the sense of tribal chiefs),should
not be viewed as a resurrection of "Bolshevism."

Nationalization of Gas Industry
--------------

4. (C) Morales would need substantial capital, Pinard
underlined, in order to move ahead with his ambitious (and in
many regards, he continued, amply justified) social and
economic reforms. Many of the resources would naturally come
from the country's natural gas industry, Pinard said, but
Bolivia did not have the capacity to do this alone and would
still need international investors. He added that Morales'
stated plans to nationalize the gas industry was viewed with
less concern in France than in the U.S., given France's
significant experience with state-owned industries. Chirac
would nonetheless warn Morales to ensure that any such
nationalization allow for foreign investment in an
environment of transparent judicial regulation and long-term
stability. France's Total energy company, which Pinard
estimated had a 200 million euro investment in Bolivia, was
ready to discuss terms with Morales and felt confidant that a
reasonable agreement could be reached.

Coca Production
--------------

5. (C) When questioned specifically, Pinard assured us that
Chirac would also raise coca and cocaine production with
Morales. That said, the GoF drew a distinction between a
"cocalero" and a cartel head, and recognized that the coca
leaf -- but not cocaine -- played an important role in
indigenous culture. The question would be one of quantity
-- small plots for use in tea or for chewing as opposed to
large-scale cultivation for cocaine production -- and Morales
would be advised to clarify quickly his policy on this point.
Pinard readily acknowledged that France and the U.S. had a
common interest too in interdicting cocaine trafficking into
America and Europe.

Relationship with U.S. and Need for Assistance
-------------- -

6. (C) An important issue that Chirac would raise with
Morales, Pinard indicated, would be the need to develop a
cordial, working relationship with the U.S. Chirac would
stress that the rhetoric and attitude toward the U.S. of
Morales the President would have to differ from that of
Morales the Candidate, Pinard said, noting that the realities
of office would likely argue for more moderation and citing
alleged recent statements by Morales' aides as evidence.
Additionally, Pinard argued, it was in the best interest of
the U.S. and Europe that Morales have both good external
relations and economic assistance so that his options would
not be limited to Venezuelan money and Cuban doctors.
Unfortunately, Pinard noted, France had little aid to offer
Bolivia, although he did say that the GoF hoped to provide
assistance in establishing better administration of the
Bolivian government.

Presidency
--------------

7. (C) In a discussing reftel points with PolMinCouns and
PolOff, Presidential diplomatic advisor for the Americas
Dominique Boche stressed that the GoF would seek to sensitize
Morales on four key points: the need to respect democracy and
the unity of the Bolivian people; the need to assure legal
certainty for foreign investment; the need to continue the
fight against narco-trafficking even if there is a
depenalization of coca growing; and
the need to preserve dialogue with the U.S. Boche opined
that the U.S. needed to be realistic and shouldn't expect
Morales to have a sudden change of heart in response to GoF
appeals. All new leaders had the tendency to come into power
thinking that the world began with them, Boche continued, and
it took time to discover reality. In Morales' case, it would
probably take six months before he had a more realistic sense
of Bolivia's relative weight in Latin America, and the
limitations he faces as a leader. In the interim, radical
groups would continue to pressure him to take an extreme
line, and the U.S. and Europe have to try and channel him in
other directions; after six months, he should be much easier
to deal with. On nationalization of gas production, Total is
ready to hold discussions with him, but will insist that
contracts be honored. Morales statements that
nationalization didn't mean confiscation of property are
reassuring; at the same time, there are other French
investments in question, including Suez as the principle
shareholder in the privatized La Paz El Alto water utility.
Ultimately, Boche underlined, Morales must be clear that
contractual obligations will be respected, or there will be
no more European investment in Bolivia.

Colombia Visit
--------------

8. (C) Deputy Political Counselor also raised with Pinard
the issue of MFA statements indicating that FM Philippe
Douste-Blazy would travel to Colombia "in the coming weeks,"
presumably to pressure FARC leaders to reverse their
rejection of the French-Swiss-Spanish humanitarian accord
initiative. Pinard lamented the public announcement by Uribe
of the GoC's acceptance of the proposal and judged the
phrasing of the FARC's refusal to be sufficiently vague to be
open to many interpretations, including further negotiations.
Contrary to doubts expressed by the French ambassador in
Bogota (ref B),Pinard believed that Douste-Blazy would
indeed travel sometime between January 23 and February 23.
The Ingrid Betancourt affair was too powerful an internal
political issue, Pinard noted, not to put forth additional
efforts to bring about her release, particularly as the
fourth anniversary of her kidnapping (Feb. 23) approached.

Comment
--------------

9. (C) The French call for moderation and a positive
relationship with the U.S. is to be welcomed. Implicit in
Pinard's emphasis on the need for assistance, however, was
the thought that the U.S. would need to overlook Morales'
rhetoric and be prepared to work with him, if only to keep
him out of the arms of Castro and Chavez. Less helpfully,
the GoF seems resigned to accepting some level of coca
cultivation, although such a policy begs the question of how
the GoF will distinguish between coca intended for cultural
use and that destined for cocaine production. End Comment.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

Hofmann