Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARAMARIBO311
2006-05-26 15:38:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Paramaribo
Cable title:  

SURINAMESE FLOODS TWO WEEKS ON: PAST CRISIS PHASE

Tags:  SENV PGOV PREL EAID ECON NS 
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VZCZCXRO9539
RR RUEHGR
DE RUEHPO #0311/01 1461538
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 261538Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8361
INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE
RUEHAO/AMCONSUL CURACAO 1036
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 1549
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 1434
RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 0443
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PARAMARIBO 000311 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA/CAR - LLUFTIG
DEPT FOR WHA/PD - APRUITT, GADAMS, EDETTER
DEPT FOR PA/PRS
USAID FOR DCHA/OFDA
SAN JOSE FOR USAID/OFDA TIM CALLAGHAN
PLEASE PASS PEACE CORPS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SENV PGOV PREL EAID ECON NS
SUBJECT: SURINAMESE FLOODS TWO WEEKS ON: PAST CRISIS PHASE

REFS: (A) PARAMARIBO 266; (B) PARAMARIBO 269; (C) PARAMARIBO

270

PARAMARIBO 00000311 001.2 OF 002


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PARAMARIBO 000311

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA/CAR - LLUFTIG
DEPT FOR WHA/PD - APRUITT, GADAMS, EDETTER
DEPT FOR PA/PRS
USAID FOR DCHA/OFDA
SAN JOSE FOR USAID/OFDA TIM CALLAGHAN
PLEASE PASS PEACE CORPS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SENV PGOV PREL EAID ECON NS
SUBJECT: SURINAMESE FLOODS TWO WEEKS ON: PAST CRISIS PHASE

REFS: (A) PARAMARIBO 266; (B) PARAMARIBO 269; (C) PARAMARIBO

270

PARAMARIBO 00000311 001.2 OF 002



1. Summary: While the ongoing rainy season may yet bring
new challenges, for now the flooding disaster in Suriname's
interior is under control. A quick and generous
international official and private sector response has been
sufficient to meet identified immediate needs. The picture
remains less clear about medium term support that will be
required to accommodate damage to the agricultural sector
and health issues related to water sanitation and increased
incidence of malaria; some eco-tourism sites were also badly
hit. The new National Disaster Response Center (NCCR),
stood up with U.S. training and material assistance since
2002 but untested in a country that rarely encounters
disasters, won widespread praise from the international
donor community for its cool and efficient handling of the
crisis. End summary.


2. Suriname's May 3-17 flooding had varying, but non-life
threatening, impact on over 20,000 of the 37,000 residents
in affected areas of the interior. Water levels in the
Upper Suriname River area have receded, and there was only
minor flooding in the southern Kwamalasamutu area, although
with some crop damage. High water levels continue to affect
residents in the eastern region along the Marowijne and
Tapanahony Rivers. Conditions are generally stabilizing,
and expected to continue to improve - assuming no more
severe rains through the remainder of the rainy season. The
root cause of the flooding was heavy rainfall in upper
catchment areas in Brazil. The water rose slowly, however,
allowing many residents and medical clinics to rescue
belongings. While the rivers rise every year in Suriname in
June and July, the increase was much higher this year, and
the earlier onset meant crops had generally not yet matured
enough to withstand the high water.


3. Given the remote locations of affected populations,
relief provision was a complicated logistic exercise.
Initially, delivery was via inadequate and deteriorating
road conditions linked to riverine transport; this was
eventually supplemented by the loan of four Dutch and one
Brazilian helicopters. While there are still isolated
pockets not completely served, emergency food, water, and
shelter needs are generally being met using Surinamese
governmental and non-governmental capabilities with support
from the international community. Some complaints for
unaddressed needs from communities in the interior, with the
exception of shelter, are more chronic than flood-related.
The Red Cross, pending correction on further assessment,
intends to deliver temporary shelter supplies for 2,500
families, generally to sustain them during home clean up and
repair. Comparatively few families are homeless in the
sense of requiring relocation to temporary shelter.


4. Although the NCCR had never before handled a complex
emergency situation, it drew very high marks under the
leadership of National Army Colonel Slijngaard for
accurately conveying needs to the international community
and coordinating relief. On her departure, the leader of
the UN disaster response team held up the NCCR's management
as a prime example of how to shape cooperation among the
army, police, NGOs, the Red Cross, and international
organizations into a quick response to a crisis situation.
Our own Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) experts
echoed these views based on their observations of the NCCR
in action. (Note: The NCCR's skills stem in part from U.S.
security assistance, which provided first responder and
warehouse management training for disaster logistics
operations in 2004 and 2005. End note.)


5. Complicated logistics were in fact the greater
constraint than resources. The Netherlands led the
assistance effort, with a EURO 1 million cash donation from
the Government of the Netherlands to UNDP, supplemented by
the provision of helicopters and their fuel, as well as a
plane-load of relief supplies and a team of disaster
experts. A telethon in the Netherlands raised USD 500,000,
and sister city relationships with Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and
the Hague resulted in a further USD 833,000 contribution.

PARAMARIBO 00000311 002.2 OF 002


The EU's disaster agency donated over USD 400,000 toward
malaria control. It appears that OFDA's USD 250,000 total
contribution (to Red Cross emergency relief and to a Pan
American Health Organization water sanitation project) was
the next biggest official financial donation; IDB
contributed USD 200,000. Brazil gave a planeload of relief
supplies in addition to the use of one helicopter for two
weeks. Venezuela is reportedly providing 20,000 barrels of
fuel. In all, over USD 2 million for humanitarian
assistance was funneled through international organizations
including UNDP, PAHO, the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC),UNICEF, and the World Food Program (WFP).


6. UNDP figures from May 24 show a financing gap of over
USD 300,000 in those humanitarian relief needs, but the
amount is more than dwarfed by the nearly USD 3 million in
domestic and international private and official donations.
That figure does not/not include contributions from
parastatal and international corporations operating in
Suriname. It is not apparent how post-emergency funding
coordination for yet-to-be-finalized medium-term needs will
be handled, although there have been discussions about the
GOS creating a multi-ministerial successor entity to the
NCCR to accomplish this task. To date, the NCCR's Colonel
Slijngaard has left financial controls to a PAHO financial
specialist; it is to be hoped that the GOS will ensure
similarly transparent accountability for financing the tasks
ahead.


7. On the health front, so far there have been a few
reports of areas experiencing incidences of diarrhea, as
safe water practices were disrupted by flood damage. PAHO
has rigorous plans for water safety (where our OFDA
assistance was concentrated) and malaria control programs in
the short term. The fact that the system of health clinics
serving the interior emerged largely unscathed is a huge
benefit for disease surveillance. We understand that a
large-scale spraying campaign with support from the French
will soon commence to attenuate the risk of malaria.
Initial concerns that mercury from gold mining would spread
with flooding to contaminate water supplies have not been
borne out.


8. Comment: Barring renewed flooding due to heavy rains,
attention can now gradually turn to a broader view of
requirements for recovery. These will depend heavily on the
results of assessments measuring the extent of crop losses,
home and generator repairs. While handling of a natural
disaster provides ample fodder for political posturing,
outside observers at least agree that to date the NCCR was a
credible and effective steward of relief efforts. Longer-
term, transparent success in addressing the needs of
Suriname's often-neglected interior populations will provide
ample ground for renewed evaluation - by domestic political
foes and the international community alike.

BARNES