AVIAN INFLUENZA: POST CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PARAMARIBO 000023

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR S/ES-O/CMS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AMGT ASEC CASC AMED KFLO AMER NS
SUBJECT: AVIAN INFLUENZA: POST CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND
TRIPWIRES

REFS: (A) 05 STATE 219189; (B) 05 PARAMARIBO 764

PARAMARIBO 00000023 001.2 OF 002



1. (SBU) Further to the readiness assessment of Government of
Suriname (GOS) capabilities conveyed ref (b),post notes
that the GOS avian flu working group, consisting of
government entities and the Pan American Health Organization
(PAHO),had not as of January 9 yet completed its promised
avian flu epidemic response strategy. It has, however,
begun a public awareness campaign, with statements by the
Health Minister and information pages in newspapers. We
remain in close contact with lead action offices at the
Ministries of Health and Agriculture as well as with PAHO on
Suriname's state of readiness, which so far has focused
mainly on testing domestic poultry and export birds. The
established exotic bird export market here has heightened
GOS attention to the potential impact of the avian flu for
domestic stakeholders.


2. (SBU) Health services and the hospital system would likely be
quickly overwhelmed by a human AI outbreak, thus post's
strategies for in-country case management will be based in
home care and quarantine. Another complicating factor for
post planning is that there are no/no direct commercial
travel routes from Suriname to the United States, and
established service via neighboring countries can be tenuous
even in normal times. Assessing the wisdom of drawdown,
should the situation in the United States even make such
action wise, would also depend on the status of outbreaks in
Trinidad, Curacao, and Guyana; we have exchanged contact
information for avian flu working groups at these
neighboring posts. There are also commercial connections,
albeit lengthy, via Amsterdam, through neighboring French
Guyana to Paris, and via Belem, Brazil, making our
definition of "neighboring" links quite diverse.
Competition for commercial seats would quickly be quite
keen.


3. (SBU) This same geographic isolation and dependency on
regional transport routes also creates uncertainties for
estimating the amount of time that post can shelter in
place, because even in ordinary times there can be supply
gaps in consumable merchandise imports. Paramaribo is,
however, a consumables post, meaning most Embassy homes
generally have some food stocks, and have been reminded to
think of food and water reserves already. Water reserve
tanks holding 450 gallons of water are standard at Embassy
residences.


4. (SBU) For tripwires, please see updated input on the TRIPS
network on the classified server.


5. (SBU) The following general preparedness measures have been
taken to date:

Regular consultation among "working group" members (DCM,
RSO, CONS, POL/ECON, MGMT, CLO, GSO, Peace Corps, DATT, IMO,
in this small embassy essentially the regular EAC plus the
Health Unit).

Pol/econ and MED liaison with Government of Suriname Avian
Flu Working Group and PAHO to monitor disease surveillance
and community preparedness. As of January 9, GOS action
plan not completed, but public information/awareness
campaign has begun.

RSO, Consular, Med, MGMT develop and implement quarantine
and embassy visitor screening plans so they will be ready if
tripwires indicate they are needed.

MED shipping Tamiflu, secure storage plan established (store
in Embassy safehaven); other essential supplies (as
identified in coordination with RMO Bogota, ie masks,
gloves, etc.) are on order.

Medical triage and biological agent plans being developed,
drawing heavily on RMO/Bogota's input.

CONS maintains information links with Amcit community; to
date information posted on Embassy web sites and included in
quarterly warden letter. Informational meetings will
follow, beginning with regularly scheduled warden meeting
(February 06) unless evolution of situation requires more
extensive meetings.

CLO to maintain links with local schools attended by Embassy

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dependents to advise on their preparedness. Tripwire plan
includes suggested school closure thresholds.

Identified avian flu contacts in neighboring Embassies,
given our dependence on interim stops to get to the United
States, if that turns out to be a sensible option.

RMO offered a briefing to the official American community in
a town hall meeting in December visit, advised households to
buy gloves, hand sanitizer, and protective masks, and to
think of modest food and water reserves. FSNs were briefed
in regularly monthly meeting with DCM on January 11.

BARNES