Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARAMARIBO219
2006-04-20 12:08:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Paramaribo
Cable title:  

GROWING DIVIDE WITHIN PRESIDENT VENETIAAN'S

Tags:  PGOV PREL SOCI ECON NS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8917
RR RUEHGR
DE RUEHPO #0219/01 1101208
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 201208Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8235
INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE
RUEHAO/AMCONSUL CURACAO 1005
RUEHBR/USDAO BRASILIA BR
RUEWMFC/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PARAMARIBO 000219 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR WHA/CAR LLUFTIG
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL SOCI ECON NS
SUBJECT: GROWING DIVIDE WITHIN PRESIDENT VENETIAAN'S
COALITION


PARAMARIBO 00000219 001.2 OF 002


REFTELS: (A) 05 PARAMARIBO 768

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PARAMARIBO 000219

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR WHA/CAR LLUFTIG
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL SOCI ECON NS
SUBJECT: GROWING DIVIDE WITHIN PRESIDENT VENETIAAN'S
COALITION


PARAMARIBO 00000219 001.2 OF 002


REFTELS: (A) 05 PARAMARIBO 768


1. (SBU) Summary. Eight months into his second consecutive
term, President Ronald Venetiaan is presiding over an
increasingly fractured eight-party coalition. The all-
Maroon (descendants of escaped slaves) A-Combination (AC)
is in a coalition standoff with the President's New Front
grouping over a bill concerning unlawful occupation of
property. Members of the Javanese-based Pertjaja Luhur
(PL) are refusing to attend sessions of the National
Assembly to protest President Venetiaan's public
admonishment of a PL minister. Meanwhile the Hindustani-
based United Reform Party (VHP) is cracking from within as
splinter groups are pressing for more internal party
democracy, undermining Vice-President and party chair
Ramdien Sardjoe's control. This recent escalation of
coalition infighting has many observers questioning whether
the governing coalition will stay together until the next
scheduled election in four years. Sounding the death knell
for the coalition is premature, however, as for the moment
the parties still appear inclined to limp forward as a
group in order to remain in power. The result will be a
cautious president and cabinet preoccupied with balancing
competing interests. This cable, which is the first in a
series of cables on the fractured coalition, focuses on the
pivotal AC. End Summary.


2. (U) With the loss of its parliamentary majority in the
May 2005 election, President Ronald Venetian's four party
New Front coalition (the Creole-based NPS, labor-oriented
SPA, VHP, and PL) was forced to caucus with the three party
AC coalition and the single seat DA91 party to form a
governing coalition dubbed the New Front Plus. The 2005
election represented a political watershed for the Maroon
community as three all-Maroon parties (ABOP, BEP, and
SEEKA) united to form a coalition and for the first time
won parliamentary seats (five of 51) and secured cabinet
positions (three of 17). Their success brought not only a
previously underrepresented ethnic group into the forefront

of Surinamese politics, but turned them into critical
dealmakers.


3. (U) Smooth cooperation within the New Front Plus has
been elusive since its formation. Simmering troubles
erupted on April 4 when AC parliamentarians refused to
attend a DNA session, preventing the formation of a quorum
and scuttling an expected vote on a bill concerning
unlawful occupation of property and buildings. New Front
leaders claimed the AC members never raised their
objections to the bill until the day of the vote, while
deputy DNA speaker Caprino Alendy, a former International
Visitor's Program participant, maintained that New Front
leaders paid no attention to proposed AC changes prior to
the session.


4. (SBU) AC members oppose the bill, claiming it would
enable the government to easily evict Maroons from their
traditional lands because the bill's definition of a plot
of land could be interpreted to include the undemarcated
interior territory used by Maroon communities. The intent
of the original bill, however, was more to address illegal
occupation of clearly defined land plots and buildings and
to give law enforcement the tools to evict squatters.
Because there are several Maroon "squatter villages" in
Paramaribo that would be jeopardized by the proposed law,
some are questioning whether the AC's objections are more
related to keeping illegally occupied property in the hands
of Maroon groups in Paramaribo, where the AC has one DNA
seat.


5. (U) The vote has been postponed to give the AC and New
Front leadership a chance to hash out a compromise bill,
but finding common ground may be difficult as Alendy wants
the complex and long-ignored issue of land rights for
indigenous groups to be included in the parliamentary
debate. Maroon groups in the interior often do not have
title to the land on which they live and farm, which
creates social tensions particularly when traditional
Maroon land overlaps private mining concessions granted by
the government.

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FORMER JUNGLE COMMANDO LEADER BRUNSWIJK STILL A LOOSE
CANNON

PARAMARIBO 00000219 002.2 OF 002


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6. (SBU) Adding to coalition instability is former Jungle
Commando rebel leader, convicted narcotics trafficker, and
AC parliamentarian Ronnie Brunswijk's hostile stance
towards his coalition's plan to sell the state-owned lumber
company Bruynzeel to Dutch-Belgian concern Doorwin.
Brunswijk, who holds a large wood concession himself,
heavily criticized a Letter of Intent (LOI) submitted for
DNA approval by President Venetiaan's cabinet. Only after
long and tortuous debate did the New Front Plus majority
approve the LOI on March 30, but with Brunswijk abstaining
from the vote, putting him not only at odds with the New
Front, but fellow AC leaders. Brunswijk is also rankling
the New Front by leading an effort to place fellow AC
members in key positions on the boards of various state-
owned companies.


7. (SBU) Brunswijk's unpredictable and aggressive nature
(also a former bank robber, he recently brandished a gun at
soccer match, threatening the other team) is in stark
contrast to the traditional, slow-moving politics of
compromise associated with President Venetiaan. The
president faces little choice but to tolerate and appease
the influential, yet impetuous Brunswijk in order to keep
his majority in tact. The President's decision to join
forces with Brunswijk upset many in the political
establishment, who see the ex-jungle commando as a thug, as
well as many in the military, who fought against him in the
interior war of the late 1980's.

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OPPOSITION ALSO FIGHTING FOR HEARTS AND MINDS OF MAROONS
-------------- --------------


8. (SBU) For AC leaders, it is a political necessity to
appear strong on the issue of land rights, a top concern
for their Maroon constituents, to enable them to fend off a
direct challenge for the hearts and minds of their
electorate from the largest opposition party National
Democratic Party (NDP),chaired by former military dictator
and convicted narcotics trafficker Desi Bouterse. (See
reftel). Over the last several months, the NDP has been
attempting to tap into pockets of Maroon discontent and
promote itself as the defender of Maroon interests. The NDP
too is opposed to the unlawful occupation bill, claiming
the bill will force Maroons off their land. By the NDP
keeping the political pressure on the AC, AC leaders will
be compelled to be out in front of the land rights issue
even if their position is at odds with other New Front Plus
partners. Some political observers comment that the NDP's
true goal is to drive a wedge between coalition partners by
focusing on its perceived weakest link, the AC.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


9. (SBU) Inter-coalition squabbling has preoccupied the New
Front Plus since coming together several months ago and set
the government on a plodding, cautious course. Having to
swallow the demands of its new AC partner and to share the
political spoils of an election has been difficult for the
New Front. Long-standing ethnic prejudice against Maroons,
which has resurfaced lately after a Maroon man allegedly
brutally murdered a Hindustani women, may also be playing a
role in the reluctance of some New Front members to think
of the AC as an equal partner. On the other side, the
mostly politically inexperienced AC has faced a steep
learning curve in the art of political compromise. The AC
parties are under intense scrutiny from the Maroon
community to fulfill inflated expectations and to push
through their agenda, which can sometimes put the AC at
odds with coalition partners. While the fissures in the
coalition are quickly growing, they are yet not permanent
cracks, as all sides still seem willing to work towards
acceptable compromise in order to continue holding onto the
reigns of power.

BARNES