Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARAMARIBO155
2006-03-14 12:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paramaribo
Cable title:  

CONTINUED CONCERN OVER BOUTERSE'S NEXT STEPS

Tags:  PGOV PREL SNAR KCRM ASEC NS 
pdf how-to read a cable
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 141222Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8154
INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE
RUEHAO/AMCONSUL CURACAO 0986
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 1525
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARAMARIBO 000155 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA/CAR Q LLUFTIG
PORT OF SPAIN FOR LEGATT
SOUTCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR KCRM ASEC NS
SUBJECT: CONTINUED CONCERN OVER BOUTERSE'S NEXT STEPS

REFS: (A) PARAMARIBO 90 (B) PARAMARIBO 39 (D) PARAMARIBO
118

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR MARSHA E. BARNES, REASONS 1.4 (b)
& (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARAMARIBO 000155

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA/CAR Q LLUFTIG
PORT OF SPAIN FOR LEGATT
SOUTCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR KCRM ASEC NS
SUBJECT: CONTINUED CONCERN OVER BOUTERSE'S NEXT STEPS

REFS: (A) PARAMARIBO 90 (B) PARAMARIBO 39 (D) PARAMARIBO
118

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR MARSHA E. BARNES, REASONS 1.4 (b)
& (d).


1. (SBU) Summary. Former military dictator and convicted
narcotics trafficker Desi Bouterse's recent statements
claiming current conditions in Suriname are similar to
those just prior to his 1980 coup have heightened public
unease over Suriname's future stability. Adding to the
atmosphere was a recent military depot weapons theft
portrayed by an influential editorial page as one in a
series of destabilizing acts planned by a group, implying
Bouterse's National Democratic Party (NDP),interested in
seizing power through "undemocratic" means. Whether
Bouterse would go so far as a violent power grab to protect
himself from prosecution in the 1982 December murders case
remains subject of much speculation. The sheer amount of
chatter about his possible intentions reverberates in this
small, sometimes hothouse society, creating sense that
things are slightly off balance. End Summary.

--------------
CONCERNS SURROUNDING BOUTERSE CONTINUE
--------------


2. (SBU) At a February 24 celebration for the 26th
anniversary of his military coup, Bouterse shocked the
crowd by saying the conditions that existed just before the
1980 coup exist again today. He said patronage politics,
criminality, and corruption, among other things, are
leading the country into a deep crisis once again. After
uttering these words, the silence was palpable; he then
coyly stated that history would not repeat itself. He said
that he and his fellow coup leaders stand ready, though, to
pass on the ideals of the "revolution," which is how he
describes his coup, to Suriname's next generation. At a
political rally a week later, Bouterse said the results of
the 2005 elections should be voided because the New Front
coalition's campaign was financed by illegal funds, namely
money laundering proceeds. He also claimed the head of
Suriname's Intelligence Agency (CIVD) Colonel Johan Ceder,
President Ronald Venetiaan's nephew, conducted arms-for-

drugs deals with Brazilian gangs.


3. (C) The specter of armed action against the government
was raised by the media just prior to Bouterse's speech
when an unknown gang stole 150 grenades, 240 rounds of Bren
ammunition, and 500 rounds of carbine ammunition from a
military arms depot at the Ayoko military barracks located
near Suriname's international airport. The ammunition is
considered out-dated and the quality of the grenades
questionable. Sources say the arms are thought to be now
located in western Suriname and that an "inside-job" is
suspected, but no arrests have been made. Media speculation
that a group intent on fomenting unrest stole the weapons
caused a public stir. (COMMENT: Reporting in other
channels reflects conflicting theories over the weapons
theft, but on the street there is concern, which is perhaps
a result of what the public remembers from the military
period of the 1980's. End Comment.)


4. (C) Three days after the arms theft, the newspaper De
West's influential weekly editorial page Keerpunt painted a
worrying security picture. It expressed concern that
groups within Suriname are planning to take power through
"undemocratic" means and are attempting to solicit internal
support from Suriname's interior to this end. It said it
feared that violence in Guyana could spill into Suriname.
The editorial claimed there were certain political parties,
implying the NDP, unwilling to wait until 2010 election for
a change in government and expressed concern over the
unstable atmosphere in the National Assembly created by the
NDP. (See ref A).

--------------
GOVERNMENT OF SURINAME NOT STANDING IDLY BY
--------------


5. (C) In recent weeks the Government of Suriname has
stepped up its monitoring of its border with Guyana through
increased joint police-military boat patrols along the
Corantijn River. According to an Embassy source, GOS
officials think the group responsible for the depot theft
plans to smuggle the arms into Guyana. Another source,

PARAMARIBO 00000155 002 OF 002


however, thinks the arms will stay in Suriname and that AK-
47s stolen in Guyana may come here. The military patrols
resulted in the seizure of 3.5 kilograms of marijuana from
one Surinamer and two Guyanese and four boats on March 2.


6. (U) A squad of military personnel recently conducted a
readiness exercise by marching through the streets of a
high-crime neighborhood in Paramaribo. According to a
military spokesperson, the exercise was one in a series
designed to stem rising crime in some areas, and more such
exercises will occur. The spokesman denied media
speculation that the exercise was related to the December
murder case or the military weapons theft.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


7. (C) However short on details, the framework of Keerpunt
speculation squares with information recently volunteered
by Embassy sources. (See ref B). Although last fall's
street protests and neighborhood rallies failed to rally a
critical mass of support for Bouterse, few are prepared to
believe that Bouterse has played his last card. There is
increased chatter that Bouterse is planning more nefarious
actions with a focus on gaining support from interior
groups, specifically longtime Amerindian associates.
Collaboration with Guyanese criminal elements remains a
serious concern, as Bouterse has reportedly been spending
significant time in western Suriname near the border.
Despite these concerns, government officials still appear
committed to prosecuting Bouterse for the December murders,
possibly setting up a contentious showdown in the second
half of this year when the trial is expected to begin. (See
ref C).

BARNES