Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06OSLO958
2006-08-03 06:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Oslo
Cable title:  

OSLO MEETING WITH SPECIAL ENVOY HANSSEN-BAUER

Tags:  PTER PGOV PHUM CE NO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNY #0958/01 2150658
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 030658Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4366
INFO RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 0342
C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000958 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

SCA/INS (GOWER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/2016
TAGS: PTER PGOV PHUM CE NO
SUBJECT: OSLO MEETING WITH SPECIAL ENVOY HANSSEN-BAUER

REF: 8/1/06 (C) GOWER EMAIL TO CANUEL

Classified By: Acting Pol/Econ Counselor David Henry, Reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000958

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

SCA/INS (GOWER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/2016
TAGS: PTER PGOV PHUM CE NO
SUBJECT: OSLO MEETING WITH SPECIAL ENVOY HANSSEN-BAUER

REF: 8/1/06 (C) GOWER EMAIL TO CANUEL

Classified By: Acting Pol/Econ Counselor David Henry, Reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d)


1. (C) On August 2, 2006 we met with Jon Hanssen-Bauer,
Special Envoy to Sri Lanka at the MFA and Sri Lanka Desk
Officer Sondre Bjotveit. Noting Norwegian Development
Minister Eric Solheim's public appeal earlier today for the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil (LTTE) and the Government of Sri
Lanka (GSL) forces to immediately "stop the offensive
operations," Hanssen-Bauer provided a bleak analysis of the
current Sri Lanka situation. The Special Envoy will visit Sri
Lanka on August 4, focusing on discussing the Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission (SLMM) composition.

Lacking Strategic Vision; Military and Political Situation
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Hanssen-Bauer, recalling his recent telephone
discussions with GSL President Rajapaksa, voiced concerns
that the President's day-to-day operations "lacked a clear
strategy." The Special Envoy believes neither party has the
military capacity (with the exception of the LTTE's presence
in the east) to dominate the other. In particular, he notes
that GSL forces are "wrapped up" in the LTTE's blockage of
the water sluice south of Trimcomalee. According to
Hanssen-Bauer the LTTE, after gaining ground in the east, may
be tempted to capitalize on their military achievements and
restore their former eastern military positions. He is
concerned that the LTTE's eastern advances may be a sign of a
major military operation in the works. In noting how the
military situation should de-escalate, Hanssen-Bauer believes
that the LTTE must "open the (water sluice) gates." He also
recognizes and appreciates the long-standing U.S. concerns
that the LTTE stop their use of claymore mines.


3. (C) Politically, the Special Envoy believes that both the
LTTE and GSL leadership are being dominated by military
influences. With respect to the GSL, the President is
dependent on the Janatha Vimukthi Peremuna (JVP). Attempts
to get the United National Party (UNP) into the current
governmental power structure have not been possible. He

alluded that the JVP's conditions for joining with the
government have been "highly problematic." Politically, the
Special Envoy also warns that the GSL must deal with the
Karuna faction.

SLMM Composition
--------------


4. (C) Hanssen-Bauer's impending visit to Sri Lanka will
focus largely on the SLMM composition issue. Hanssen-Bauer
states that the GSL continues to urge the SLMM's EU members
(Sweden, Finland and Denmark) to "not withdraw" and "give in"
to LTTE demands. Aside from closing the "whole thing,"
Hanssen-Bauer sees two distinct possibilities concerning the
SLMM. First, the SLMM could continue operating with minimal
staffing (three international observers staffing offices),
with a limited increased presence by Norway and Iceland (from
approximately 19 members to 30).


5. (C) Alternatively, new member countries could be invited
to replace the Nordic EU members, which would require
amending the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA). Potential volunteer
countries include Switzerland and New Zealand (with the added
possibility of South Africa). The GSL prefers additional
members from the Middle East which the Special Envoy suggests
as unlikely. He emphasized that any new SLMM member must
meet with the approval of India. He is also quick to point
out that any such amendment must be limited to the SLMM's
composition--and not be an invitation to renegotiate the
entire CFA. The GSL will conduct meetings on the issue if the
LTTE agrees to attend (and is not currently willing to do
so). He feels that neither party wants the SLMM to "walk
out."

Bilateral Aid in Question?
--------------


6. (C) Hanssen-Bauer notes certain European rumblings that
international bilateral aid to Sri Lanka may be reconsidered,
given the precarious state of the peace process. He believes
Japan is not willing to tie Sri Lankan aid with the progress
of peace talks. As a practical matter, Hanssen-Bauer notes
that military escalation will invariably impact any aid
programs (e.g. military operations will destabilize NGO aid
efforts and infrastructure projects).

Next Steps - A Co-Chairs Meeting
--------------


7. (C) Hanssen-Bauer noted that AS Boucher floated the idea
of a Co-Chairs meeting in line with a September UN General
Assembly meeting. The Special Envoy feels this concept "is a
good idea and should be explored," and should "logically"
take place in the United States. Hanssen-Bauer called on the
Co-Chairs to "join hands" and voice a "public, unified
message" appealing to both the LTTE and GSL to show
restraint. Given the EU listing of the LTTE as a terrorist
organization, he noted a Brussels meeting would be unlikely.
The Co-Chairs should "take stock of the current situation and
evaluate how the parties have reacted to the appeals of the
Tokyo Statement." Also, he believes that the Co-Chairs must
decide as to how to approach India and advocate that
country's increased participation in the peace process. He
emphasized that the GSL must not be emboldened to believe
that the U.S. will view the GSL's handling of the LTTE as
similar to Israel's actions in Lebanon. He asked that the
U.S. "make clear" that it clearly supports the Tokyo
Statement, and that any comparison to the U.S. support of
Israel in Lebanon is misplaced and "unfortunate." Finally,
he restated his appreciation of the continued U.S. role in
Sri Lanka, and called his August 1 telephone conference with
PDAS Steve Mann (ref) "very useful."
Visit Oslo's Classified website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/oslo/index.cf m

JOHNSON