Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06OSLO690
2006-05-26 16:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Oslo
Cable title:  

C-RE6-00473; NORWAY, ISAF AND THE FARYAB PRT

Tags:  PINR MASS MOPS PTER AF NO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNY #0690/01 1461620
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261620Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4059
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0147
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1458
C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000690 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2016
TAGS: PINR MASS MOPS PTER AF NO
SUBJECT: C-RE6-00473; NORWAY, ISAF AND THE FARYAB PRT

REF: A. STATE 77257

B. OSLO 667

C. STATE 74035

Classified By: ADCM Mike Hammer, reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000690

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2016
TAGS: PINR MASS MOPS PTER AF NO
SUBJECT: C-RE6-00473; NORWAY, ISAF AND THE FARYAB PRT

REF: A. STATE 77257

B. OSLO 667

C. STATE 74035

Classified By: ADCM Mike Hammer, reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

1.(C) Summary. On May 23 we met with Keith Eikenes and
Erling Alvestad, Senior Advisers in the MOD, and discussed
reftel A points. Both offered assessments of the current
Norwegian PRT in Meymana, Afghanistan, with particular
emphasis on the lessons learned following the February, 2006
riots. They revealed that Norway plans to move its existing
Meymana camp to a safer location, reinforce its PRT military
personnel and facilitate the permanent presence of the
Afghanistan National Army (ANA) in Meymana. In addition, the
Norwegians do not foresee an expansion of its PRT and will
likely remain rooted in the North. Alvestad also confirmed
that Norway will lift the ISAF caveats noted in reftels B and

C. End Summary.

Meymana after the Riots: Lessons Learned
--------------

2.(C) Eikenes spoke at length about the February, 2006 riots
in Meymana, which, after investigations, appear to have
resulted from spontaneous mob scenes following the release of
the incendiary Mohammed cartoons in Norway rather than (as
previously thought) from a local warlord who engaged in the
drug trade. Noting that there were no direct attacks
following the riots, Eikenes stated that the February events
precipitated three changes. First, the Norwegian Meymana
camp will move to a more secure position. The construction
commencement date is estimated as of August 1, 2006 (with a
total construction time estimated between 6-8 months).
Secondly, the PRT (containing approximately 40 military
personnel) would be reinforced with added security. Finally,
Norway will facilitate the permanent presence of the ANA
(whose involvement he deemed to have a "calming effect" in
February). Norway will provide the ANA with funding,
equipment and training (in coordination with ISAF).

3.(C) Both Eikenes and Alvestad expressed the Norwegian
resolve to remain in Meymana following the riots. According
to Alvestad, Norway is "anchored firmly in the North."

Although he would completely rule out Norway's involvement in
the South, the focus (and Norwegian presence) will clearly
remain in the North. He noted that Norway would not exclude
contributing to ISAF in Stages 3 or 4, but that Norway's SOF
commitment to NRF 7 (and parts of NRF 8) would be a limiting
factor.

4.(C) Eikenes did express some frustration with the
Norwegian MFA regarding the dedicated number of civilian
development experts present in Meymana. Norway has fifty
soldiers in Faryab province, Eikenes noted, but only one
civilian advisor form the MFA. Eikenes believes that Norway,
as lead nation in Meymana, should "lead the way" in providing
development experts to the region. He voiced some concern
that Norway was "not delivering" on the Afghans' "clear
expectations" of receiving civilian development expertise.
Eikenes did state that 2-3 NGOs may be heading to Meymana
(including the Norwegian Church Aid),and realized that the
MFA "cannot force NGOs" to go to the province. Eikenes also
noted with embarrassment that the Finnish contribution to the
Meymana PRT includes more civilians and that the Finns are
spending more development money in Faryab province than
Norway is.

Caveats to be Lifted
--------------

5.(C) Alvestad revealed that the government will lift its
caveat, per reftels b and c.

Norway looks forward to ANA presence in Faryab
-------------- -

6.(C) Eikenes and Alvestad also directly responded to
certain additional applicable reftel a points. The Norwegian
language does not have a word corresponding to
"counter-insurgency," so they do not use this term. The ISAF
ROE does include certain "kill or capture" provisions; if
Norway must conduct an offensive to fulfill an ISAF mandate,
then killing/capturing Taliban or other insurgents is
permissive under the ISAF rules of engagement. In addition,
the PRT does conduct patrols which may last between 3-4 days,
and include territory within the entire province. During
these patrols, the Norwegians monitor the government's
authority and report on development needs to the PRT's
development experts (which currently consists of one MFA
specialist) in order to plan the appropriate development
and/or reconstruction assistance. Although combined patrols
with ANA forces are still under review, both Eikenes and
Alvestad consider it important to conduct such combined
efforts and believe that when ANA establishes a presence in
Faryab province that joint patrols will become a reality.

7.(C) Eikenes views the Afghanistan police as unreliable,
underpaid, corrupt, and often under the authority of the
local warlords. He noted that the police were playing cards
"next door" when the February, 2006 riots occurred and, when
they finally extended assistance to the Norwegians, the
police "overreacted" (spraying live ammunition into the
crowds). Eikenes did note that Norway will send a few
civilian judicial experts to join the Meymana PRT this Fall,
bringing the total of Norwegian judicial experts and police
trainers (most in Kabul) to 15.
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