IAEA/IRAN: FM PERSONALLY DRIVING NORWAY'S POLICY

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000063

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2016
TAGS: PARM KNNP PREL IR NO
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: FM PERSONALLY DRIVING NORWAY'S POLICY

REF: OSLO 56 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: P/E Counselor Mike Hammer, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Stoere is
directly and personally driving Norway's policy on whether
the IAEA should report Iran to the UN Security Council.
Stoere wants clarity on how the Security Council will deal
with the issue before agreeing to send it there. Stoere is
reaching out to his British, French, and German colleagues to
sound them out. (Note. Post understands that Stoere's call
to Straw has already taken place, but has no read-out of the
content. End Note.) Stoere has told the press that Norway
has not yet decided whether it will support reporting Iran to
the UNSC. No approach to Norway below Stoere himself is
likely to have much of an impact on Norway's position. End
Summary.


2. (C) A visibly uncomfortable MFA DAS for Nonproliferation
and Disarmament Jan Arve Knutsen admitted to us on January 18
that Stoere's direction on IAEA/Iran is at odds with the
Ministry's previous indication that Norway was likely follow
the EU-3 lead. "The Minister himself needs to be convinced
that reporting Iran to Security Council is the right thing to
do," Knutsen said, blushing when he added, "We've changed our
talking points to be in line with the Minister's lead."


3. (C) Knutsen told us that after his meeting with el
Baradei on January 17, Stoere is prepared to see the issue
carry on until the next regularly scheduled IAEA meeting in
March. Stoere also heard from el Baradei that Iran should be
allowed a "pilot facility," and Stoere appears sympathetic to
the idea that Iran should be given something. Knutsen
admitted that he had no idea what a "pilot facility" was, but
that el Baradei had told Stoere that a "pilot facility" had
no proliferation risk.


4. (C) When pushed on how we should expect Norway to vote,
whether it would stand with its major allies in the EU and
US, Knutsen noted that Stoere has said that his mind is not
yet made up, but that for the present Stoere thinks more time
needs to be given to (undefined) "diplomatic efforts."
Stoere's Chief of Staff independently confirmed to us that
his minister needs convincing and reiterated that Stoere's
major concern is how the Security Council would handle the
issue if it were sent there.


5. (C) On January 17, Ambassador raised Iran in a previously
scheduled meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Kjetil
Skogrand. Skogrand told the Ambassador that, even though
Norway is unsure that reporting the matter to the UNSC should
be the next step, Norway "will not stand in the way" if a
majority of the IAEA board support reporting Iran to the
Security Council.


6. (C) Comment. Stoere's tack on IAEA/Iran is clearly less
forward-leaning than that of Foreign Ministry as a whole, and
Stoere personally has taken Norway deeper into the undecided
column. Stoere is running this policy single-handed.
Despite Deputy FM Skogrand's assurance that Norway would not
stand in the way, it is conceivable that Stoere will continue
to call for more time to be given to a diplomatic solution at
the February Extraordinary IAEA Board meeting. If we want to
make sure that Norway is with us, we need to go directly to
Stoere and allay his concerns about how the UNSC would handle
this issue.

Visit Oslo's Classified website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/oslo/index.cf m

WHITNEY


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