Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06OSLO627
2006-05-15 12:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Oslo
Cable title:
NORWAY WILL LOOK AGAIN AT ISAF CAVEATS
how-toVZCZCXYZ0003 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHNY #0627 1351258 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 151258Z MAY 06 FM AMEMBASSY OSLO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3973 INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU PRIORITY 0037 RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 1231 RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY 0197 RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY 7794 RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0144 RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE PRIORITY 0157 RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 2841 RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA PRIORITY 0203 RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0282 RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0368 RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB PRIORITY 0245 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0159 RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000627
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2016
TAGS: MARR NATO PREL PGOV AF NO
SUBJECT: NORWAY WILL LOOK AGAIN AT ISAF CAVEATS
REF: STATE 74035
Classified By: Pol/Econ Counselor Mike Hammer,
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000627
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2016
TAGS: MARR NATO PREL PGOV AF NO
SUBJECT: NORWAY WILL LOOK AGAIN AT ISAF CAVEATS
REF: STATE 74035
Classified By: Pol/Econ Counselor Mike Hammer,
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) On May 11, we delivered reftel points to Leif
Larsen, MFA Security Policy Section DAS, and to MOD USA Desk
Officer Erling Alvestad. Larsen and Alvestad agreed to
coordinate between their ministries and consider our request.
The MOD noted that Norway's caveat was out of step with its
previous commitment to lift all of its (few) caveats, since,
in principle, Norway agrees that national caveats have a
deleterious effect on NATO commanders' operational
flexibility. The new caveat appears to have been imposed
when Norway deployed forces to the quick reaction force (QRF)
in Mazar-i-Sharif.
2. (C) Comment. In the past, Norway has been a strong
supporter of our efforts in NATO against national caveats.
However, the MOD and MFA are now under the leadership of a
government that includes the ultra-leftwing Socialist Left
party (SV). SV would prefer to have no Norwegian troops in
Afghanistan. Norway's current political leadership most
likely insisted on imposing the restrictions on the Norwegian
QRF contingent, overruling the MOD and MFA bureaucracies, in
order to appease SV. In the absence of internal government
coalition pressure to keep the Norwegian national caveat, we
are confident that there would be broad support in both
ministries for lifting all caveats; however, given the
high-level of internal government efforts to appease SV, we
are not confident that the ministries' advice to their
ministers will be followed, despite our active engagement.
Visit Oslo's Classified website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/oslo/index.cf m
WHITNEY
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2016
TAGS: MARR NATO PREL PGOV AF NO
SUBJECT: NORWAY WILL LOOK AGAIN AT ISAF CAVEATS
REF: STATE 74035
Classified By: Pol/Econ Counselor Mike Hammer,
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) On May 11, we delivered reftel points to Leif
Larsen, MFA Security Policy Section DAS, and to MOD USA Desk
Officer Erling Alvestad. Larsen and Alvestad agreed to
coordinate between their ministries and consider our request.
The MOD noted that Norway's caveat was out of step with its
previous commitment to lift all of its (few) caveats, since,
in principle, Norway agrees that national caveats have a
deleterious effect on NATO commanders' operational
flexibility. The new caveat appears to have been imposed
when Norway deployed forces to the quick reaction force (QRF)
in Mazar-i-Sharif.
2. (C) Comment. In the past, Norway has been a strong
supporter of our efforts in NATO against national caveats.
However, the MOD and MFA are now under the leadership of a
government that includes the ultra-leftwing Socialist Left
party (SV). SV would prefer to have no Norwegian troops in
Afghanistan. Norway's current political leadership most
likely insisted on imposing the restrictions on the Norwegian
QRF contingent, overruling the MOD and MFA bureaucracies, in
order to appease SV. In the absence of internal government
coalition pressure to keep the Norwegian national caveat, we
are confident that there would be broad support in both
ministries for lifting all caveats; however, given the
high-level of internal government efforts to appease SV, we
are not confident that the ministries' advice to their
ministers will be followed, despite our active engagement.
Visit Oslo's Classified website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/oslo/index.cf m
WHITNEY