Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06OSLO296
2006-03-10 17:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Oslo
Cable title:  

NORWAY CLAIMS "NO NEW CHANNEL" TO IRAN

Tags:  PARM PREL AORC IR NO KNNP 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNY #0296/01 0691716
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 101716Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3606
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1314
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0890
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0539
C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000296 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL AORC IR NO KNNP
SUBJECT: NORWAY CLAIMS "NO NEW CHANNEL" TO IRAN

REF: A. SECSTATE 35677


B. LONDON 1773

C. PARIS 1410

Classified By: P/E Counselor Mike Hammer, reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000296

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL AORC IR NO KNNP
SUBJECT: NORWAY CLAIMS "NO NEW CHANNEL" TO IRAN

REF: A. SECSTATE 35677


B. LONDON 1773

C. PARIS 1410

Classified By: P/E Counselor Mike Hammer, reason 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) We raised reftel concerns with MFA Assistant Secretary
for Security Policy Kaare Aas, freshly back from the IAEA
Board Meeting in Vienna, on March 10. Aas tried to spin the
visit of Norwegian State Secretary Raymond Johansen in the
best light, stressing that the concept of a broader security
dialogue with Iran was based on the understanding that Iran
would fully implement all IAEA decisions. Norway already has
a dialogue with Iran on human rights, and inter-religious
dialogue, and therefore security would just be an new
dimension of ongoing discussions. "No new channel," were his
words. On the defensive, Aas also said Norway had informed
all members of the IAEA Board at the February meeting that
Norway planned to engage Iran on a broader range of security
issues. Aas noted that the proposals in the Norwegian
presentation of broader security dialogue with Iran were
directly drawn from previous EU3 perimeters.


2. (C) We countered that while the concept of Johansen's
visiting Iran to push for Iranian compliance was understood,
the idea of a broader security dialogue with Iran was a bad
idea and would only play into Iranian efforts to divide the
international community. We also questioned Aas's assertions
that several members of the international community were
supportive of the need for increased dialogue with Iran.
Under pressure Aas admitted that Norway now recognized that
neither the EU3 nor the U.S. were supportive of Norway
engendering a wider security dialogue with Iran, although he
maintained that there were slight variations in the reaction
from the EU3 to Johansen's trip (in contradiction to ref b
and c).


3. (C) Aas asked if it was a question of the level of
interaction with Iran that caused concern. Would the U.S.
support Norway pursuing a security dialogue with Iran at the
official level instead of the political level, he asked. We
flatly told Aas that the problem was with Norway having this

kind of security agenda with Iran, not of level of
interaction.


4. (C) Aas promised that he would convey our concerns up to
his minister. Aas made clear that the momentum for engaging
with Iran was being driven by Foreign Minister Stoere. The
Stoltenberg government, Aas said, was intent on contributing
to a diplomatic solution with Iran; Stoere wants to play a
role. That said, Aas conceded that the Iranian statements in
Vienna left little hope of Iranian flexibility and were
similar to the Iranian positions that Johansen had heard in
Iran.


5. (C) Aas said that FM Stoere has asked the MFA Security
Policy department to prepare a new assessment as to how to
proceed with regard to Iran. Aas assured us that the
reactions from the "P5 and Germany" would play into the
assessment that he will send to Stoere and promised to share
that assessment with us as well, in order to maintain full
transparency. He forecast that the assessment would
recommend that any further steps towards pursuing dialogue
with Iran should be contingent upon how Iran behaves when
UNSC considers the matter.


6. (C) Aas went on to discuss other aspects of an active
foreign policy agenda that FM Stoere plans to pursue. Stoere
has directed Aas to begin thinking about the formulation for
a to-be-defined Norwegian initiative against cluster bombs.
Aas also indicated that he hoped to travel to Washington in
April in order to lay out Norwegian plans for reviving the
non-proliferation UN Summit resolution that Norway failed to
promote successfully last summer/autumn.


7. (C) Comment. Reflecting his keen desire for Norway to
play a more active role in promoting dialogue and mediation
internationally, Stoere appears intent for Norway to be a
"player" on Iran. There is no doubt that Norwegians have
heard the EU3 and U.S. concerns about starting a broader
security dialogue with Iran, and are unlikely to take any
more steps in this direction, pending UNSC action and Iranian
reaction. However, Norway is clearly not giving up hope that
it can play a role in finding a diplomatic solution on Iran.
We welcome Aas's assurance that Norway will be transparent,
but we can only hope that Norway will listen to future
concerns more cautiously than it did to EU3 misgivings before
Johansen traveled. Foreign Minister Stoere knows that he has
the support of the Prime Minister and the Labor party to go
forward with this sort of approach (be it Iran,
non-proliferation, or cluster bombs). The Stoltenberg
government as a whole does not yet seem to have come to grips
with the fact that Norway's credibility as an effective
international partner and advocate for peace can be seriously
compromised if Norway fails to maintain its allies'
confidence or decides to go at it alone.

Visit Oslo's Classified website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/oslo/index.cf m

WHITNEY