Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06OSLO1352
2006-11-02 14:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Oslo
Cable title:  

NORWAY ASSESSES THE GENEVA SRI LANKA TALKS

Tags:  PGOV PREL CE NO 
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DE RUEHNY #1352/01 3061435
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021435Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4827
INFO RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 0348
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1388
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0423
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 3033
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1581
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1278
C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 001352 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

MOLLY GOWER/SCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL CE NO
SUBJECT: NORWAY ASSESSES THE GENEVA SRI LANKA TALKS


Classified By: CDA Kevin M. Johnson, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 001352

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

MOLLY GOWER/SCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL CE NO
SUBJECT: NORWAY ASSESSES THE GENEVA SRI LANKA TALKS


Classified By: CDA Kevin M. Johnson, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. Norway attributes the recent Geneva talks
stalemate to the evolving negotiating position of both the
Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) and the LTTE, divisions within
the GSL negotiating team and the LTTE's decision to raise the
A-9 road as a major issue. The Norwegians note the LTTE's
apparent willingness to hold future discussions (as evidenced
in the Geneva press conference),while predicting that
violence will continue. Despite renewed violence, Norway
envisions renewed talks in January or early spring, depending
on the domestic situation in Sri Lanka. End Summary.


2. (C) On October 31, the DCM and Pol/Econ officers met with
Tore Hattrem, Director General of the MFA's Peace and
Reconciliation Section. The meeting focused on peace efforts
in several global hot spots. Accordingly, Hattrem drew
together several Section members, consisting of MFA advisers
who address conflicts in Sri Lanka, Colombia, Somalia, Haiti,
Sudan and the Philippines (See Septel).

Reviewing Geneva: Strategies, Goals and Outcome
-------------- --


3. (C) Special Envoy Jon Hanssen-Bauer led discussions on
Sri Lanka, debriefing us on the recent Geneva talks. He noted
that Norway had hoped to exit the talks with new dates for
further discussions and was disappointed to end with a
stalemate. He reflected on several issues which contributed
to the Geneva outcome. First, the timing for the
negotiations was "all wrong," particularly given that leading
up to the talks the LTTE was perceived as weak (an atypical
negotiating status for the Tigers),while the GSL was viewed
in a militarily advantageous position. These fortunes were
reversing in the days before the talks given the failed GSL
northern offensive and recent LTTE suicide attacks. Such
events further altered the parties' negotiating positions.


4. (C) Complicating matters, the parties' negotiating
strategies were divergent. The GSL initially focused on
political issues (within the context of a unified Sri Lankan
state),while the LTTE held humanitarian issues paramount.
The LTTE demonstrated flexibility by agreeing to discuss

political issues, if GSL negotiators would also address
humanitarian concerns. In addition, the LTTE agreed to many
core issues (including welcoming the Memorandum of
Understanding in southern political parties).


5. (C) But the LTTE flexibility did not produce any
results, given that the GSL delegation was "internally
divided" and had no real mandate to give concessions. As an
example, Hanssen-Bauer described the destabilizing role of
two GSL negotiators (members of the Janatha Vimukthi Peremuna
(JVP) political party, appointed by the GSL because of
political considerations) whose presence was to ensure that
the peace talks failed. In addition, the GSL viewed the LTTE
as not being serious, merely biding time to allow LTTE forces
an opportunity to regroup.


6. (C) Other challenges were separate goals, particularly
the LTTE's choice of the opening of the A-9 road as a
deal-breaker. The GSL was more focused on past issues while
the LTTE looked to the future. The LTTE wants to maintain
traffic on the road to interfere with potential government
operations, while ensuring that the income flow resulting
from tolls continues to fill LTTE coffers. Advisor Tomas
Stangeland noted that the A-9 serves as a potent symbol, with
its closure representing an essential LTTE defeat. For that
very reason, the GSL is adamant it remain closed. Thus, the
LTTE's sole focus on the A-9 was seen by the Norwegians as a
"major blunder."


7. (C) The Special Envoy noted that both parties were under
international pressure in Geneva, and that neither party
excelled in political dialogues. He recalled that
Prabhakaran, although adept in military matters, has poor
(and worsening) political acumen. (Note: Hanssen-Bauer said
Prabhakaran almost never sees foreigners or even anyone
willing to disagree with him. He likely reads only Tamil
press. His isolation affects his judgment. Hanssen-Bauer
said that the Sri Lankan President also lacks advisors
willing to tell hard truths). Alternatively, the Special
Envoy surmised that the GSL, attempting to curry
international support, is labeling its efforts as fighting a
war against terrorists and may feel time is on its side in
this endeavor.


8. (C) Turning to the forthcoming Hero's Day speech
(Prabhakaran's yearly speech that launches the LTTE's
year-long strategy),Hanssen-Bauer emphasized that the LTTE
warned prior to entering into recent Geneva negotiations that
the LTTE needed some immediate results to sustain domestic
support. With the talks at a stalemate, the Special Envoy
predicts the speech would not be definitive, and likely allow
the LTTE to keep its options open.

Nonetheless, A Happy Press Conference
--------------

9. (C) Despite the outcome, the press conference following
the talks was "a happy moment." Fears that not setting a
date for new discussions would lead to a cessation of any
dialogue did not materialize. Both parties restated their
commitment to the political process (with Hanssen-Bauer
pointing out the LTTE's willingness to resume negotiations).
On a related matter, he noted that the LTTE's recent
cancellation of trips to Norway and Iceland does not
contradict this purported willingness to negotiate. The LTTE
canceled its trips to Norway and Iceland based upon the
LTTE's safety concerns (e.g. guarantees of safe transit from
Sri Lanka to both Nordic countries (and back to Sri Lanka)
might be revoked by the GSL).

Looking Ahead
--------------


10. (C) Hanssen-Bauer predicted that the present violent
situation will continue (but not lead to all out war),and
both parties could continue to "do serious harm." GSL forces
are effectively bogged down by LTTE strategies (such as tying
down GSL troops with demining duties and diverting one-third
of the GSL's elite forces to Colombo). He predicts that a
new LTTE offensive could occur following the Geneva talks.
Alternatively, the LTTE may not want to jeopardize its
popular support by spoiling its reputation within the
international community. He suggested that the timing of
future talks will hinge on key issues unfolding, including
the resumption of violence (with any future talks then
restarting in April or May). Alternatively, if the two
central Sri Lankan political parties cooperate on the budget,
he predicted that talks could resume in January.


11. (C) Hanssen-Bauer was frustrated with Norway's role as
the seemingly only conduit through which the LTTE could send
its requests to the international community and vice versa.
Calling Norway "a channel overloaded with messages," he noted
that the sheer volume of LTTE requests hampered Norway's
focus on arguably more substantive efforts leading up to the
peace talks. Norway is overloaded in the other direction as
well, he added, with at least half of his sessions with the
LTTE always filled with tough messages from the international
community, leaving too little time to discuss concrete issues.

Comment
--------------

12. (C) Although not explicitly stated, it appears that
Norway is observing (and considering) the actions of the
parties immediately following the Geneva talks in devising a
future negotiation strategy. Whether Norway would advocate a
suggested political agenda (in line with the Tokyo Co-Chairs
meeting) was not addressed in the meeting. We will continue
to closely follow their evolving thinking.
Johnson