NORWEGIAN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN SUDAN, IRAQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OSLO 001344

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2016
TAGS: PREF PREL EAID NATO SU NO AF SL IZ
SUBJECT: NORWEGIAN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN SUDAN, IRAQ
AND AFGHANISTAN AND VIEWS ON SRI LANKA

REF: A. SECSTATE 179828

B. OSLO 1323 (NOTAL)

Summary
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1. (C) In an October 30 tour d'horizon, Norwegian Minister of
Development Assistance Erik Solheim reviewed Norway's
approach to Sudan, Afghanistan, Iraq and Sri Lanka. He cited
unhappiness with the multilateral aid mechanisms Norway has
been using in the Sudan, saying Norway may have to switch to
aid through bilateral and NGO projects. On Afghanistan, he
underlined his view that political stability must come first
and that Norwegian aid will be used to that end. With regard
to Iraq, Solheim pointed out the obstacles to Norway's
assistance but promised to consider participating in or
observing the Compact process. Finally, Solheim suggested
that no progress in the Sri Lankan talks is likely until the
fighting dies down again. End Summary.

Sudan
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2. (C) On October 30, the Ambassador met with Norwegian
Minister of Development Erik Solheim to review the GON's
approach to development assistance and thoughts on aid to
specific countries. The Ambassador conveyed ref a points on
funding to Sudan. Solheim responded that Sudan is Norway's
top recipient of aid, surpassing Palestine and others.
Norway is however troubled by the inefficiency of the aid
mechanisms it has been using, particularly the World Bank
Multi-Donor Trust Fund. Over the past two years, the World
Bank and UNDP have failed to coordinate and ensure the aid
flows properly, engaging in "ridiculous" legal disputes. In
light of this, Norway is considering pulling funding from
multilateral entities and moving it to NGOs and bilateral
projects. A decision on this matter may be taken within
several weeks. Solheim will be traveling to Sudan November
13 to assess the situation.


3. (C) Looking at the challenge in the Sudan more broadly,
Solheim said that the key goal must be to ensure peace. Only
later can issues such as justice be addressed. He suggested
that the Sudanese government's problems with allowing in a UN
force stem from their fear that the UN force will seek to
arrest them and bring them to international justice. This
represents a total misreading of the UN mandate but
nonetheless remains a real concern to the government.
Solheim also noted that his government has been talking to US
Special Envoy on Sudan Natsios and that the possibility of
Norwegian troops somehow serving with the AU troops has been
raised. He said although this is a surprising idea, the GON
has not yet closed the door on it. (Note: After this
meeting, we were requested to assist with arranging a
telephone call between Solheim and Natsios in preparation for
the November 13 trip. We are working to coordinate this with
the respective offices.)

Afghanistan
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4. (C) The Ambassador reviewed the GON's recent decision not
to provide additional troops to ISAF, choosing instead to
focus on development assistance in Afghanistan. Solheim
responded that in Afghanistan the political situation is key.
Without political stability, military force and development
assistance will have little meaning. Therefore, the GON
wants to use its assistance to support political structures
that can bring stability. Solheim noted that this may result
initially in an Afghanistan that is not to his taste-ie an
Afghanistan where women's rights for example are not fully
permitted. Nonetheless, a start must be made with a
political situation that is acceptable to the culture. For
that reason, Norway plans to throw its development assistance
behind efforts to produce stability, even in a less than
ideal state. He noted that the GON now accepts that it is
permissible to provide assistance in furtherance of political
aims. In this vein, Norway will be providing development
assistance particularly in areas covered by its PRT. Solheim
himself will be traveling to Afghanistan with the Minister
for Defense - a reflection of the desire to coordinate aid
with military efforts. (See ref b for a discussion of MFA
Afghan Coordinator Eide's views on international coordination
and GON assistance in Afghanistan.) Solheim stressed that
the Norwegian aid to Afghanistan will increase per the GON's
recent promise (see ref b).

Iraq
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5. (C) Turning to Iraq, the Ambassador pointed out that for
the same reasons assistance is needed to shore up political

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progress in Afghanistan, Norway should consider contributing
in Iraq. He noted that Norway's oil expertise would be
especially welcome in Iraq. Solheim explained clearly that
Iraq continues to be a very difficult place for Norway to put
aid. Only if there were some political trigger to signal
change, could Norway to consider providing more or different
assistance in Iraq. (Comment: the recently established Iraqi
Ambassador to Norway could theoretically provide such a
trigger by being able to appeal directly to the Norwegian
government and public on behalf of the Iraqi people.)


6. (C) The Ambassador urged Solheim to consider GON
participation in the Iraq Compact process so they would
better understand Iraq's needs and consider whether Norway
has a role to play in the matter. Solheim agreed to consider
participating in or observing the process.

Sri Lanka
--------------

7. (C) In discussing the disappointing outcome of the most
recent Sri Lankan talks, Solheim vented his frustration with
both sides. He felt there is little hope for progress until
the fighting dies down again, something he expects to happen
as the Sri Lankan government faces more setbacks. That said,
he fears the leadership of neither side gets much objective
news and this presents a serious obstacle to realistic talks.

Comment
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8. (C) Norway's development assistance is being used in many
cases, with the notable exception so far of Iraq, in parallel
with our efforts. The increasing use of development
assistance by Norway to achieve political goals reinforces
many of our tranformational diplomacy approaches. A meeting
October 31 with the MFA's Peace and Reconciliation Office
being reported septel furthers our view that we have much to
gain from well coordinated approaches with Norway. End
Comment.
Whitney