Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06OSAKAKOBE332
2006-06-23 07:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Osaka Kobe
Cable title:  

DIET MEMBER CHUMA ON LDP ELECTION: RACE IS OPEN

Tags:  PGOV PREL JA 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OSAKA KOBE 000332 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT. PASS TO USTR/WENDY CUTLER, MICHAEL BEEMAN
PASS TO INR/B
COMMERCE FOR OFFICE OF JAPAN/MELCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL JA
SUBJECT: DIET MEMBER CHUMA ON LDP ELECTION: RACE IS OPEN


Classified By: CG Daniel Russel, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OSAKA KOBE 000332

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT. PASS TO USTR/WENDY CUTLER, MICHAEL BEEMAN
PASS TO INR/B
COMMERCE FOR OFFICE OF JAPAN/MELCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL JA
SUBJECT: DIET MEMBER CHUMA ON LDP ELECTION: RACE IS OPEN


Classified By: CG Daniel Russel, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Cabinet Minister Koki Chuma described several
scenarios for the upcoming LDP Presidential election, including
one in which local LDP city and prefectural assemblymen play a
deciding role in who will succeed Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi.
Chuma claimed that front-runners Abe and Fukuda, both from the LDP
Mori faction, are engaged in intense politicking behind the scenes
to improve their odds. Chuma said the role of the so-called
Koizumi children would be greatest in a runoff in an open session
of the Diet, but that FM Aso still had a chance to act as a
kingmaker by throwing his weight behind either of the front-runners.
Chuma was nuanced in his personal support but he characterized Abe
as the candidate most likely to follow through on Koizumi's reforms.
Chuma downplayed the importance of the Yasukuni issue on the PM
race.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) At a one-on-one lunch in Osaka June 21, Mr. Koki Chuma,
Minister of State for Administrative and Regulatory Reform and
LDP Dietmember from Osaka, told the Consul General that there
are several scenarios for how the LDP presidency race will play
out. Fukuda remains a real contender, and even Aso cannot be ruled
out in the event the election goes to a parliamentary runoff.


3. (C) Faction leader and former PM Mori and Fukuda himself
until recently held out hope that Abe could be brought along to
accept the package deal whereby Fukuda, as "sempai" would serve
first then yield to Abe after the 2007 Upper House elections.
Now that it is clear Abe will run there is intense behind the
scenes politicking within the Mori faction. Fukuda is a careful,
traditionalist, methodical politician and is moving slowly while
gauging his support. His personality, experience, and
credentials as a veteran make him quite attractive to many LDP
politicians. There is a chance he will drop out of the race,
although Chuma tended to think he would stay in. Chuma
confirmed that Fukuda very much wants to become PM.


4. (C) Chuma warned me not to underestimate the influence of the

mainstream LDP veteran politicians--especially the Prefectural
and City Assemblymen who act as local political fixers and have
significant clout. Local LDP members will generally vote
according to the "recommendations" of their local political
leaders. Since Fukuda is respected by many of these LDP veterans
as a reliable and steady hand, he may do well in the party
election. The freshmen "children" on the other hand have
virtually no influence in their districts and won't deliver
many votes for Abe. Now that Mori has gotten Koizumi to agree
not to come out publicly in support of Abe, the PM's influence
in the party-wide election will be somewhat muted.


5. (C) If the vote goes to a runoff in the Diet, as seems
likely, then Koizumi's "children's" votes will count heavily.
In this scenario Aso's interests are served well because he has
a chance to act as a "kingmaker" between Abe and Fukuda. Chuma
also entertained the scenario in which Fukuda pulled out at
this point but threw his weight behind Aso, who Chuma claims is
respected for his business experience. Since many Fukuda
followers resent Abe, and many other factions are wary of the
Mori group getting a third consecutive prime ministership, this
scenario is less far-fetched than it might sound, according to
Chuma. Comment: Since Chuma is friends with Aso and from the
same Kono faction, Chuma's comments should be taken with a grain
of salt. End Comment.


6. (C) Koizumi definitely backs Abe, but he is not going to
become a puppet-master like previous prime ministers. He himself
gained power by flouting the traditional backroom deal system and
is not going to play it himself. (Note: Chuma's close connection
with Koizumi and cabinet positions stem from having been one of
the earliest backers to encourage Koizumi to challenge Hashimoto
Ryutaro for the LDP presidency in the mid '90s. End Note.)


7. (C) Chuma said he felt that Abe was far more likely to follow
through on the reforms that Koizumi has launched (and Chuma has
helped implement). He felt strongly that this was only the

OSAKA KOBE 00000332 002 OF 002


beginning and the important and hard work of implementing real
reforms lay ahead. At the same time he emphasized how important
good Sino-Japanese relations were and was clear that under Abe
the process would be harder and slower. China has gone from an
economic threat to Japan (the challenger that was stealing
markets and customers) to become Japan's most important market.
For commercial reasons it was important to improve
Sino-Japanese relations. It was also important for strategic
reasons to prevent the Chinese leadership from using Japan as an
external enemy and an excuse to resist reforms and democratization.
That said, Abe would be able to improve relations with Beijing
over time.


8. (C) He dismissed the Yasukuni Shrine as an issue, saying it has
been "solved." When pressed for an explanation, he said that
the WWII survivors group, whose votes Koizumi had sought when he
initially promised to regularly visit Yasukuni, has atrophied and
now has very little political clout. There is no need for the
LDP to woo them. Chuma said a plan was well in the works for a
secular war memorial in keeping with the Constitutional separation
of church and state. Yasukuni would not be an issue for Abe, he
insisted.
RUSSEL