MAURITANIA: EMEGERNCY ACTION COMMITTEE MEETING

S E C R E T NOUAKCHOTT 000471

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA, DS/DSS/OSAC, PLEASE PASS TO
DS/LNO TO EUCOM PETER HARGAVE PLEASE PASS TO PEACE CORPS.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2016
TAGS: ASEC PREL PTER ABLD CASC MR
SUBJECT: MAURITANIA: EMEGERNCY ACTION COMMITTEE MEETING
(EAC) THURSDAY, APRIL 20, 2006

REF: A. A. TD-314/27617-06

B. B. TD/314-18637-06

C. C. 12 FAH 6 H-113

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOSEPH LEBARON, REASON 1.4 (B),(C),(D)

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(S/NF) Key Points
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-- Emergency Action Committee (EAC) met to discuss recent
threats made by Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
(GSPC),see references A and B, and efforts to mitigate or
respond to those threats referencing.

-- Despite the lack of corroborating information, the EAC is
carefully assessing the current security situation to
mitigate the following: (1.) surveillance against AmEmbassy
Nouakchott by posing as visa applicants to infiltrate a
vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) into
AmEmbassy Nouakchott and detonate within the compound during
the late morning hours inflicting maximum amount of
casualties, (2.) surveillance on U.S. Ambassador,
(3.) threat to kidnap and ransom western tourists traveling
in and around the Adrar area of Mauritania.

-- EAC emphasized the need to strengthen specific security
measures to include the implementation of more vigorous
vehicle inspections to be reassessed after 30 days for those
requesting access to the Embassy compound, reinforce personal
security measures, mitigate vulnerabilities to the
Ambassador, pass tear line information to host country,
encourage personal security safeguards, query all prior visa
applicants within a 90 day window beginning in March 15, 2006
and working backward, and consider implementing a warden
message to warn tourists in the Adrar province.

END KEY POINTS.


1. (S/NF) On April 20, 2006 at 1100 hours the Embassy's
Emergency Action Committee (EAC) met to discuss recently
obtained threat information which added specificity to
previously acquired ambiguous information (reftels A and B).
The threat suggested that GSPC teams have conducted
surveillance operations under the guise of visa applicants in
an attempt to infiltrate AmEmbassy Nouakchott with a VBIED
and detonate within the compound during the late morning
hours ensuring the maximum amount of casualties possible.
Further threat information also indicated separate GSPC teams
were surveilling the Ambassador to monitor his habits and
movements inside the country. Other information indicated a
desire to kidnap western tourists driving sport utility
vehicles in and around the area of Adrar.


2. (S/NF) EAC discussed the implementation of security
measures to mitigate the aforementioned threats in accordance
with a more rigorous interpretation of the policies and
procedures outlined in 12 FAH 6 to cover: vehicle access and
screening, personnel access and screening to include possible
allowances to VIP,s, and mitigating the threats posed to the
Ambassador.


3. (S/NF) The EAC agreed that vehicles will undergo a more
comprehensive screening process prior to obtaining
authorization for access to the compound. The EAC did note
that Visa applicants are prohibited from entering the
security zone that encompasses the embassy, and that any
applicant attempting to enter would be stopped and turned
away by host country National Guard personnel permanently
assigned to protect the Embassy. However, visa applicants
could park within proximity of the Embassy,s outer perimeter
in an area controlled by the Spanish Embassy.


4. (SBU/NF) A vehicle inspection sally port with newly
installed hydraulic barriers is nearing completion, however;
technical difficulties have precluded commencing operations
for the moment. However, upon remedying all of the
deficiencies, and project certification, post will move its
current vehicle screening to the new inspection area and
dismantle the locally fabricated vehicle arrest system
presently used at the former location.


5. (S/NF) EAC discussed means by which to ensure the
Ambassador,s security without impinging upon his ability to
conduct foreign policy. EAC agreed that further restricting
access to the Ambassador,s schedule was warranted, lessening
lead times to the media where their presence is sought, as
well as making sure organizers of private events that seek
the U.S. Ambassador,s attendance take an active role in
arranging an appropriate level of security as a requirement
for his attendance.


6. (S/NF) In addition to the threat tear line information
that has been passed to host country security services,
Mauritanian security officials continue to monitor the
situation and are working diligently to mitigate these
threats. The EAC recommended that the Foreign Ministry also
be informed of the threat and of our efforts to counter the
threat.


7. (SBU/NF) The EAC continues to stress to Embassy employees
the vital importance that all employees take ownership of
their personal security. The EAC has stressed to supervisors
that they have a continuing responsibility to ensure that
sufficient security precautions and practices are being
adhered to by their subordinates. All employees are
repeatedly encouraged to vary routes and times especially
when traveling to and from work.


8. (S/NF) The EAC also agreed that the new, specific
information regarding the possible kidnapping in the Adrar
area of foreign tourists merited further attention. The
Adrar region includes popular tourist locations such as the
historic cities of Chinguetti and Ouadane, and the oasis,
Terjit. The regional capital, Atar, hosts several hotels and
travel agencies that cater to and organize groups traveling
through the desert. There are nine PCVs in Adrar. The EAC
determined that the information did not warrant limiting
travel to Adrar or removing the PCVs from the area but did
consider issuing a Warden Message.


9. (S/NF) Following the meeting, the Embassy received
further information that the purported attackers were using a
female LES as a witting or unwitting accomplice (Ref B).
Embassy is taking immediate and appropriate steps to follow
up on this latest information.

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RECOMMENDATIONS
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10. (S/NF) The EAC made the following recommendations:

-- Immediately implement a more thorough screening of
vehicles. (RSO)

-- Bring new sally port on line as soon as possible. (Post,
OBO, DS)

-- Develop procedures for improved security for Ambassador
during public events, and inform host government of the
threat. (DCM, RSO, PAO)

-- Conduct a detailed name check of names of all visa
applicants who applied at the Embassy 90 days prior to the 15
March 2006. (CONS, RSO)

-- Draft Warden Message for EAC consideration. (CONS, RSO)

-- Interview selected LES to determine whether elicitation
has occurred. (RSO)


LeBaron
LeBaron