Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NOUAKCHOTT1081
2006-09-06 12:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nouakchott
Cable title:  

PRDR: RE-BRANDED, BUT STILL AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE

Tags:  PINR PREL PGOV PHUM EAID KPAO MR 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 001081 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2015
TAGS: PINR PREL PGOV PHUM EAID KPAO MR
SUBJECT: PRDR: RE-BRANDED, BUT STILL AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE
(C-AL6-01339)

REF: A. 2005NOUAKCHOTT 1267

B. NOUAKCHOTT 993

Classified By: CDA Steven Koutsis, Reasons 1.4(b)(d)

-----------
(C) Summary
-----------

-- Despite significant and continuing challenges, the PRDR
(Taya's former political party) remains a top contender for
municipal, legislative, and presidential elections.

-- PRDR's greatest strengths are its organizational and
funding superiority over all other parties, and the fact that
it remains the most recognized political party, with most
voters knowing little about the other 34 contenders.

-- If the PRDR leadership is to be believed, all the Taya
loyalists "who could not accept change" have left the party,
leaving pro-democracy reformers at the helm.

-- However, regardless of its re-branding efforts, nearly all
Mauritanians still perceive the PRDR as Taya's party, and
this may hurt PRDR candidates attempting to separate
themselves from the former regime.

------------
(C) Comments
------------

-- The PRDR has been fairly silent since the coup, while
other parties have been grabbing headlines and attracting new
candidates and voters (ref B).

-- The municipal and legislative elections will be the real
test for the future of the PRDR. There are three possible
outcomes:

1 - The PRDR wins an absolute majority. The party
would then likely make power-sharing deals with other leading
parties in exchange for support for PRDR's presidential
candidate.

2 - The PRDR performs well, but does not gain a
majority. The party would likely look towards a coalition
with other strong parties in the race to the presidency.

3 - The PRDR's candidates are snubbed by voters. This
would force the party underground, where it would look for
ways to secretly influence the presidential outcome, such as
through financing an independent candidate.

End Summary and Comments.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 001081

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2015
TAGS: PINR PREL PGOV PHUM EAID KPAO MR
SUBJECT: PRDR: RE-BRANDED, BUT STILL AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE
(C-AL6-01339)

REF: A. 2005NOUAKCHOTT 1267

B. NOUAKCHOTT 993

Classified By: CDA Steven Koutsis, Reasons 1.4(b)(d)

--------------
(C) Summary
--------------

-- Despite significant and continuing challenges, the PRDR
(Taya's former political party) remains a top contender for
municipal, legislative, and presidential elections.

-- PRDR's greatest strengths are its organizational and
funding superiority over all other parties, and the fact that
it remains the most recognized political party, with most
voters knowing little about the other 34 contenders.

-- If the PRDR leadership is to be believed, all the Taya
loyalists "who could not accept change" have left the party,
leaving pro-democracy reformers at the helm.

-- However, regardless of its re-branding efforts, nearly all
Mauritanians still perceive the PRDR as Taya's party, and
this may hurt PRDR candidates attempting to separate
themselves from the former regime.

--------------
(C) Comments
--------------

-- The PRDR has been fairly silent since the coup, while
other parties have been grabbing headlines and attracting new
candidates and voters (ref B).

-- The municipal and legislative elections will be the real
test for the future of the PRDR. There are three possible
outcomes:

1 - The PRDR wins an absolute majority. The party
would then likely make power-sharing deals with other leading
parties in exchange for support for PRDR's presidential
candidate.

2 - The PRDR performs well, but does not gain a
majority. The party would likely look towards a coalition
with other strong parties in the race to the presidency.

3 - The PRDR's candidates are snubbed by voters. This
would force the party underground, where it would look for
ways to secretly influence the presidential outcome, such as
through financing an independent candidate.

End Summary and Comments.


1. (C) Following the August 2005 coup, former president

Taya's political party (The Democratic and Social Republican
Party - PRDS) lost a significant amount of members, power,
and influence (ref A). Parliament, which PRDS dominated, was
dissolved, and the new transitional government took several
steps, including the temporary freezing of party assets, to
limit the influence of this body of potential Taya
supporters. Meanwhile, the party struggled with infighting
and an effort to redefine itself, eventually changing their
name to the Republican Party for Democracy and Renewal (PRDR)
(ref A). Despite these challenges, the party remains
extremely strong, and is considered by many to be a top
contender for the municipal, legislative, and presidential
elections.

--------------
PRDR'S STRENGTHS
--------------


2. (C) PRDR's greatest strengths remain its organizational
and funding superiority over all other political parties.
PRDR has offices in each of Mauritania's 13 regions, as well
as in most of the heavily populated towns; while a vast
majority of other parties have only one or two offices.
Estimates of PRDR's assets vary, however, most political
observers agree that they have significantly more resources

NOUAKCHOTT 00001081 002 OF 003


than do all other parties combined. These advantages were
amassed during PRDS' long reign in power, when Taya used his
position to enrich himself, and the party he controlled.


3. (C) Another clear advantage is PRDR's name recognition and
experience. Even with their name change, PRDR remains the
most recognized political party in Mauritania, with most
voters knowing little about the other 34 parties. PRDR
candidates dominated nearly all municipal councils and both
houses of Parliament under Taya. Even with the high rate of
PRDR defections (ref A),most candidates with political
experience were, or still are, PRDR members. In a recent
meeting with the Charge, the political party Union for
Democracy and Progress president Naha Mint Mouknass explained
that "people will vote for the PRDR because they don't know
anything else," adding that "the majority of the country is
still living under the old reality of Taya and the PRDR."

-------------- ---
PRDR'S WEAKNESS - AND ITS STRUGGLE TO ADDRESS IT
-------------- ---


4. (C) PRDR's name recognition is also its greatest weakness.
Regardless of its re-branding efforts, for nearly all
Mauritanians, PRDR remains Taya's party. This association is
likely to hurt PRDR candidates attempting to separate
themselves from the old regime.


5. (C) The new PRDR leadership is well aware of this
weakness, and takes every opportunity to draw a distinction
between the old PRDS and the new PRDR. "This is a completely
different party," PRDR Secretary General Ikrin Ould Mohamed
Vall told Charge in a September 5 meeting. "The old party
was about one man, while the new party is about all
Mauritanians," Mohamed Vall said, adding that "everything has
changed, from our new leadership, to our party policies, to
our platform and principles."


6. (C) Mohamed Vall explained that following PRDR's October
2005 party congress (ref A),"those who wanted to keep the
old party, those who were opposed to our new plan, left the
party and began criticizing us...but they were criticizing
the old PRDR, not the new party we have today." Mohamed Vall
added that "while several parties have formed a coalition
(The Coalition of Forces for Democratic Change) to oppose the
PRDR in the coming elections...the coalition is not strong
and many of its members are talking with us about
partnerships."


7. (C) The true impact of PRDR's association with Taya will
not be known until after the municipal and legislative
elections. If PRDR candidates do well, the party will likely
have significant strength heading towards presidential
elections in March. If on the other hand PRDR's candidates
are rejected by voters, the PRDR will likely look for
alternative means to influence the presidential elections.


8. (C) While Mohamed Vall works hard to give the impression
of a new and unified PRDR, continued infighting and
defections pose a constant threat to the political viability
of party.

--------------
ELECTORAL PROSPECTS
--------------


9. (C) At present it is difficult to know how PRDR's
candidates will do in municipal and legislative elections.
More will be known after candidate lists are formally
submitted between September 20 and 30 for municipal
elections, and October 3 to the 18 for legislative elections.
As for presidential prospects, the municipal and legislative
elections will likely indicate whether PRDR's significant
advantages outweigh the voters' distaste for Taya.


10. (C) Mohamed Vall assured Charge that the PRDR would be
running its own presidential candidate, saying that the
nomination would occur during PRDR's party congress in
December. However, independent presidential hopeful Dahane
Ould Ahmed Mahmoud told Charge that even if PRDR polls well
in municipal and legislative elections, that "there

NOUAKCHOTT 00001081 003 OF 003


association with Taya will make them unlikely to win the
presidency." Dahane explained that "there is an air of
change throughout Mauritania, and the people do not want
another Taya." He said that instead, the PRDR would look to
support an independent candidate, such as himself.


11. (C) However, if PRDR candidates are poorly received in
November, the party could consider forming a coalition or
look towards some other tactic to influence the elections.
Koutsis