THE GREATEST THREATS TO THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 001000

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2016
TAGS: PINR PREL PGOV PHUM EAID ASEC KPAO MR
SUBJECT: THE GREATEST THREATS TO THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
(C-AL6-01048)

REF: NOUAKCHOTT 764

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Classified By: Amb. Joseph LeBaron, Reasons 1.4(b)(d)

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(C) Key Points
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-- The largest threat to the democratic transition is another
coup led by military officers dissatisfied with how the
transition is unfolding.

-- While overt/overt electoral interference by the military
council cannot be ruled out, it seems unlikely.

-- If the council were to interfere, they would likely follow
a more subtle path through secret campaign contributions,
backroom candidate endorsements or by adopting electoral
procedures that favor particular parties.

-- However, there is no evidence to date that the council is
backing any candidate or party.

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(C) Comments
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-- While rumors abound about fissures in the CMJD, we have
seen no concrete evidence of this. Our best guess is that
the transition will go to its end, resulting in elections
that will be accepted by both Mauritanians and the
international community, with a handover to the civilian
government as planned.

-- However, many questions remain about what comes next and
the post-election role of Fal and the other council members.
The military has always played a significant role here, and
elections alone will not change that, nor will they change
Fal or the military's influence over public affairs.

-- Striking the correct civil-military relationship will
likely be among the new government's most formidable tasks.

End Key Points and Comments.

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A COUP - THE LARGEST THREAT TO SUCCESSFUL ELECTIONS
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1. (C) The current democratic transition was set into motion
following the coup of August 2005, and ironically, a new coup
presents the largest threat to the ultimate success of the
transition. As the transition to democracy will not end with
the presidential elections in March, but will take years to
build up, so too will the threat of a coup remain for the
foreseeable future.


2. (U) On June 20 the government arrested several high
ranking military officers and civilians for allegedly
plotting a coup (reftel),and both government officials and
citizens alike believe additional coup attempts are possible.


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WHY AND FROM WHERE?
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3. (C) Mauritania's long history of coups (from Colonel Saleh
in 1978 to Army Chief of Staff Taya in 1984 to Colonel Fal in
2005) have all come from high-ranking military officers close
to the head of state. While it seems likely that a future
coup would also come from an officer, it is not clear how
close this officer might be to Fal or the council. Some
believe the next coup will come from officers close to former
president Taya (such as the men recently arrested),while
others believe the coup will stem from members of the
military council who are disaffected by the process.


4. (C) Other possible threats to the transition, including
civil strife and extremist activity, grow less likely as the
process continues. Aggrieved minorities seem to have

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accepted the process despite its flaws and the government's
lack of responsiveness to their concerns, and the government
has kept a good lid on extremist activity.


5. (C) A coup prior to the elections could be led by officers
who feel they are not getting their share of the new found
wealth that this transitional government has amassed. There
are rumors that Fal is feathering his own bed (septel),and
that other officers, who have not been at the trough so long,
might be resentful. Another scenario would have officers
derailing the process because they dislike the way the
elections are going (if an Islamist or non-White Moor became
the presidential front runner for example).


6. (C) Even following the elections, the possibility of
another coup remains strong if the military leaders sense
that their economic welfare is threatened or fear that the
new government might represent a personal risk to the
officer, either through a military restructuring or perhaps
through pursuing convictions for past human rights abuses
committed by officers in the 1980s and 90s (Taya is currently
being pursued in a Belgian court for such abuses).

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WILL THE COUNCIL INTERFERE IN THE TRANSITION?
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7. (C) While overt/overt electoral interference by the
military council cannot be ruled out, it seems unlikely. The
council's actions to date have been consistent with the
democratic transition plan they agreed to in negotiations
with the US, EU, and UN, and the June 25 constitutional
referendum to limit important powers of the president was
deemed free and fair by all observers, including post. In
short, they have gone to a lot of trouble to do it right if,
in the end, they intend to explicitly interfere and throw it
all away.


8. (C) If the council were to interfere, they would likely
follow a more subtle path of influencing the election outcome
through secret campaign contributions, backroom deals to
endorse specific candidates or by adopting electoral
procedures that favor particular parties (such as public
funding for political campaigns). They would likely work
within the democratic system, rather than against it. For
many observers, it seems probable that the council will
follow this more subtle approach (either in an organized
fashion or with council members acting independently).

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WILL THE COUNCIL STEP DOWN?
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9. (C) Yes. It seems likely that the council and Fal will
step down. He will probably retire as well, to build on his
legacy and possibly prepare for a run at the presidency
sometime in the future. However, the more important question
is what comes next? What will they do after they hand over
power? What role will the military play in the civilian
government? The answers to these questions are much more
difficult.


10. (C) It seems clear that the military will remain a
central player in the Mauritanian power balance. They have
always had significant power (most often through direct rule
of the country),and elections alone will not change that.
While some may retire, most council members will likely
remain the most powerful military leaders in the country, and
will therefore likely continue holding many of the strings.
Even when some leaders leave, the seconds in command are
ready to step up and provide continuity.


11. (C) Thus it will be incredibly important that the new
government form a positive relationship with the military,
while not ceding too much power to this long-standing
authority. If too much power is handed back to the military,
then the democratic transition will have only succeeded in
electing a puppet government; while if the new government
tries to drain too much power to quickly from the military,
the threat of another coup will dramatically increase. In
either case, striking the correct civil-military relationship

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is likely to be among the new governments most formidable
tasks.
LeBaron