Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NICOSIA975
2006-06-26 13:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

"TRNC" LOCAL ELECTIONS: SERDAR DENKTASH BIGGEST

Tags:  PGOV PREL EUN EU TU CY 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHNC #0975/01 1771348
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261348Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6270
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0578
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000975 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL EUN EU TU CY
SUBJECT: "TRNC" LOCAL ELECTIONS: SERDAR DENKTASH BIGGEST
WINNER

REF: A. NICOSIA 935


B. NICOSIA 203

C. 05 NICOSIA 1883

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000975

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL EUN EU TU CY
SUBJECT: "TRNC" LOCAL ELECTIONS: SERDAR DENKTASH BIGGEST
WINNER

REF: A. NICOSIA 935


B. NICOSIA 203

C. 05 NICOSIA 1883

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. Turkish Cypriots voted on June 25 for two
empty seats in the "parliament," as well as for mayors and
local officials in the north's 28 municipalities (ref a).
While the ruling CTP of "President" Talat won both empty
seats, they suffered serious setbacks at the municipal level,
losing control of Nicosia to a candidate from the DP of
Serdar Denktash. The main opposition UBP suffered even worse
losses, and saw the overall number of municipalities in its
control drop by more than one third. The DP's unprecedented
victory in Nicosia marks a milestone in Serdar's attempts to
displace the UBP as the main party on the nationalist right,
but the DP still has a long way to go if it is to break out
of its perennial third-place position. The UBP's poor
showing will probably trigger another leadership struggle in
the beleaguered party. Despite some post-election posturing
by both Soyer and Serdar, the current CTP-DP partnership
seems unlikely to break up, although tense discussions are
likely over what portfolio changes -- if any -- would be
appropriate in light of each party's electoral successes.
These elections, which focused heavily on local issues, are
unlikely to cause any significant shift in Turkish Cypriot
macro-policy on the Cyprus problem, although the strong
showing of Serdar's DP is in part a reflection of Turkish
Cypriots' growing impatience with Talat's previously flexible
line. The advent of a nationalist mayor in Nicosia (who is
also rumored to be terribly corrupt) may pose difficulties
for many of the UN-brokered development and cultural heritage
programs the USG finances in the city, as well as overcoming
the impasse on opening Ledra Street. END COMMENT.

CTP DOES WELL IN "PARLIAMENT"...
--------------


2. (C) June 25 elections in the "TRNC" yielded mixed results
for the ruling CTP. The party of "President" Talat and "PM"
Soyer picked up both empty seats in the "parliament,"

increasing its overall number of "MPs" to 25 (out of 50).
CTP insiders credit their relatively comfortable by-election
victories to a well-financed campaign machine and a hopeful,
forward-leaning message on "national" issues (such as
relations with the EU). Optimistically, they point to the
relatively high turnout (75 percent) as evidence that voters
have not lost their enthusiasm for the CTP's pro-solution
rhetoric and policy goals. Observers outside the party,
however, note that the party faced unusually anemic
competition for the open seats -- suggesting that the CTP's
by-election clean sweep reflects less of an enthusiasm for
the party than the lack of a credible alternative.


3. (C) While the CTP's new 25-seat tally will not be enough
for them to rule alone, it does eliminate the possibility of
any other combination of parties pushing the CTP out of
"government." The CTP's two new seats also give Soyer the
theoretical option of ditching his coalition partner, the
nationalist DP of Serdar Denktash, and seeking to form a
partnership with other parties or individual defectors.


4. (C) Sources close to both Soyer and Serdar suggest that
this is unlikely, however, despite the open friction between
the two men. The current 32-seat CTP-DP coalition is the
most mathematically stable possible arrangement. And
although the "PM" and "DPM" spar openly over Cyprus policy,
they have developed a live-and-let-live approach to other
issues of government -- an arrangement both are reluctant to
disrupt. Still, insiders from the CTP have hinted they may
try to capitalize on their improved parliamentary position by
seeking concessions from Serdar, either by taking back one of
his "ministerial" portfolios or assuming control of
sub-cabinet agencies.

... BUT SERDAR'S DP GAINS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL
--------------


5. (C) CTP's success in "parliament," however, was
overshadowed by DP gains at the municipal level, especially
the victory of businessman-turned-politician Cemal
Bulutoglulari in the Nicosia "mayoral" race. Although the
CTP increased the overall number of municipalities under its
control from 5 to 8, the loss of the capital and largest city
was a severe blow. Despite a reputation for corruption and
thuggishness, Bulutoglulari narrowly defeated the incumbent
CTP "mayor" Kutlay Erk with a splashy campaign that made
several expensive (and implausible) promises, while playing
on voters' sense that Erk devoted more time to his role as

NICOSIA 00000975 002 OF 003


CTP's globe-trotting foreign affairs spokesman than to fixing
the city's abysmal public services.


6. (C) DP gained elsewhere, increasing the total number of
municipalities it controls from 4 to 7. The party also came
within one vote of victory in Dikmen, and within 15 votes in
the UBP stronghold of Iskele. DP may emerge victorious in
these municipalities if recounts go their way. (COMMENT:
Challenges must be filed within 24 hours, so recounts can be
completed in time for the new "mayors" to take office on June

29. END COMMENT.) Serdar, who celebrated the Nicosia
victory with a joyous speech and fireworks, claimed that the
DP's electoral success proved that his party was well on its
way to displacing the UBP as the largest party on the right.
He also threw down the gauntlet to the CTP, suggesting that
any attempt to alter the coalition at his expense would
trigger a government collapse and early elections.


7. (C) But skeptics are quick to point out that, despite its
heady buzz in Nicosia and a handful of smaller towns, the DP
has a long way to go before it breaks out of its traditional
number-three position "nationwide." The party barely
registered in mayoral races in Famagusta, Kyrenia, and
Morphou, and was never seriously in the running for either of
the "parliamentary" seats. As one journalist noted, the
Nicosia race was about controversial and colorful local
personalities; the DP does not yet have the sort of credible
grassroots organization necessary to sustain its upswing.

UBP REELING
--------------


8. (C) The UBP was the biggest loser in this race. It failed
to mount a credible challenge for either open "MP" spot, and
saw an overall reduction of over 30 percent in the number of
municipalities it controls (from 16 to 10). The party had
only a handful of solid victories, including Morphou
(Guzelyurt),where the popular incumbent trounced his DP and
CTP challengers. The only other comparatively bright spot
was Famagusta, where a UBP candidate came unexpectedly close
to unseating the popular CTP "mayor."


9. (C) Most observers agree that the UBP's losses were
crippling, however, and party insiders expect pressure will
mount for the young, inexperienced Huseyin Ozgurgun to step
aside as party chairman. A leadership struggle between
(somewhat more) moderate UBP'ers and hard-line nationalists
led by the (somewhat more) charismatic Tahsin Ertugruloglu
seems likely at some point in the future (ref b).

COMMENT - SO WHAT?
--------------


10. (C) It seems unlikely that the June 25 elections will
produce any immediate changes in Turkish Cypriot policies on
the Cyprus question. For one thing, the most important
elements of Cyprus policy -- such as how and when to engage
with the UN -- are largely matters for "President" Talat to
work out, either on his own or with Ankara. Nonetheless, the
"PM" and cabinet do make policy decisions with broader
implications, such as how "TRNC" officials should help or
hinder trade across the Green Line. But although minor
changes in the cabinet are possible, a major shift in the
"government's" overall approach to these matters is unlikely.
The momentum gained by the DP (in Nicosia) and the gains
made by the CTP (in "parliament") could well cancel each
other out -- resulting in a continuation of the
"government's" uneasy balance between pro-solution instincts
and nationalist impulses, both here and in Ankara, that
increasingly hold them in check.


11. (C) Ironically, the local elections -- especially in
Nicosia -- could have a greater immediate effect on U.S.
interests. The victory of a DP candidate who shares Serdar's
nationalist agenda could complicate USG-backed initiatives
like the Nicosia Master Plan, which are most successful when
authorities on both sides show pragmatic flexibility on joint
projects. Bulutoglulari seems even less likely than his
predecessor to come up with creative solutions to problems
like the Ledra Street impasse (ref c),and more likely (if
rumors are true) to use his office to further his own
business interests and help Serdar distribute patronage.


12. (C) Turkish Cypriots appear to have lost the idealistic
enthusiasm for Europe and reunification that led them to give
such overwhelming support to avowedly pro-settlement forces
in previous elections. The CTP's pro-solution rhetoric got
much less mileage than it has in the past, while Serdar's
rejectionism no longer seems like much of an electoral
liability. If this election has any significance beyond
local issues, it is as a barometer of Turkish Cypriot

NICOSIA 00000975 003 OF 003


disappointment over the Cyprus stalemate, and the resulting
resurgent nationalism. END COMMENT.
SCHLICHER