Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NICOSIA816
2006-06-02 13:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR'S JUNE 1 LUNCH WITH PRESIDENTIAL

Tags:  PREL PGOV TU CY 
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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNC #0816/01 1531341
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021341Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6112
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 4656
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 3603
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1199
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0477
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0558
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000816 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2021
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU CY
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S JUNE 1 LUNCH WITH PRESIDENTIAL
DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR TASOS TZIONIS: TECHNICAL COMMITTEES AT
AN IMPASSE


Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher; Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000816

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2021
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU CY
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S JUNE 1 LUNCH WITH PRESIDENTIAL
DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR TASOS TZIONIS: TECHNICAL COMMITTEES AT
AN IMPASSE


Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher; Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In a private lunch on June 1, Ambassador
Schlicher and President Papadopoulos' Diplomatic Advisor
Tasos Tzionis discussed the current state-of-play in the
UN-led technical talks, as well as Turkey's EU accession
prospects, and the possibility of a visit by DAS Bryza to
Cyprus in the near future. Tzionis acknowledged that the
technical talks appeared to be at an impasse, and UN SRSG
Moeller, while not ready to throw in the towel, was already
probing for ideas on how to announce that the process had
failed. Tzionis believed that alleged backsliding by the
Turkish Cypriot participant reflected Ankara's interest in
ensuring that no progress was made. The Ambassador pressed
Tzionis hard on the issue of Turkey's EU accession process,
stressing that a breakdown in the negotiations would have
severe negative repercussions for the Cyprus issue. The ROC
needed to be both creative and flexible, rather than relying
on narrowly-interpreted points of law. Tzionis said that he
hoped we were delivering a similar message to Ankara, which
was ignoring overall EU sentiment with respect to its
obligations. GOC ideas on Famagusta/Varosha were still on the
table and could help Turkey on the EU track. The Ambassador
noted that DAS Bryza might visit the island soon. He would
want to meet with both Papadopoulos and Turkish Cypriot
leader Talat. We wanted to signal this in advance in order
to avoid any potential "Straw problem." Tzionis replied that
Bryza was a "political personality," and the Straw rules
might apply. End Summary.


Technical Talks Stymied
--------------


1. (C) Tzionis told the Ambassador that the UN technical
talks -- in which Tzionis himself represents the Greek
Cypriot side -- appeared to be at an impasse, although it was
too early to declare the effort dead. UN SRSG Michael
Moeller had met with Tzionis and Turkish Cypriot
representative Rasit Pertev on May 31, but the parties had
again failed to reach agreement. Tzionis had also met
privately with both Moeller and Pertev earlier in the week.

Moeller had already begun to probe gently for ideas on how to
announce publicly that the technical talks process had
failed.


2. (C) Tzionis observed that, at a few junctures in the
three-way talks, the parties had come close to agreement, but
"something had happened" on the Turkish Cypriot side to
scuttle the deal. In comments that track with the private
observations of Moeller, this was expressed in the talks
through Pertev's backtracking on previously-agreed language
and long arguments about terminology ("sides" vice
"communities" in particular). The current Turkish Cypriot
stance, according to Tzionis, was to agree to nothing beyond
the most narrow interpretation of the committee's mandate to
deal with everyday "technical" issues. In their most recent
meeting, Pertev had gone so far as to refer to the purpose of
the process as one of promoting the "normalization" of
everyday relations. Obviously, declared Tzionis, the Greek
Cypriot side had no interest in a process that served only to
increase "separateness." Asked for his take on why the
Turkish Cypriots had adopted this approach, Tzionis asserted
that Ankara had decreed that the process should not move
forward. He acknowledged, however, that he had no real proof
that this was the case. He speculated that Turkish Cypriot
leader Mehmet Ali Talat might also be adopting a truculent
stance as a means of both assuaging Ankara and posturing for
upcoming Turkish Cypriot elections.


3. (C) The Ambassador asked Tzionis whether the most recent
Annan-Talat letter and the SYG's latest UNFICYP report might
help move the process, and the Turkish Cypriots in
particular, closer to agreement. Tzionis replied that these
documents contained elements that should provide the Turkish
Cypriots with sufficient political cover to take action, but
had so far seemed to make little difference. It was also
possible, he continued, that the main Turkish/Turkish Cypriot
aim at the moment might be to "destroy Moeller," whom he
described as "frustratingly scrupulous" about not taking
sides. At one point, Moeller had tried to catalyze some
movement in the technical talks process by suggesting the
sides agree to the immediate functioning of two committees --
with each party to choose one. The Turkish Cypriot side had
chosen the committee on crime, to which the Greek Cypriot


side immediately agreed. The Greek Cypriots had chosen
"economic integration." Pertev balked, arguing that the
committee had to be styled as one of "economic convergence."
Tzionis said that he had then suggested the moniker "economic
convergence and integration," but Pertev had rejected this --
along with the Greek Cypriot proposal that the Euro be
accepted as legal tender in the north when the ROC entered
the Eurozone.


4. (C) Tzionis reported that plans for a Talat-Papadopoulos
meeting in the context of the arrival of a new third member
for the Committee on Missing Persons were "still on." The
Greek Cypriot side was hoping, however, that there could be
more to the meeting than simply a meeting.

Little New Thinking on Turkey and the EU
--------------


5. (C) The Ambassador pressed Tzionis hard on the issue of
Turkey's EU accession process, emphasizing that a breakdown
in the negotiations would have severely negative
repercussions for the Cyprus issue, particularly if the ROC
itself was seen as the culprit. Other EU states with other
agendas -- such as the idea of "preferential partnership" --
would seek to hide behind the ROC, when in fact their
objectives with respect to Turkey's membership prospects were
very much at odds with those of the ROC, or the United
States. Cyprus indeed had cards to play and would naturally
look to make its points in the process. At the same time,
Cyprus would actually lose leverage on the accession issue if
it overplayed its hand. The Ambassador noted that, to him,
this meant that the ROC needed not simply to rely on narrow
interpretations of legalities, but instead to be creative in
finding a way forward. Ideally -- though the UN and EU
processes were separate -- Cyprus and the international
community could create circumstances of positive synergy on
both tracks. Stalemate on either track, however, was likely
to undercut the chances for progress on the other track.


6. (C) Tzionis replied that he hoped the USG was also
advising Turkey to be creative on the accession issue as
well, since, as far as he could tell, Ankara was ignoring
overall EU sentiment with regards to the nature of its
obligations. President Papadopoulos had put forward ideas in
the UN forum on Famagusta and Varosha that would also have
helped Turkey on the EU track, ideas that he knew Talat
actually agreed with but to which Ankara objected. Thus, as
the ROC saw it, Ankara was precipitating crises in both fora.
He professed puzzlement at this, and wondered whether
Erdogan was actually seeking to manufacture crises as a means
of managing his domestic problems with the Turkish General
Staff and with rising nationalist sentiment. It was also
possible, he speculated, that Turkey was simply waiting to
see if the EU, the UN, the United States and/or the UK were
somehow going to salvage the situation for Ankara. The
Ambassador reinforced the importance of the ROC's adopting a
flexible, pro-active approach. ThE GOC shoqld Recognize p`qT
iiad sdrong iugristS in t"fyI~'`dubbed&&|he 02ob'kzQQJ4urky&w.m[3QS3ioo-&:bQQzajsld*4pQQ/ o=vh%pr34rv%fSQlUMQMQ-"4#!QM-l,*")/1Q%}l.,-Qq Q=}m,would visit the island soon. We did not have notional dates,
but wanted to signal well in advance the possibility of a
visit in order to avert any potential "Straw problem." If he
did come, Bryza would want to meet with both President
Papadopoulos and Mehmet Ali Talat. It was in Cyprus'
interest that this be accomplished without rancor. The
Ambassador reminded Tzionis of several government statements
during the Straw dust-up to the effect that non-ministerial
visitors would not be bound by the "Straw rules." We wanted
to work cooperatively with the GOC to ensure a smooth visit
when the time came. Tzionis replied that Bryza was a
"political personality," and that the Straw rules might
apply. The Ambassador noted that a DAS was not a
ministerial-level job and Bryza was an FSO like himself.
Tzionis commented that, protocol-wise, Papadopoulos did not
have to receive a DAS. True, the Ambassador replied, but it
would be strongly in the interests of both countries for the
President to receive Bryza and hear him out. The Ambassador
promised to keep Tzionis apprised, and noted that he might
choose to go straight to the President with the issue.


Comment
--------------


8. (C) Tzionis' comments on the technical talks process
track with what Moeller has been telling us off-line, though
the SRSG is more reluctant to point the finger at Turkish
Cypriot foot-dragging. On Turkey's EU accession process, it
seems clear that, at this point, there is little creative
thinking going on in the Presidency, and that neither Ankara
nor Nicosia is demonstrating much in the way of flexibility.

SCHLICHER