TURKISH "AMBASSADOR" HOLDS A HARD LINE ON THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000726

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2021
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU CY
SUBJECT: TURKISH "AMBASSADOR" HOLDS A HARD LINE ON THE
CYPRUS ISSUE

REF: USUN 992

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher; Reason 1.4 (b)
and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In a May 16 conversation with Ambassador
Schlicher, Aydan Karahan, the Turkish "Ambassador" to the
"TRNC," stressed that Ankara was still waiting for a reply to
both the Gul proposal from January on the mutual easing of
restrictions and the April 4 letter from Turkish Cypriot
leader Mehmet Ali Talat to UN SYG Annan. The Turkish side
would continue to insist that the UN respond. In the
meantime, Ankara supported the work of the technical
committees but objected to any effort by the Greek Cypriot
side to include political issues on the agenda.
Famagusta-Varosha, in particular, was clearly a final status
issue. While Karahan stressed that he had nothing against UN
SRSG Moeller "personally," he complained about Moeller's
perceived pro-Greek Cypriot bias and poor coordination
between UNFICYP and UN headquarters. The Ambassador
emphasized our support for Moeller's and the importance of
Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots regaining the initiative in
the public relations game. Karahan complained about Cyprus
becoming an issue for Turkey's EU accession process. This
was never something Ankara had accepted. Cyprus was still "a
national issue" for Turkey. For now, Turkey was focused on
the UNFICYP report and was looking to the United States to
ensure that it was fair and objective. Karahan made it
absolutely clear to us that whenever Turkish and Turkish
Cypriot interests diverged -- as they seem to be doing over
the issue of Famagusta-Varosha -- Ankara's interests would
determine the policy. End Summary.


2. (C) Karahan stressed that Turkish FM Gul had put a
serious proposal for the mutual easing of restrictions on the
table in January and Ankara was still waiting for a response
from the UN. Moreover, Turkish Cypriot leader Talat's April
4 letter to the Secretary General asking Annan whether he
continued to support his name-sake plan remained unanswered.
This was why the Turkish/Turkish Cypriot side had reacted so
strongly to Greek Cypriot attempts to include political
issues on the agenda for the technical committees. Ankara
supported the work of the committees, but would not allow
them to serve as the leading edge of a Greek Cypriot effort
to substitute a piecemeal approach for a comprehensive effort
at negotiating a settlement. The technical committees should
focus only on technical issues. If they proved successful,
it might open the door to a more comprehensive approach. An
issue like Varosha, however, was clearly an element of a
final settlement package that could not be handled separately
from the negotiations on an overall solution. Negotiating a
separate deal on Varosha "would not be in Turkey's national
interest." Allowing the Greek Cypriots to include political
issues on the agenda for the technical talks would be
tantamount to offering "concessions in exchange for nothing."
Karahan emphasized, however, that the Turkish/Turkish
Cypriot side was ready -- in fact eager -- to begin talks on
comprehensive settlement immediately.


3. (C) Although Karahan said that he had nothing against
SRSG Moeller personally, he proceeded to offer a long list of
the UNFICYP COM's ostensible shortcomings, focusing in
particular on his perceived pro-Greek Cypriot bias. Moeller
had also failed to coordinate adequately with New York.
UNFICYP and UN Headquarters often seemed to be giving out
different signals with respect to the handling of the Cyprus
issue. Karahan noted Ankara's interest in seeing a new SRSG
appointed to oversee the political track (Note: a sentiment
he evidently shares with Cypriot President Papadopoulos).
Turkey had been assured, Karahan asserted, that the UN would
appoint a more senior figure to manage the negotiations once
serious talks resumed. In the meantime, Ankara was focused
on the upcoming UNFICYP report. Karahan hoped that the
report, which he assumed Moeller would draft, would be fair
and objective. (Note: It was quite clear that he doubted
this would be the case.) Ankara, he added, was looking to
the United States to ensure that the report reflected
Turkey's positive stance. The Ambassador emphasized our
support for Moeller's efforts to get the parties to agreement
on the technical committees, and dismissed Karahan's charges
of bias as wildly off-base, and urged Karahan to meet
personally with Moeller to seek to clear the air. Karahan
rather contemptuously dismissed the idea.


4. (C) The Ambassador warned Karahan that Turkey and the
Turkish Cypriots were losing the public relations game, and
allowing Papadopoulos to paint Talat as the intransigent

party. This did not reflect the fundamental political
realities, and was not in Ankara's interest. Karahan
expressed little concern over this. The Turkish side was not
blocking progress, he insisted. Rather, Ankara supported the
parties taking up "humanitarian" issues such as the
environment and agriculture as quickly as possible.


5. (C) The Ambassador asked Karahan for his views on
Turkey's EU accession process. The Turkish "ambassador"
complained about Cyprus becoming an issue for Turkey in
negotiations with the EU. "This was never something we
accepted," he said. Cyprus, he reminded the Ambassador, was
still "a national issue for Turkey." The Gul proposal from
January could have benefited all involved in the accession
process, but had so far generated little response.
Meanwhile, Papadopoulos had given an interview to a French
publication ("L'Express") in which he rejected the concept of
federation. The Turkish side had done all that it could and
the Turkish Cypriots had voted in favor of a solution in

2004. Turkey would continue to insist on a reply to both the
Gul proposal and the Talat letter of April 4. (Note Karahan
gave no indication he was aware of the substance of U/SYG
Gambari's recent briefing to the P-5, in which he indicated
that a response to the Gul proposal at least was in the works
(reftel)).


6. (C) The Ambassador asked Karahan whether there had been
any movement on the issue of civilian control of the police
in the north, which Talat has been seeking. Karahan was
cautious in his reply. The security situation on the island
was governed by nothing more than a truce arrangement. Under
those circumstances, it would be a mistake to divide the
command of the security forces.


7. (C) On the issue of municipal elections in the north,
Karahan predicted that both Oktay Kayalp in Famagusta and
Sumer Aygin in Kyrenia would hold onto their seats. The
Nicosia race was closer and would likely come down to a
two-way competition between the incumbent CTP candidate
Kutlay Erk and the DP's Cemal Bulutogullari. Karahan made no
secret of his preference for the DP candidate.

SIPDIS


8. (C) Comment: Karahan's message was unusually hard-line
and his tone somewhat nasty, as indeed it often is with is
Turkish Cypriot interlocutors. He made clear to us that
Turkey's national interests -- which he seemed to define in a
very narrow fashion -- would trump Turkish Cypriot interests
whenever the two came into conflict. The Turkish Cypriots,
meanwhile, are all too aware of this, and Talat's recent
spate of angry letters to the SYG should be understood at
least in part as an effort to shore up his credentials as a
hard-nosed defender of both Turkish and Turkish Cypriot
interests. Karahan represents one wall of the political box
Talat finds himself in as he attempts to revive a serious
effort at negotiating a Cyprus settlement. Karahan's
assurance in emphatically dismissing the possibility of a
deal on Famagusta-Varosha was consistent with what we have
been hearing from our Turkish Cypriot contacts about the
Turkish position. We have seen no sign from the Turkish
officials on the island of any hint of flexibility on this
issue. It is one of several areas -- EU aid is another -- in
which Turkish and Turkish Cypriot interests are increasingly
divergent. This bodes poorly for both the Cyprus issue and
for a smooth review of Turkey's EU-accession process later
this year.
SCHLICHER