Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NICOSIA716
2006-05-17 10:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPERTY COMMISSION BEGINS HEARING

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM EUN TU CY 
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PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0716/01 1371032
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171032Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6009
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0540
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000716 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM EUN TU CY
SUBJECT: TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPERTY COMMISSION BEGINS HEARING
CLAIMS

REF: NICOSIA 440 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, for reasons 1.5 (b) and
(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000716

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM EUN TU CY
SUBJECT: TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPERTY COMMISSION BEGINS HEARING
CLAIMS

REF: NICOSIA 440 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, for reasons 1.5 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. The Turkish Cypriot Property Commission has
begun processing claims from Greek Cypriots displaced from
their properties in the north since the 1974 war -- and
sources close to the body say it may start "closing cases" by
returning land or paying compensation in the coming months.
The Commission, which was set up in March 2006 by the "TRNC"
in response to a property-related ECHR ruling against Turkey,
has received eight applications thus far (with several more
apparently on the way) from Greek Cypriots who are eager for
either restitution or compensation, but nonetheless anxious
to maintain their anonymity in light of political
sensitivities over property issues in the south. A "TRNC
Constitutional Court" challenge, filed by the opposition
nationalist UBP party, seems unlikely to derail the
Commission in the short term. Serious questions remain,
however, regarding the long-term viability of the Commission
-- including whether it can pass muster as "effective remedy"
with the ECHR, how many Greek Cypriots actually apply, and to
what extent Turkey's political support for the Commission
will translate into financial underwriting of what is certain
to be a very expensive exercise. An ECHR-compliant Turkish
Cypriot Property Commission would not solve all Greek Cypriot
claims in the north, but could blunt Greek Cypriot complaints
about continued Turkish human rights violations in the north
-- and put into sharper relief the ROC's legally questionable
confiscation of Turkish Cypriot land in the south. END
SUMMARY.

WORK TRICKLING IN FOR THE COMMISSION
--------------


2. (C) According to local press reports, the Turkish Cypriot
Property Commission has begun to receive applications from
Greek Cypriots displaced from their properties in the north
since the 1974 war. Sources close to the "TRNC government"
say the Commission may start "closing cases" before the end
of summer. The Commission was set up in March (reftel) in

response to the ECHR's 2005 Xenedis-Arestis ruling, which
required Turkey (and its "subordinate local authority," the
"TRNC") to set up an "effective local remedy" to the ongoing
denial of Greek Cypriot property owners' rights over their
pre-1974 houses and land. On paper, the Commission has the
authority to return land to Greek Cypriot owners who apply --
provided the land in question is both unoccupied and not
being used by the military. If the land does not meet these
criteria, the Commission has the option of providing either
delayed restitution (i.e., delayed until after a Cyprus
settlement) or compensation.


3. (C) Since only 3-5 percent of the property in the north
appears to meet the qualifications for immediate restitution
(compared to the estimated 80-90 percent of the "TRNC" that
is Greek Cypriot-owned),observers close to the Commission
feel it will be mainly in the business of handing out
compensation. Any other option involving greater restitution
would be too disruptive to the Turkish Cypriot economy and
society, they claim. Nonetheless, the estimated 1600 Greek
Cypriot property cases against Turkey currently pending at
the ECHR have led to dire predictions in the Turkish Cypriot
papers (especially the nationalist opposition rags) that an
expensive and disruptive flood of claims is on the way. One
story involving the formerly Greek village of Tatlisu
(Akathou),where 49 villagers received notice, as required by
"TRNC" law, that the property on which they were living was
the subject of a claim before the Property Commission
received extensive and melodramatic coverage in the Turkish
Cypriot press.


4. (C) The number of Greek Cypriots who have filed with the
Commission, however, appears to be a very small percentage of
potential claimants. Press reports suggest that just eight
people have applied so far. One Turkish Cypriot legal expert
who advises the "government" on property suggested that more
applications are in the pipeline, but he estimated the number
to be in the "dozens, not hundreds." Another Turkish
Cypriot lawyer told us that she had filed two claims with the
Commission on behalf of Greek Cypriot clients, and that a
third client was "on the verge" of filing -- but had
expressed unease about the scorn he might receive in the
south if he was seen to be asking the "occupation regime" for
"blood money." When she asked him to elaborate, he admitted
he was also worried about the effect filing a claim might
have on the case he had pending at the ECHR.

POTENTIAL APPLICANTS UNCERTAIN, UNWILLING
--------------

NICOSIA 00000716 002 OF 003




5. (C) The hesitation expressed by our contact's undecided
client encapsulates many issues which could ultimately
prevent Greek Cypriots from applying to the Commission in
large numbers. The tenor of public discussion in the south
over the Property Commission has been decidedly negative,
with some lawmakers even calling for legislation to punish
any Greek Cypriot who applied. Uncertainty over the legal
status of the Commission plays an equally important role in
scaring off potential claimants.


6. (C) The ECHR has yet to rule whether the Commission does
indeed constitute "effective local remedy." It is unclear
whether the Commission will offer (or the "TRNC" can afford
to pay) the hundreds of millions of dollars that would be
required should it seek to compensate even a small number of
property owners at fair market prices. At the same time, the
ECHR may decide that restrictions on the Commission's ability
to offer restitution are too strict. As one lawyer pointed
out to us, even a pragmatic claimant (whose only interest was
getting something for his land, not politics) would have
second thoughts about casting his lot with the Commission
when he was not sure what level of compensation he would
receive -- or even whether the Commission itself would be
overturned in court.


7. (C) In an effort to address concerns about political
backlash against applicants, the Property Commission has
agreed to process all claims anonymously. As one lawyer
pointed out, however, the anonymity of applicants can only be
guaranteed if they are willing to ask for compensation rather
than restitution. "You cannot remain unknown if you return
to live in your house or try to resell it," he noted, adding
that "TRNC" law requires current tenants (like the Tatlisu
villagers) to be informed if property they are using is the
subject of a restitution claim (even though property
currently in use would only be subject to delayed
restitution). Greek Cypriots willing to apply to the
Commission for vacant property -- but unwilling to be bought
off -- will therefore have to make the difficult choice
between continued displacement from their land and the
opprobrium of their compatriots.

LEGAL CHALLENGE AND RESOURCE LIMITATIONS: ANKARA BUTTS IN
-------------- --------------


8. (C) In addition to the possibility that the ECHR may rule
against it, the new Property Commission also faces a legal
challenge before the "TRNC Constitutional Court." The main
opposition party, the nationalist UBP, has complained that
the property law is unconstitutional since the "TRNC
Constitution" allows the "government" to establish a
mechanism to compensate for expropriated Greek Cypriot land
-- but does not explicitly mention restitution. The lawyer
representing the "government" in this case (scheduled to be
argued on May 18) is confident that the UBP's challenge will
be thrown out. Pointing to a stack of precedents that would
appear to support the property law, she insists the
opposition's case is on "narrow and shaky" legal ground.


9. (C) Ironically, UBP party leader Huseyin Ozgurgun
privately agrees. In a conversation with us, he admitted
that his party's challenge was unlikely to be upheld, but
that he had felt politically obliged to file the case anyway.
With his eyes firmly on June 25 municipal and parliamentary
bi-elections, the young and untested UBP leader viewed filing
the challenge to the property law (which many of his core
supporters vehemently oppose) as a way to boost his own
nationalist credentials on an issue over which the public is
worried and the ruling CTP of Mehmet Ali Talat looks
potentially vulnerable.


10. (C) Ozgurgun's decision to challenge the law has clearly
ruffled feathers in Ankara -- which has traditionally
supported the nationalist UBP as its stalking horse on the
island. Ozgurgun recounts an hour-long phone conversation he
held recently with PM Erdogan (this has also been discussed
in general terms in the press),in which the Turkish leader
urged Ozgurgun to drop his party's challenge, stressing how
important the Commission was to getting Turkey off the hook
at the ECHR. Ozgurgun reportedly pushed back, arguing that
his electoral base was "forcing" him to file the challenge.
While the two men politely agreed to disagree, UBP insiders
report that the party's relationship with Ankara has
subsequently taken a turn for the worse -- with the local
Turkish Ambassador using colorful language to threaten
Ozgurgun, visiting AKP delegations refusing to meet with UBP
counterparts, and the Turkish Embassy's aid office cutting
off funds to UBP-run municipalities as punishment for
Ozgurgun's temerity.


NICOSIA 00000716 003 OF 003



10. (C) Turkish support for the new Property Commission has
been consistent and open, representing perhaps the most overt
GOT effort to influence Turkish Cypriot policy since the
Denktash era. Turkish Cypriot politicians who drafted the
new property law reject accusations that the Property
Commission is designed solely for Ankara's convenience. The
possibility that the ECHR might rule in favor of the new
body, they note, would not only help defuse economically
disruptive property law suits -- but would also force Greek
Cypriots to deal directly with a Turkish Cypriot body (rather
than Ankara) if they want their land back. While they are
quick to reject accusations that they are after political
recognition for the "TRNC," politicians from the ruling party
nonetheless relish the thought that a Turkish Cypriot
institution might finally gain the international legitimacy
they feel the Greek Cypriots stole from them when they "took
over" the ROC in 1963. In their view, the establishment of
the Property Commission is the result of a confluence of
Turkish and Turkish Cypriot political interests -- such that
Ankara will be more than willing to increase its aid to the
"TRNC" in order to foot the bill for the Commission and the
compensation it awards.


11. (C) This is far from certain, however. While Turkish
Embassy contacts are very tight-lipped about the assistance
they give to the "TRNC," they are nonetheless clear that
Ankara does not have unlimited funds to support the
Commission. A Turkish political officer acknowledged to us
that paying off every Greek Cypriot claimant would cost
hundreds of millions of dollars, and expressed his belief
that the Commission would therefore have to be "reasonable"
in the amount of compensation it awarded to claimants.

COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) With over one third of the "TRNC" budget coming from
Ankara already, the Turkish Cypriots will be unable to afford
the bill if they end up caught between the "rock" of limited
Turkish resources and the "hard place" of multiple,
fair-market-value compensation rulings by the Commission.
Given the limitations the Turkish Cypriots have placed on
potential restitution, however, any systematic low-balling on
compensation could lead to an ECHR ruling that the Commission
does not represent "effective local remedy" for Greek Cypriot
property complaints. The best outcome for the Turkish
Cypriots, therefore, would be to dish out restitution and
compensation sufficient to satisfy the ECHR -- but not so
much as to break the bank. The Turkish Cypriots are hoping
that some Greek Cypriots apply, but that many (if not most)
decide not to sully themselves by petitioning the Commission.
An ECHR-compliant Turkish Cypriot Property Commission would
not solve all Greek Cypriot claims in the north, but could
blunt Greek Cypriot complaints about continued Turkish human
rights violations in the north -- and put into sharper relief
the parallel issue of the ROC's legally questionable
confiscation of Turkish Cypriot land in the south. END
COMMENT.
SCHLICHER