Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NICOSIA698
2006-05-11 14:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

AVOIDING A TRAIN WRECK OVER SHIPS AND PLANES IN

Tags:  PREL PGOV CY 
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VZCZCXYZ0024
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNC #0698/01 1311454
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 111454Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5990
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 4627
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 3574
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1180
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0534
C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000698 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2021
TAGS: PREL PGOV CY
SUBJECT: AVOIDING A TRAIN WRECK OVER SHIPS AND PLANES IN
THE FALL PROGRESS REPORT ON TURKEY

REF: NICOSIA 352

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher; Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000698

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2021
TAGS: PREL PGOV CY
SUBJECT: AVOIDING A TRAIN WRECK OVER SHIPS AND PLANES IN
THE FALL PROGRESS REPORT ON TURKEY

REF: NICOSIA 352

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher; Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: As things stand, Turkey and the EU seem
headed towards a confrontation at some point in the fall over
Ankara's failure to open its ports and airports to
Cypriot-registered traffic. While President Papadopoulos
does not want Turkey's EU accession process to fail, he does
want to use the October progress report to leverage real
concessions out of Turkey. Ankara, for its part, has made
clear that it will not implement the customs union protocol
without meaningful progress in easing the isolation of
Turkish Cypriots. For a range of reasons, and barring an
unexpected change of position in Ankara, the proposed deal on
Famagusta-Varosha is in itself not a viable way out of this
dilemma. The return of Varosha to Greek Cypriot control is a
bridge to far. We should encourage Ankara to come forward
with a serious proposal for the opening of Famagusta that
would -- at a minimum -- wrong-foot Papadopoulos and thus
shift responsibility for the Cyprus deadlock back onto the
Greek Cypriot side. This will not, of course, solve the
problem, but it may at least buy us some valuable time. End
Summary.

Planes, Trains and Automobiles
--------------


2. (C) Just about everyone working for a resolution of the
long-standing Cyprus dispute agrees on at least one point.
The best metaphor for the looming confrontation between
Turkey and the EU regarding access to Turkish ports and
airports for Greek Cypriot registered ships and planes is a
"train wreck". Mixed metaphors aside, there is a real
problem before us, the solution to which will require both
goodwill and creative thinking. Much of this will have to be
generated by us and the EU, as the parties themselves seem to
be in desperately short supply. One point in our favor is
that, while Cypriot President Papadopoulos sees tension
between Turkey and the EU as a point of leverage in Cyprus'
favor, he does not want Ankara's EU accession process to run
off the rails. Papadopoulos is smart enough (and then some)
to understand that a melt-down in the accession talks would

eliminate whatever incentives might now exist for Turkey to
adopt a more accommodating position with respect to the
Cyprus dispute. The Cypriot President will want to get what
he can out of the fall progress report on Turkey, but he is
aware of the real risks inherent in the ROC over-playing its
hand. It is for this very reason that he and the Greeks have
been urging their EU partners to express support for Turkey's
eventual full accession to the EU rather than such lesser
ideas as "privileged partnership."

Varosha-Famagusta: Don't Expect Too Much
--------------


3. (C) Much of the thinking over how to avoid a real
disaster in the October review has centered around a possible
deal for the opening of Famagusta port for direct trade with
the EU and the return of the fenced area of Varosha to its
former (largely Greek Cypriot) inhabitants. In theory, this
agreement would give Turkey the political cover its needs to
fulfill its EU obligations and open its ports to Cypriot
traffic. For a range of reasons, however attractive the idea
is in many respects, we see such a deal as highly unlikely.
Here's why:

-- Turkey seems intent on holding onto Varosha until the
end-game of final settlement negotiations, and reportedly has
reminded the Turkish Cypriots that this is Ankara's position.
We have seen no indications from senior Turkish political
figures -- let alone from someone in authority in the TGS --
that Varosha was even on the table for discussion.

-- The Turkish Cypriot leadership might be willing to
entertain at least opening up Varosha for resettlement, but
would almost certainly balk at returning the fenced-area to
Greek Cypriot control. Moreover, the Turkish Cypriots would
insist on including direct flights into Ercan airport as part
of a separate deal on Varosha, something the Greek Cypriot
side has made clear it will never agree to do.

-- Papadopoulos has laid down clear markers about Famagusta.
Varosha is the quid for the port opening quo. No return of
Varosha; no "direct" trade with the European Union. As near
as we can tell, there is little enthusiasm in EU circles for
re-visiting the idea of direct trade without the support of
Nicosia. Some in EU circles here have floated the idea of

"limited" direct trade for the Turkish Cypriots: allowing
exports but not imports, restricting the volume or types of
goods that could be traded, or something along these lines.
Turkish Cypriots describe this possibility in apocalyptic
language and would almost certainly reject a "half-a-loaf"
offer on direct trade.

-- The Turkish military will have a hard time agreeing to any
foreign role in running the Famagusta port. The collective
administration of the port by Turkish Cypriots, Greek
Cypriots and the EU would be a particularly hard sell.
Famagusta is the only real deep water port in the north and
it would be extremely difficult to separate commercial and
military operations there. Using Kyrenia for exports instead
of Famagusta is not a viable option. The much smaller
Kyrenia port is little more than a glorified ferry-boat
marina. There are no cranes or warehouses, and no berths
suitable for container ships. The wave-breakers at Kyrenia
are inadequate and the port closes frequently in bad weather.


Keeping the Train on the Rails
--------------


4. (C) While it is possible that the parties will reach some
11th hour agreement under pressure from the European Union,
we should be thinking now about what we can do to keep
Turkey's EU accession process on track without the cover of a
Varosha-Famagusta agreement. We have already proposed one
possible way forward (reftel). If Ankara took the initiative
to put a broad-based and challenging package on the table --
including the return of Varosha to Greek Cypriots, full
implementation of the Ankara Agreement and an end to the
blackballing of Cyprus in international organizations in
exchange for the ROC's agreement to direct trade through
Famagusta and direct flights to Ercan airport -- it would
wrong-foot Papadopoulos and ease building pressure in the EU
for a negative report on Turkey in the fall. At a minimum,
it would likely provide enough fodder for Turkey's supporters
in the EU to push off for at least a few months any kind of
decision on freezing the opening of selected chapters or even
suspending talks altogether. It could also have the effect
of helping the UN jump-start a serious effort at negotiations
towards a comprehensive settlement.


5. (C) Another possible approach would be to separate the
issues of Famagusta port and the status of Varosha and try
for a different kind of package. We might suggest to Turkey,
for example, that it offer to open the doors to Cypriot
membership in the full range of international organizations
(including potentially PfP) in exchange for direct trade
through Famagusta port. Without directly linking this deal
to implementation of the Ankara Protocol, Turkey could then
open its own ports and airports to Cypriot traffic without
having to defend a humiliating climb-down. Papadopoulos will
be reluctant to drop Varosha, but a combination of EU
pressure and his own reluctance to see Turkey's EU
aspirations thwarted prematurely might be enough to persuade
him to go along. There are other variations on a theme that
we might consider. The return of Varosha to Greek Cypriot
control, however, is the kind of high-level "concession" that
could only be balanced by a similarly onerous move by the
ROC. The only thing that would come close, in our view, is
Ercan airport. We would note, however, that pressing for
movement on Ercan would raise a host of related and
complicated questions, such as who, precisely, controls the
Flight Information Region.

The Way Ahead
--------------


6. (C) We should not count on Papadopoulos to put any new
ideas in play. He is absolutely secure in his political
position and may well calculate that he can contain the
fallout from a major break between Turkey and the EU over the
implementation of the Ankara Agreement. Some in Nicosia are
already talking about restricting the ROC's demands in the
fall to limited areas of the EU-Turkey agenda (i.e., chapters
on transportation, the free movement of goods or external
relations) rather than adopting a more global approach.


7. (C) For our purposes, it would be best for a new idea to
come out of Ankara; Gul's January proposal, which to many EU
observers contained nothing new, simply did not have the
resonance to get Turkey and the EU through the looming crisis
successfully. Our goal is not to open the Famagusta port
(although that would be nice); it is to forestall a major and
foreseeable blow-out between Turkey and the EU. If Ankara is
seen as the constructive party and Papadopoulos as the
unreasonable maximalist, it will go a long way towards
countering the ROC's argument that the EU need do nothing to
facilitate Turkey's implementing the customs union protocol.
Traditionally, the Cyprus issue has been played as game of
blame-shifting. Turkey and Talat have been on the losing end
of that game since last October. Forcing Papadopoulos to say
"OXI" (or "no") to a reasonable, serious offer should help
rectify that.
SCHLICHER