Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NICOSIA641
2006-04-28 14:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

TALAT PLEASED WITH SECRETARY'S REMARKS; STILL

Tags:  PGOV PREL UN EUN TU CY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8329
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0641/01 1181423
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 281423Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5942
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0529
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000641 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2006
TAGS: PGOV PREL UN EUN TU CY
SUBJECT: TALAT PLEASED WITH SECRETARY'S REMARKS; STILL
PESSIMISTIC ON TECHNICAL TALKS

REF: NICOSIA 503

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher; Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000641

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2006
TAGS: PGOV PREL UN EUN TU CY
SUBJECT: TALAT PLEASED WITH SECRETARY'S REMARKS; STILL
PESSIMISTIC ON TECHNICAL TALKS

REF: NICOSIA 503

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher; Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. "TRNC President" Talat told Ambassador that
he appreciated the Secretary's "balanced" remarks on Cyprus
during her recent visit to Athens. He doubted the technical
talks would start in earnest any time soon, however, and
blamed the Greek Cypriots for tying down the process by
insisting substantive issues also be addressed in that forum.
Greek Cypriot refusal to engage in a dialogue on changes to
the Annan Plan -- as well as UNFICYP Chief Moeller's apparent
willingness to "go along" with Papadopoulos's "delaying"
tactics -- did not bode well for the resumption of
comprehensive settlement talks. Absent comprehensive talks,
little progress on substance would be possible, since the
Turkish Cypriots could not accept a piecemeal approach (for
example a mini-deal involving Varosha). Frustrated, Talat
nonetheless acknowledged the need to keep working with the UN
and Moeller -- as well as the wisdom of meeting Papadopoulos
in the context of the Committee on Missing Persons, even
though he did not expect this meeting to accomplish much.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) In an April 28 meeting with Ambassador, Turkish
Cypriot "President" Mehmet Ali Talat expressed appreciation
for the Secretary's "balanced" and "helpful" remarks during
her recent visit to Athens. He praised U.S. commitment to
advancing a settlement to the Cyprus problem through the
easing of Turkish Cypriot isolation -- and for U.S. support
for Turkey's EU candidacy. He had not gotten an "official"
readout from Turkey about how the Secretary's visit to Ankara
had gone, but felt from the press and "informal" sources that
it had been a success from the Turkish point of view.


3. (C) Turning to the Cyprus settlement process, Talat
expressed continued frustration over what he termed Greek
Cypriot "delaying tactics." The ongoing three-way
discussions between his "Under Secretary" Rasit Pertev, ROC
Presidential Diplomatic Advisor Tasos Tzionis, and UNFICYP
Chief Michael Moeller concerning the start of technical talks

(reftel) were being bogged down by the Greek Cypriot
insistence that the sides also address issues of substance in
the technical talks forum. (Pertev, who accompanied Talat in
his meeting with the Ambassador, chimed in to joke that the
ROC seemed to want to "solve the Cyprus problem before
technical talks could begin.") Talat said he did not object
to discussing substantive issues, but insisted that the Greek
Cypriot side first present a clear and complete list of what
changes they would seek to the existing "plan on the table"
(i.e., the Annan Plan). Piecemeal discussions on individual
subjects (such as Varosha) would only serve to delay an
overall deal, and therefore could not take place outside the
context of comprehensive settlement talks.


4. (C) Talat expressed anger at how the Greek Cypriots had
abandoned their previous acceptance of the Annan Plan as a
"basis" for renewed talks. Imperfect though it may be, Talat
said, the Annan Plan nonetheless represented a compromise.
As such, it was a better starting point than the two sides'
respective fall-back positions ("osmosis" for the Greek
Cypriots, confederation or two states for the Turkish
Cypriots). Greek Cypriot "demonization" of the Annan Plan,
without offering a corresponding counterproposal, showed that
the Papadopoulos administration was hoping negotiations would
drag on indefinitely. Recent Greek Cypriot demands that
negotiations be conducted with "no time limit" (a hardening
of their previous concern about "asphyxiating" deadlines)
only supported this interpretation of Greek Cypriot
motivations, he said.


5. (C) At the same time, Talat was astonished and worried at
the UN's apparent willingness to "play along" with the Greek
Cypriot delaying game. SRSG Moeller had (perhaps
inadvertently, perhaps out of bias) accepted Greek Cypriot
arguments (for example, by insisting that even use of the
term "Annan Plan" was a bad idea, or his reported claim that
elements of the Plan "were against international law.") At
the same time, Moeller appeared to be ill informed about some
basic facts, Talat said -- such as when he mistakenly
insisted to Pertev that the ROC had already presented a
written list of desired changes to the Annan Plan. Talat
hoped that his April 4 letter to SYG Annan would prompt the
UN to clarify its position, and that the UN would state
unequivocally that the Annan Plan remained the basis for
future talks. After all, Talat reasoned, the Plan was
written by the UN so the SYG should still support it.


6. (C) Ambassador stressed to Talat the importance of
engaging with the UN and with SRSG Moeller, and underlined
that personal criticism of Moeller and his approach was

NICOSIA 00000641 002 OF 002


counterproductive. It was in the Turkish Cypriot interest to
see the UN process move forward, first on the technical track
and later -- if all parties agreed -- on substance. This
must involve an honest effort by the Turkish Cypriots to
improve their relationship with Moeller. Talat countered
that it was Moeller's responsibility to prove he was an
impartial mediator, especially since Moeller had "cooked up"
the Paris Declaration, which was so disastrous for the
Turkish Cypriot side. The Ambassador reminded Talat that the
Greek Cypriot press had seriously inflated the importance of
the Paris meeting; the Turkish Cypriots should not shape
their relationship with the UN in response to spin doctors in
the Greek Cypriot media. Ambassador praised Talat for
publicly reiterating his willingness to find a solution that
would allow the two communities to live together (most
recently in a speech marking his 1-year anniversary as
"president"). Staying "one step ahead" in his public
rhetoric, rather than bickering with Moeller or sniping at
Papadopoulos, would help demonstrate that the Turkish
Cypriots were not being intransigent. Talat acknowledged
this point, adding that he realized there was no alternative
to working with Moeller.


7. (C) Talat said he was still willing to meet Papadopoulos
in the context of the Committee on Missing Persons (CMP),but
expressed doubt that the get-together would be worthwhile
since the Greek Cypriot leader had insisted he would not talk
about any subjects other than the missing. Talat worried
that such a meeting could politicize the comparatively
well-functioning CMP -- and allow Papadopoulos to take credit
for having seen Talat without forcing the Greek Cypriot
leader to talk about substantive matters. Talat had agreed
to meet Papadopoulos at any time and in any context, however,
and would stick to his word. Although the UN had not
hammered out the details, the meeting would probably take
place, Talat said, after the new Third Member arrived in
June. But Talat expected little progress, either on
technical committees or on a leaders' meeting, until after
Greek Cypriot parliamentary elections on May 21.


8. (C) COMMENT: Talat seemed genuinely mystified that the
Greek Cypriots could be successfully painting him as the
intransigent party for refusing to discuss substance in the
technical committee context -- when it is so clear (to him,
at least) that blame for the lack of real progress lies
squarely with Papadopoulos. He also seemed to be unaware
that the shrill and defensive tone of his dialogue with the
UN is playing badly, though this point was made several ways
in this meeting. Neither side has broken the press blackout
over the technical committee talks, however, so the Turkish
Cypriots have not aired their frustrations with the process
publicly -- at least not to the same degree as they have in
private. The challenge (especially in light of elections in
the north scheduled for June, when the ruling CTP may be
tempted to pander to frustrated public opinion by slamming
the UN or the Greek Cypriots) will be to encourage Talat to
keep his temper in check and his eye on the ball. He must
resist the temptation to respond to his frustrations by the
adoption of "Denktash-style" tactics and nationalist bilge,
the resort to which Papadopoulos will use against him. To do
so effectively, he will also need some political space from
Ankara, which appears to be in short supply. END COMMENT.
SCHLICHER