Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NICOSIA593
2006-04-20 13:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

READING TEA LEAVES: POLLS SHOW MIXED FEELINGS

Tags:  PGOV PREL SOCI EUN CY 
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P 201307Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5895
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0983
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0526
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000593 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL SOCI EUN CY
SUBJECT: READING TEA LEAVES: POLLS SHOW MIXED FEELINGS
ABOUT LIVING WITH TURKISH CYPRIOTS, CYPRUS PROBLEM

REF: A. SIPNET DAILY REPORT (04/13/06)


B. 04 NICOSIA 2997

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000593

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL SOCI EUN CY
SUBJECT: READING TEA LEAVES: POLLS SHOW MIXED FEELINGS
ABOUT LIVING WITH TURKISH CYPRIOTS, CYPRUS PROBLEM

REF: A. SIPNET DAILY REPORT (04/13/06)


B. 04 NICOSIA 2997

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
.


1. (C) SUMMARY. A recent CyBC poll suggesting that only 45
percent of Greek Cypriots are willing to live together with
Turkish Cypriots (down from 67 percent when the Green Line
checkpoints opened in 2003) has raised serious questions in
the minds of many local pundits over whether a solution to
the Cyprus problem may be increasingly out of reach. A more
nuanced reading of the poll suggests, however, that this
apparent Greek Cypriot animosity toward the Turkish Cypriots
is neither as severe or clear-cut as it appears at first
glance. Survey results indicating that Greek Cypriots are
content with Papadopoulos's strategic foot-dragging on the
Cyprus issue are more worrying, however, and suggest that
most voters in the south see no urgent need for their
government to engage in the difficult give-and-take that will
be required if a comprehensive settlement is to be reached.
END SUMMARY.

NATIONAL BROTHERHOOD WEEK
--------------


2. (SBU) With May 21 legislative elections drawing closer,
Greek Cypriot media is awash with public opinion polling.
Although most polls focus squarely on the likely outcome of
the elections (and suggest little change is imminent in the
Greek Cypriot political landscape),a lengthy survey
published April 3 and 4 by the state-run CyBC has drawn
particular attention. The most eye-catching claim made by
the poll was that 48 percent of the Greek Cypriots did not
want to "live together" with Turkish Cypriots. This
represents a twenty percent rise in negative opinion since
the 2003 opening of the Green Line checkpoints. At that
time, polling data suggested that a majority (67 percent) of
Greek Cypriots were willing to live together with Turkish
Cypriots (ref a). According to CyBC, the number of Greek
Cypriots now in favor of living together with Turkish
Cypriots has dropped to 45 percent.


3. (SBU) The CyBC poll has dominated conversation among

chattering classes on both sides of the Green Line for the
past two weeks. A Greek Cypriot bi-communal activist lamented
in one paper that his compatriots were "settling into the
partition of the island geographically, emotionally,
psychologically, politically, and sociologically," and
suggested that the poll results indicated an overall drop in
support for the reunification of Cyprus.


4. (SBU) One particular cause for worry is the fact that
Greek Cypriot youth appear to have the most reservations
about living with Turkish Cypriots. The CyBC poll confirms
earlier research showing decreased support among younger
Greek Cypriots for living together. Those under the age of
35 were most wary, with 63 percent of the 18-24 year-olds and
59 percent of 24-34-year-olds saying they would rather not
live with Turkish Cypriots. The 35-55 age group, many of
whom have clear memories of the 1974 war, were split 50-50.
Only those over 55 were clearly in favor of living side by
side with Turkish Cypriots.


5. (C) The apparent dislike many Greek Cypriot youth feel
toward Turkish Cypriots is not news; pro-settlement observers
have long wondered "what's the matter with kids today?" (ref
b). Critics of President Papadopoulos lay the blame squarely
on the current administration. One publicly accused the
president of "failing to promote a vision of reunification,"
and "creating a hostile climate for Greek Cypriot youth." It
is probably an exaggeration to lay all the blame on
Papadopoulos's doorstep, however, even though his hard line
certainly resonates with many Greek Cypriots. The poll
nonetheless supports the idea that the uncompromising
attitude of younger Greek Cypriots (who have no memory of
bi-communal co-existence and have been fed a regular diet of
Turcophobia at school) is growing more dominant with the
passage of time.

YOU SAY POTATO, I SAY BIZONAL
--------------


6. (C) Not all observers agree, however, that the CyBC poll
represents a major shift away from public support for
reunification -- even if it might suggest a decrease in
sympathy for Turkish Cypriots. Former Attorney General
Alecos Markides was one of many who pointed out to us the
ambiguity of the survey's questions about living together.
It was not clear whether "living together means in the same

NICOSIA 00000593 002 OF 003


bed, the same flat, the same village, or what," he said.
Turkish Cypriot journalist Simon Bahceli agreed, noting that
everyone who supported the long-standing goal of a bizonal,
bicommunal federation accepted the idea that the two
communities would be segregated to some degree. "Not wanting
to live together does not mean being against a solution," he
insisted, since living apart is implicit in the idea of
bizonality. According to Markides, the "naughty" CyBC poll
did not get at the real meat of Greek Cypriot attitudes
toward coexistence because it asked "absurd questions."


7. (C) Other survey responses were equally ambiguous,
suggesting that Markides is right to criticize CyBC for
sloppy questioning. For example, one question asked "how
much do you like" Turkish Cypriots (with 41 percent saying a
little, 33 percent saying moderately, and 26 percent saying a
lot),but offered no option to express dislike. Another
question asked Greek Cypriots about their opinion of Turkish
Cypriots since the opening of the checkpoints. 18 percent of
respondents said their opinions of Turkish Cypriots had
improved, 17 percent said they had worsened, and 61 percent
said they had "stayed the same" -- although no indication was
given of the pro- and anti-Turkish breakdown within this
61-percent majority. Survey results showing that only 55
percent of Greek Cypriots have crossed north suggest that
some in the south are happy to keep their distance from
Turkish Cypriots, and it is common knowledge that many Greek
Cypriots do not cross the Green Line because they do not want
to show their ID papers to officials of the "occupation
regime." But the CyBC survey offered no follow-on data to
quantify these feelings; it remains unclear how many of those
45 percent who do not cross are motivated by antipathy -- or
just plain apathy.

GETTING COMFORTABLE WITH THE STATUS QUO?
--------------


8. (C) Less noticed, but perhaps more significant, was a
series of other questions in the CyBC survey reflecting not
so much a dislike of Turkish Cypriots as a Greek Cypriot
willingness to tolerate the status quo and/or support the
GOC's current foot-dragging on its strategic bottom line of
reunification of the island. In response to one question, 78
percent of Greek Cypriots felt that their community's
position in the international arena had either held steady or
improved over the past year. Responding to a question on the
EU, 66 percent said they were opposed to Turkish accession.
In a private conversation with the Ambassador, DISY leader
Nicos Anastassiades expressed concern that (should Turkey
continue to slow-roll on implementing its EU obligations)
such strong popular opposition to Turkish EU membership might
eventually force Papadopoulos to exercise his threatened
veto. This could snuff out any hope of a Cyprus settlement.


9. (C) Especially worrying are results showing that, while 56
percent of Greek Cypriots feel that they are not getting any
closer to a Cyprus solution, a nearly equal majority (61
percent) support President Papadopoulos's current Cyprus
policy. As one observer pointed out, these apparently
contradictory results only make sense if most Greek Cypriots
are happy with the status quo.

WE TOLD YOU THEY HATE US
--------------


10. (C) The CyBC poll has received prominent press coverage
in the north, where commentators generally view it as
confirmation that Greek Cypriots are neither particularly
eager for a settlement nor particularly fond of Turkish
Cypriots -- a belief that has been gaining currency since the
rejection of the Annan Plan in the south. While many in the
north initially blamed Papadopoulos for his community's "no"
vote, it is increasingly common to hear Turkish Cypriots
complain that the "problem" (i.e., hatred of Turks) runs deep
in the Greek Cypriot national psyche and is not the fault of
just one man. Perhaps as a result of this, a recent survey
in the northern city of Guzelyurt (Morphou) confirmed a
serious deterioration in support for the Annan Plan among
Turkish Cypriots there, while other polling suggests that
Turkish Cypriots elsewhere are increasingly skeptical that
the two sides could live together.

COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) That many Greek Cypriots neither particularly like
Turkish Cypriots nor want to live with them is nothing new --
and surveys in the north taken since the Annan Plan suggest
that for many Turkish Cypriots, the feeling is mutual. If
bizonality is accepted by most people on each side, however,

NICOSIA 00000593 003 OF 003


this need not be an impediment to a settlement deal. As one
AmCit resident of Cyprus quipped: "Afterall, how many New
Yorkers want to live among Texans?"


12. (C) What is remarkable about the CyBC survey are the
questions it poses about just how eager Greek Cypriots are to
see their government engage in the real give-and-take
negotiations required for a settlement to the Cyprus problem.
Although 80 percent still say the division of the island is
their top political concern, the poll gives little indication
that Greek Cypriots feel any sense of urgency on the matter
-- while the 66 percent who oppose Turkish EU membership do
not appear to see a link between progress toward Turkey's
accession and a potential Cyprus settlement. Former UN
Cyprus envoy Hugo Gobi reportedly once said that "the drama
of Cyprus is the absence of drama." This appears to be truer
than ever. Absent any dramatic change in the geopolitical
landscape, most Greek Cypriots seem content to nod
approvingly at their president's policy of slow-motion EU
brinksmanship with Turkey -- and then get back to their
generally pleasant, prosperous daily lives. END COMMENT.
SCHLICHER