SRSG "OPTIMISTIC" ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR TECHNICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000529

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2021
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC CY
SUBJECT: SRSG "OPTIMISTIC" ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR TECHNICAL
TALKS; GOC EXCEPTIONALLY CAGEY

REF: A. NICOSIA 503


B. NICOSIA 1585 (2005)

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher; Reason
1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: SRSG Michael Moeller told Ambassador
Schlicher on April 7 that he was optimistic the technical
talks process would succeed in galvanizing movement on the
Cyprus issue. The atmosphere in the talks was positive, even
"effusive," and the principals had readily agreed to a total
news blackout. The parties were closer than they realized,
or at least closer than they wanted to admit. The most
significant hurdle was not the nature of the technical
committees, but rather the Turkish Cypriot side's insistence
(at Ankara's behest, Moeller believed) that the Annan Plan
should be the sole basis for settlement negotiations.
Moeller recognized that he still had a credibility problem
with Ankara, though he does say that there has been some
improvement. He asked that we weigh-in with the Turkish
Mission to the UN to underscore that the P-5 supported both
the SRSG personally and the technical talks process.
Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriot participant in the technical
talks -- Presidential Diplomatic Advisor Tasos Tzionis --
told DCM that his side would not agree to limit the
discussion to issues of day-to-day concern. The process
should be aimed at both building trust between the two sides
and preparing the ground for the resumption of full
settlement negotiations. "Technical talks" was a euphemism
for political dialogue below the leaders level. President
Papadopoulos was prepared to meet Turkish Cypriot leader
Mehmet Ali Talat in the context of the Committee on Missing
Persons, but it was probably too early to resume full-blown
negotiations. The gap between the two sides was simply too
great. End summary.


Moeller Typically Optimistic
--------------


2. (C) UNFICYP COM and SRSG Michael Moeller told Ambassador
Schlicher on April 7 that the "technical talks" had gotten
off to a good start and he was "still optimistic" about the
direction in which things were moving. Moeller had so far
hosted two sessions for a total of eight hours of
conversation. A third meeting was tentatively scheduled for
April 10. Both sides had agreed to a complete news blackout
on the process. There would be no statements and -- it was
agreed -- no leaks. UNFICYP spokesman Brian Kelley would be
the only one authorized to speak authoritatively about the
process. Turkish Cypriot representative Rasit Pertev and
Greek Cypriot representative Tasos Tzionis got on quite well
personally and so far the atmosphere in the talks was, as
Moeller described it, "effusive." The two sides were closer
than they realized, or at least closer than they wanted to
admit. Both Pertev and Tzionis were sensitive to the time
factor and the need to get something moving on an urgent
basis. Both sides had complained to Moeller that he was
bending over backwards to accommodate the other party, which
he took as a good sign.


3. (C) The Ambassador asked if the two sides had agreed that
the technical committees could begin working. Moeller
replied that the Greek Cypriot side was not yet on board.
The real stumbling block, however, was not the concept of the
committees but rather the Annan Plan. Pertev clearly had
instructions -- from Ankara, Moeller believed -- to emphasize
the Annan Plan as the sole basis for settlement negotiations.
The Greek Cypriots supported a very different approach and,
in fact, did not want any reference to the Annan Plan at all.
It was clear, Moeller observed, that the phrase "The Annan
Plan" was problematic and needed to be jettisoned. Moeller
himself preferred "The Cyprus Plan" as a convenient label for
the objective of new negotiations.


4. (C) Moeller anticipated that managing Ankara would be an
important but difficult part of the process. The SRSG
recognized that, while he thought that the situation for him
had eased over the past two or three weeks, he still had a
credibility problem with Turkey and he asked for our support.
In particular, it would be helpful if we could deliver a
message to the Turkish PermRep to the UN that the P-5 backed
both Moeller personally and the technical talks process he
was trying to jump-start. The Turkish PermRep had evidently
been expressing considerable skepticism about this in his
conversations in New York. It was important that Turkey
understand it was getting something out of this process, and

Moeller believed that might be some expression of openness to
the Gul Proposal from January. The SYG had not yet responded
formally to the proposal. When he did so, he was likely to
make two points: first, that Turkey should fulfill its
obligations to the European Union, but also that the issues
specific to Cyprus can and should be addressed in a parallel
process.


5. (C) Moeller believed it would be better if the number of
high-level envoys on the Cyprus issue could be kept to a
minimum. Senior UK officials had already assured him that
London had no plans to appoint a replacement for David
Hannay. Moeller noted that he intended to travel to New York
at some point soon and wondered whether it might be useful to
visit Washington as well. The Ambassador agreed that this
would be a good idea. Moeller mused that, if he did this, he
would likely have to travel to London, Paris and Moscow as
well to make clear that he was being even-handed. (Note: He
made no mention of a possible visit to Beijing.)

Tzionis Typically Cautious
--------------


6. (C) Holding true to the spirit of his agreement with
Moeller and Pertev, Presidential Diplomatic Advisor Tasos
Tzionis refused to discuss the specific details of the
technical talks process in an April 7 conversation with DCM.
He was, however, willing to discuss the Greek Cypriot
position. Tzionis stressed that his side was not prepared to
countenance a process that would be limited to a discussion
of day-to-day concerns. This would succeed only in
normalizing an abnormal and unacceptable situation. The
talks would also have to address issues of substance. The
aim of the process under discussion was two-fold: First, to
build trust between the parties, and second to prepare the
ground for the resumption of full negotiations on a
settlement. This could not be done through limited
discussions on waste management. The discussions should also
include issues specific to a solution of the Cyprus problem.
Tzionis cited cooperation on energy issues as one topic his
side wanted to explore. The GOC decision to provide
electricity to the north during the Turkish Cypriot energy
crisis in January was a one-off, ad hoc decision. It was
important to consider how energy generation and distribution
would be handled within a federal arrangement.


7. (C) DCM asked Tzionis if the Greek Cypriot side was
really ready for the resumption of full negotiations.
Tzionis replied that it would probably be a mistake to move
on this too soon. If Papadopoulos and Talat met now, for
example, it would only highlight the sizable gap between
their respective positions. The gap is there, he
acknowledged, and we shouldn't fool ourselves about this.
The concept of "technical talks" was clearly something of a
misnomer. Tzionis himself was representing President
Papadopoulos and Pertev was there as Talat's representative.
They were not technicians and the talks themselves were
inherently political. "Technical talks" really meant simply
dialogue below the level of leaders. Indeed, on April 10,
Moeller noted that, instead of discussing "technical
committees" or "day-to-day issues," he preferred the process
to be phrased in terms of "issues that the parties have
determined should be handled at the technical level." The
Greek Cypriot side was ready, however, to go ahead with a
Papadopoulos-Talat meeting in the context of the Committee on
Missing Persons (CMP). This was an opportunity to be
practical, and the leaders could showcase their commitment to
progress on this important humanitarian concern and perhaps
agree on a joint call for international funding. Since the
Turkish Cypriot side as of April 10 had not agreed to the
appointment of the CMP's third member, Moeller judges that
the meeting of the Leaders likely will not happen before
early June.


8. (C) Tzionis stressed that as far as the Greek Cypriot
side was concerned, the technical talks process needed to do
more than simply produce "movement." The talks should be
focused on getting to "yes" on a settlement. Otherwise,
there was a real risk of Turkey simply using the fact of a
dialogue process as an alibi with the EU for not meeting its
obligations to Cyprus and the 24 other member states. "We
don't want to be hostage to Turkey again," he concluded.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) Moeller seems to be underestimating the difficulties
he will face in moving the technical talks process forward.
There is still a fundamental disconnect between the two sides
as to what this process is supposed to be. We think Moeller
is absolutely right, however, about the need to play-down our
collective support for "The Annan Plan" as such and by name
(ref B). The "A-word" is a red flag to the bull for the
Greek Cypriot side. Moreover, our repeated public
endorsements of a plan that only encourages the Turkish
Cypriot side to resist the concept of negotiating meaningful
changes, which in turn Papadopoulos used as a justification
to avoid serious engagement. We would also endorse Moeller's
request that we weigh-in with the Turkish mission in New York
to underscore our support -- and the support of the P-5 more
broadly -- for both the SRSG and the technical talks process.
For the time being, this is the only game in town and it is
important that the parties demonstrate that they can engage
and succeed.
SCHLICHER