WHO'S REALLY IN CHARGE HERE? TURKEY AND THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NICOSIA 000047

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU CY
SUBJECT: WHO'S REALLY IN CHARGE HERE? TURKEY AND THE
TURKISH CYPRIOTS

REF: A. 05 NICOSIA 2024

B. 05 NICOSIA 291

C. 05 NICOSIA 1766

D. PALMER-INGMANSON EMAIL (11/28/05)

E. 05 NICOSIA 1886

F. LIBBY-INGMANSON EMAIL (12/07/05)

G. LIBBY-PLOWDEN EMAIL (6/17/05)

Classified By: Ambassador R. Schlicher, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. The relationship between Turkey and the
"TRNC" is less of a clear-cut, master-servant arrangement
than Greek Cypriot rhetoric about the "military occupation
regime" would suggest. The north's lack of outside political
recognition, the large local Turkish garrison, and a heavy
dependence on Turkish trade and financial largesse combine to
render the Turkish Cypriots particularly susceptible to
pressure from Ankara. While the Lilliputian Turkish Cypriots
harbor no illusions about ever being truly independent, their
current leaders clearly resent the extent of Turkish
influence. As a result, Talat and his allies have tried with
moderate success to carve out greater autonomy by pushing the
envelope in areas of less importance to Ankara, operating "in
the gaps" between various actors inside the GOT, and
cultivating their democratic legitimacy and status as a
"national cause" for Turkey. The Turkish Cypriot leadership
-- whose pro-settlement rhetoric distinguish them from "Mr.
Deep State" Rauf Denktash -- view their ability to make
trouble for Erdogan as a one-time trump card, providing a
certain amount of influence (and perhaps even an "in
extremis" veto) over Turkey's Cyprus policy. As a result,
relations between Lefkosa and Ankara are often more
complicated and tense than they appear on the surface --
especially when it comes to issues such as property or
deployment along the Green Line, which constitute sensitive
"red lines" for the mainland's civilian and military
leadership, respectively. Without Turkish Cypriot buy-in,
any Cyprus-related initiative from Turkey (including
long-term settlement proposals but also intermediate steps
like the opening of ports) could be difficult to pull off.
END SUMMARY.

NOT A REAL BOY...
--------------


2. (C) In his introductory meeting with the Ambassador (ref
a),Turkish Cypriot "President" Mehmet Ali Talat made the
candid observation that his most difficult problem was the
excessive influence Turkey had over the north. While Talat
quickly added that he enjoyed a good relationship with the
GOT, his comment was nonetheless revealing. And it is
something we have heard before. In previous off-the-record
conversations with poloff, "Prime Minister" Ferdi Soyer has
also made reference to the "limits" placed by Turkey in key
policy areas -- something the current Turkish Cypriot
leadership clearly resents.


3. (C) From the Greek Cypriot perspective, the Turkish
Cypriot administration is a "pseudo-state" entirely
controlled by the occupying Turkish military. Putting this
spin on the facts is partly a tactical maneuver designed to
reduce pressure on Nicosia to meet or negotiate with the
Turkish Cypriots. If Talat is a puppet of the Turks, the
reasoning goes, the island's division can only be resolved
through direct talks between Nicosia and Ankara -- preferably
linking Turkey's EU accession to concessions on the Cyprus
problem.


4. (C) But dissing the Turkish Cypriots is also critical to
the Greek Cypriot strategy of portraying themselves as
righteous victims. Casting the Cyprus problem solely as the
result of Turkish aggression, successive Greek Cypriot
leaders have dodged awkward questions about a decade of
pre-invasion intercommunal violence, in which it was arguably
the Greek Cypriots who threw the first punch. UNSC
resolutions condemning the secessionist entity in the north,
as well as more recent ECHR rulings that classify the "TRNC"
as an administration entirely "subordinate" to Turkey, add a
legal sheen to Greek Cypriot claims that the Turkish Cypriot
administration is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Ankara.


5. (C) On the face of it, there is much evidence to support
this interpretation of the "TRNC." Denktash-era declarations
of sovereignty notwithstanding, Turkey clearly holds enormous
influence in the north. The "TRNC" flag is never flown
without the flag of Turkey, while Turkish Cypriots are
emotionally attached to other symbols of their "Turkishness"
and ties to the motherland. Statues of Ataturk are

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everywhere, and even the most European-oriented Turkish
Cypriot bankers quietly reject as "impossible" economically
sound arguments that the "TRNC" should ditch the Turkish lira
in favor of the euro.


6. (C) On a more practical level, the large garrison of
Turkish troops stationed in the north (ref b) is an 800-pound
gorilla on the northern political scene, with a long history
of open meddling in Turkish Cypriot elections. Although
Turkish troops largely kept to themselves during the 2004
Annan Referendum and subsequent elections, they still retain
more subtle levers of influence over the Turkish Cypriot
community. The "TRNC's" police, small army, and even its
fire brigade remain under the command of the ranking mainland
general on the island -- while the army has reportedly used
its financial clout to reward politically friendly
businessmen with generous contracts. According to Talat's
private secretary, "the president" is constantly looking over
his shoulder and calculating the military's possible reaction
to practically every decision he makes.


7. (C) Finally, the Turkish Cypriot economy remains
overwhelmingly dependent on the mainland. The vast majority
of the north's trade, and a significant portion of its
tourists, come from or travel through Anatolia. At the same
time, the "TRNC" relies on direct financial transfers from
the GOT to pay for up to a third of its roughly $1 billion
annual budget. This aid pays for salaries and other
day-to-day expenses, and is frequently topped off with grants
for specific infrastructure projects. The Turkish Embassy
here is remarkably tight-lipped about the amount and shape of
its assistance to the Turkish Cypriots, but advisors close to
Talat have suggested the Turks attach certain conditions to
their aid -- most recently demanding the reluctant
center-left CTP take a more aggressive approach to
privatization of "TRNC"-owned enterprises, to the chagrin of
its traditional trade union allies.

... BUT WHO PULLS THE STRINGS?
--------------


8. (C) Talat's complaints of interference notwithstanding,
the Turkish Cypriots enjoy a wider autonomy -- at least in
certain policy areas -- than outside observers might think.
Even under the dictatorial rule of Rauf Denktash, who
reliably danced to the nationalist tune set by successive
mainland governments and military leaders, the Turkish
Cypriots (or at least Denktash) had a certain amount of
influence both over their own affairs and in Turkey itself.
As a living icon personifying one of the Motherland's
do-or-die national causes, Denktash was given a wide berth by
successive Turkish ambassadors and local force commanders.
He accumulated significant personal wealth locally and
developed a loyal fan base inside the "deep state" -- which
he reportedly used over the years to influence military
promotions, pressure civilian leaders, and tweak Turkish
policy on the Cyprus question. And because Denktash was
trusted to be more nationalist than Ataturk, Ankara generally
left him to run the "TRNC" as his own fiefdom.


9. (C) The consolidation of Talat's pro-settlement leadership
in 2003-2004 has changed this dynamic significantly. Talat
and his former-communist CTP party are said to be widely
mistrusted by the Turkish military, and the cool reception
Talat received when he called on President Sezer in 2005
shows that the mainland's civilian nationalists are none too
keen on him either. Talat and his entourage lack the
nationalist legitimacy to exercise the kind of quiet
influence exerted by Denktash.


10. (C) CTP heavyweight and Famagusta "mayor" Oktay Kayalp
notes, however, a local perception that there is a "new
balance of power" in Ankara, with the Turkish military
sitting largely on the political sidelines (for the moment)
and a wobbly-but-dominant AKP still officially committed to
democratic reform and EU membership. This he believes not
only allowed the CTP to come to power in the first place, but
now gives the Turkish Cypriots greater "autonomy." Nicosia
mayor and Talat confidante Kutlay Erk agrees, noting that
Turkey cannot afford to be seen leaning too hard on a
democratically-elected community leader.


11. (C) As a result, the once hardline Turkish Ambassador
"sings a more European song" than he did when he previously
served in Cyprus in the early 90s. According to Erk, the
Turkish Embassy has sat largely silent as Talat pressed
forward with "radical changes" such as the reform of the
Education "Ministry's" previously ultra-nationalist history

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curriculum, liberalization of trade across the Green Line, a
crackdown on undocumented Turkish immigrants (ref c),or the
opening of Orthodox churches in the north to Greek Cypriot
worshippers. As long as the army "stays in the barracks" on
the mainland, Turkish Cypriots feel they have more breathing
room to run their own affairs and take certain
confidence-building steps.


12. (C) At the same time, Erk and other insiders acknowledge
that there are areas where Turkey perceives its vital
interests to be at stake, and where Ankara sets much more
narrow limits. Turkey's sensitivities seem centered on a few
key issues such as military control of the Green Line and
core settlement-related questions like property. The recent
debacle over a Green Line crossing at Ledra Street (ref d)
was a case in which Talat's desire to open the checkpoint
foundered on the army's demand for continued access to its
checkpoints in the area. Meanwhile, the north's new property
legislation was the result of considerable Turkish
arm-twisting on a Turkish Cypriot public and parliament
fearful of seeing their homes and businesses "restituted" out
from underneath them (refs e and f).

SELECTIVELY PUSHING THE ENVELOPE
--------------


13. (C) According to his private secretary, Talat feels that
the best strategy to strengthen the Turkish Cypriot position
on issues like this is to bolster his own image both here and
on the mainland -- nibbling away at the constraints and
pressures placed on him by Ankara. By traveling to Turkey at
least once a month, granting frequent interviews to the
Denktash-smitten media there, and grabbing every opportunity
to stride on his own across the world stage (such as his
recent visit to Washington or an upcoming trip to London),
Talat seeks to reinforce the perception that he is the
legitimate leader of his community.


14. (C) In some cases Talat pushes the envelope, risking the
ire of the local brass, to show (in the words of one
U.S.-trained Turkish Cypriot academic) "that he, and nobody
else, is the Mayor of the Munchkin City." His recent
decision to host Bayram holiday receptions without the
participation of the Turkish Ambassador or force commander,
who traditionally co-hosted the event in the Denktash years,
caused quite a stir. The military and Ambassador are
reportedly still sulking over the perceived slight, but have
publicly held their tongues.

ERDOGAN "NEEDS" TALAT
--------------


15. (C) Talat's ultimate trump card in Ankara, according to
his private secretary, is that "Erdogan needs him." For
example, Turkish Cypriot cooperation in drafting (and
implementing) a new property scheme is an indispensable part
of the GOT's strategy of countering the increasingly costly
and embarrassing raft of ECHR law suits against it. The
Turkish Cypriot leadership feels that this gives it a certain
amount of influence in Ankara -- despite Talat's lack of
deep-state "street cred." By cooperating to a greater or
lesser degree with the AKP on matters such as property, the
Turkish Cypriots can bargain for a greater or lesser degree
of freedom on issues like settler immigration.

TURKISH CYPRIOTS TAKE A HARD LINE ON PORTS
--------------


16. (C) The big kahuna on the Turkish Cypriot agenda today,
however, is the question of whether Turkey will open its
ports to ROC-flagged planes and ships -- a question Talat has
characterized as a do-or-die issue for his community. If
Ankara accepts EU demands to open its ports without a
reciprocal "lifting of isolation," the theory goes, the
north's economy would be slowly choked to death by trade
diversion. And the door would be open to Turkey abandoning
the "TRNC" in favor of recognizing the ROC.


17. (C) Mayor Erk, Talat's private secretary, and other
insiders have all told us that this was an issue over which
Talat would willingly risk an open falling-out with Erodogan
if necessary. They insist Talat could seriously damage the
AKP's domestic political fortunes by using his bully pulpit
to condemn Erdogan loudly and publicly for any "selling out"
of Cyprus. Talat advisors are quick to point out that the
AKP has given them every assurance that no unilateral
sell-out deal is in the works, and they acknowledge that such
an open break with the AKP would probably be disastrous for

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their own tenure in office. But they quietly hope that the
implicit threat of "mutually assured destruction" (and the
possibility that the army would come to Talat's rescue if he
took up Denktash's nationalist mantle) will keep the GOT from
bargaining away vital Turkish Cypriot interests.

COMMENT
--------------


18. (C) It is an open question whether Talat would pick such
a fight, and whether he could win. Even without a
knock-down-drag-out over ports, however, the tension between
Turkish Cypriot autonomy and Ankara's equities and influence
is dynamic, making it hard to predict with certainty how the
north's decision-making process works at any given time. On
one hand, for example, if another way can be found to
resupply Turkish troops in the area, the army would probably
allow Talat to tear down the bridge at Ledra Street --
although whether he could swallow his own pride and back down
in front of Papadopoulos is another issue. On the other
hand, it is far from certain the Turkish Cypriots could have
persuaded Ankara to deliver on Talat's offer to return
Varosha in exchange for the "lifting of isolation," had the
Greek Cypriots accepted the deal during last year's
Luxembourg-sponsored talks in Brussels (ref g).


19. (C) As we engage the Turks and Turkish Cypriots on issues
related to EU accession, settlement talks, and confidence
building measures, it will be important to work both ends of
the Ankara-Lefkosa axis. The interests and goals of the two
sides do not always overlap -- and one party may be unable to
deliver without buy-in from the other. END COMMENT.
SCHLICHER