Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NICOSIA455
2006-03-28 15:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

PAPADOPOULOS CONFIDENT THAT UN PROCESS, TURKISH EU

Tags:  PREL PGOV EUN CY 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5759
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 4595
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 3540
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1153
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0439
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0503
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000455 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2021
TAGS: PREL PGOV EUN CY
SUBJECT: PAPADOPOULOS CONFIDENT THAT UN PROCESS, TURKISH EU
ACCESSION, LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS ALL GOING HIS WAY


Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher; Reason 1.4 (b)
and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000455

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2021
TAGS: PREL PGOV EUN CY
SUBJECT: PAPADOPOULOS CONFIDENT THAT UN PROCESS, TURKISH EU
ACCESSION, LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS ALL GOING HIS WAY


Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher; Reason 1.4 (b)
and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In one-on-one Sunday lunch, Ambassador
Schlicher and President Papadopoulos discussed prospects for
moving forward with "technical talks" between representatives
of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, as well
as Turkey's EU accession process and domestic political
jockeying in advance of the May 21 Parliamentary elections.
Although he seemed somewhat tired, Papadopoulos exuded the
confident air of a politician who senses that the game is
moving in his direction. Papadopoulos agreed with the
Ambassador that the technical committees should begin work as
soon as possible, but stressed that issues of substance would
also have to be addressed. Papadopoulos expressed generic
support for Turkey's EU agenda, but warned that he would
defend Cyprus' national interests in the accession process
and would not allow Ankara to slough off its obligations.
The Ambassador emphasized the need for Cyprus to exercise
extreme caution in handling this issue as a derailment of
Turkey's EU accession negotiations would almost certainly
have immediate and adverse reflections on the Cyprus problem.
Papadopoulos noted that there were a number of options
available short of killing the process altogether. On
elections, Papadopoulos predicted that his own DIKO would
improve its position and AKEL would likely retain the title
as the single largest party. End Summary.

Technical Talks Are Not Enough
--------------


2. (C) In a private lunch on March 26 hosted by President
Papadopoulos, Ambassador Schlicher stressed the importance of
allowing the UN-led "technical committees" to begin their
work without conditioning this on an agreement for handling
the so-called political issues. We had been giving this same
message to the Turkish Cypriot side and the Ambassador noted
that he would reinforce this in his March 27 meeting with
Talat (septel). Papadopoulos replied that he saw no reason
why the technical committees should not start work in those
areas where there was clear agreement, but, "as I repeatedly

told Annan," he added, "the issues of substance must also be
addressed. The Ambassador stressed that the USG also
recognized the need for a political track, and the sooner the
parties engaged with Moeller and let the technical committees
get to work the sooner we would all see how to flesh out such

a track.


3. (C) Papadopoulos asked, in a largely rhetorical fashion,
why the Turkish Cypriots and Ankara had reacted so badly to
the Paris meeting when "if they actually read the statement,
they would find things in it that Annan intended for them."
The Ambassador noted that the Turkish Cypriots seemed to be
responding to the government spokesman's spin rather than to
the actual communique. Papadopoulos replied that a few days
post-Paris he and his government had consciously toned down
their reactions. The government's response to the Gambari
letter to Talat would be equally circumspect. "There are
things in the letter that we do not like and do not consider
especially accurate," the President said, adding that this
was acceptable if it helped get the parties to the table. It
was possible, Papadopoulos mused, that the Turkish Cypriots
and Turkey would try to freeze the technical committees until
after the parliamentary elections in May in the hope of
damaging the President's party. "This would mean," however,
"that they don't understand the politics on this side."

EU/Turkey "Club"
--------------


4. (C) The President then turned to the issue of Turkey's EU
accession process and expressed considerable surprise that
Ankara "not even making a pretense that would help in the
fall's review." Alluding to a putative statement by
Assistant Secretary Fried to Foreign Minister Iacovou that
the United States "will not let" Cyprus obstruct Turkey's EU
track, Papadopoulos said that "the real question for your
government should be whether you are going to allow the
Turkish military to obstruct Erdogan." The Ambassador
stressed the need for Cyprus to exercise extreme caution in
handling this issue since a derailment in Turkey's EU
accession process -- in addition to the strategic stakes
involved -- would almost certainly have immediate and adverse
reflections on the Cyprus problem. Papadopoulos agreed, but
noted that, firstly, no one should expect him to compromise
on Cyprus' national interests for the sake of facilitating
movement in Turkey's negotiations with the EU when Ankara was
trying to slough off its obligations. Secondly, Papadopoulos
maintained that several EU states -- not only Cyprus -- would
be making an anti-Turkey case in the review process. The
Ambassador reiterated his warning about the dangers for
Cyprus of a breakdown in Turkey's EU accession process.
Papadopoulos again agreed, but Turkey had to decide whether
it wanted to join the EU "club" or not. The President
further mused that there were various potential options short
of killing the accession process, including: suspension,
postponement, and identifying specific "benchmarks" that
could re-start a stalled process.

Kids Just Don't Listen
--------------


5. (C) The Ambassador asked Papadopoulos for his views on
the May 21 parliamentary elections. Papadopoulos noted that
he had instructed his ministers to keep their involvement in
the campaigning to an absolute minimum, since things said in
the heat of political combat could have a negative impact on
the post-election task of governing. He believed his DIKO
party could improve its position by as many as 5-8 percentage
points. AKEL and DISY would both be slightly down. The race
between them for the first position would be extremely close,
but Papadopoulos felt AKEL would probably retain that
distinction. The President believed that his son, Nicholas,
a DIKO candidate in Nicosia, was doing reasonably well so
far. He claimed, however, to have counseled the 34-year-old
that he was moving into electoral politics too quickly.
Papadopoulos would have preferred that Nicholas spend more
time securing his position in the family law firm before
running for office. His political life could now put him at
a relative disadvantage vis-a-vis the children of other
senior partners in the firm. Papadopoulos suspected that
Nicholas' substantial trust fund from his mother's side of
the family had undercut his commitment to the law firm.

Comment
--------------


6. (C) Although Papadopoulos seemed tired and somewhat
haggard through the conversation, he exuded the air of a
politician who sensed the game was going in his direction.
Moreover, it seemed clear that -- whether or not the
technical talks process ultimately takes off -- the President
believes his domestic interests are covered as long as it is
the Turkish Cypriot side that is seen as doing the
foot-dragging. END COMMENT.

SCHLICHER