TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADER TALAT SAYS TECHNICAL TALKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000454

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2106
TAGS: UN PGOV PREL EUN TU CY
SUBJECT: TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADER TALAT SAYS TECHNICAL TALKS
WILL GO AHEAD

REF: A. NICOSIA 447

B. NICOSIA 380

Classified By: Ambassador R. Schlicher, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) On March 27, a tired but healthy-looking Mehmet Ali
Talat briefed Ambassador Schlicher on his meeting with
UNFICYP Chief Michael Moeller earlier that day. Talat's
meetings with Moeller and the Ambassador were his first
meetings with foreigners since he underwent unexpected heart
surgery in February (ref a). Both the Ambassador and Moeller
saw Talat at his Kyrenia home; Talat expects to return to his
office at the "Presidency" in about a week.


2. (C) Talat came out swinging, telling the Ambassador he had
made clear to Moeller his dismay with the declaration that
emerged from the February 28 Annan-Papadopoulos meeting in
Paris (ref b). He worried that the UN was "changing the
balance" in its approach to the Cyprus problem to the
detriment of the Turkish Cypriots. Talat noted that the
UNSYG had referred to Papadopoulos as "President of Cyprus,"
rather than "the Greek Cypriot Leader" (which was the term of
art Talat claimed the UN had previously used in the context
of its Cyprus mediation efforts). Talat further worried that
the Secretary General had given in to "Greek Cypriot delaying
tactics" by quietly shelving his Good Offices Report -- and
backing off the demand that Papadopoulos present his list of
desired changes to the Annan Plan with "clarity and
finality." For the Turkish Cypriots, the Annan Plan was
still the point of departure for substantive talks, and Talat
said he would not reengage on settlement-related issues until
the Greek Cypriots had given a "clear picture" of what they
wanted to change in the Plan. All these concerns, Talat
said, would be expressed in a forthcoming letter to the SYG.


3. (C) Nonetheless, Talat said that U/SYG Gambari's letter
had helped create a "better climate" between the Turkish
Cypriots and the UN -- allowing Talat to see Moeller and
opening the door for the start of technical talks on the ten
points the two sides had agreed to prior to Paris. Talat
said his U/S, Rasit Pertev, would meet with Moeller and Tasos
Tzionis (Papadopoulos's diplomatic advisor) "by the end of
this week or early next week" to get the process moving.
Talat was skeptical, however, that the talks would bear fruit
as long as the Greek Cypriots refused to have any dealings
with officials of the "TRNC." He suggested that Papadopoulos
would simply use the talks to distract attention from his
"intransigence" on settlement matters, stalling in the UN
forum while using Turkey's EU accession process to press
Ankara for unilateral concessions on Cyprus.


4. (C) The Ambassador stressed the importance of allowing
technical talks to move ahead quickly, and reiterated USG
readiness to support the technical committees where
appropriate. It was important that the Turkish Cypriots
continue their dialogue with the UN and Moeller, and not
allow themselves to be painted as the intransigent party.
The Ambassador encouraged Talat not to react to the public
statements made by ROC officials or to the "spin" in the
Greek Cypriot media. The UN understood that the process
could only move forward into more sensitive political waters
if both sides agreed. In the meantime, technical talks might
produce positive results on certain agenda items -- and would
put Papadopoulos's intentions to the test. "We'll see,"
Talat said. Recalling how his doctors in Turkey had
cooperated closely during his operation despite an initial
disagreement over which treatment was best, Talat
acknowledged that "consultation and communication" were very
important.


5. (C) On the issue of the Committee on Missing Persons, the
Ambassador urged Talat to move quickly on giving his consent
to the UN's proposed third member. Talat agreed he would do
so, once the candidate's "character" had been vetted by "my
friends." Meanwhile, Talat expressed skepticism about
Papadopoulos's stated willingness to meet him for the purpose
of discussing the Missing. Although he did not rule out such
a meeting, Talat questioned the need to discuss the CMP. The
work of the Committee was going well, Talat insisted, and
there was little for them to talk about. Papadopoulos's
willingness to discuss only the Missing, he suggested, was a
ruse designed to answer demands that he see Talat -- without
actually discussing serious issues.


6. (C) COMMENT. Although Talat devoted significant time to
his regular litany of complaints about the "rapacious" Greek
Cypriot leadership, the tone of this meeting was actually
fairly constructive. Dialogue between the Turkish Cypriots
and the UN -- specifically SRSG Moeller -- has resumed, and
the start of technical talks appears to be that much closer.
Furthermore, with Talat now seeing visitors and resuming an

NICOSIA 00000454 002 OF 002


active role in Turkish Cypriot "foreign policy," it seems
that the period of rudderless drift is coming to an end.
This is a good thing; unlike many of his lower-ranking
colleagues who gave the UN a cold shoulder when he was sick,
Talat seems to understand the importance of "consultation and
communication."


7. (C) The challenge now will be to encourage Talat to
maintain a constructive attitude, and not allow his anger at
Papadopoulos (or pressure from his nationalist flank) to
derail UN-brokered technical talks. In the process, he must
also find a way to avoid being perceived as stalling or
refusing to find a way forward in resuming a genuine
political track. Papadopoulos clearly senses that his
relative success in "spinning" the Paris meeting, enhanced by
the post-Paris bungling of a Talat-less "TRNC," have for the
moment let him seem less than intransigent on the political
issues. The Turkish Cypriots (and the Turks) need to reverse
this equation through creative engagement with the UN. END
COMMENT.





END COMMENT.
SCHLICHER