WHAT NEXT AFTER PARIS?

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 00352

SIPDIS

SIPDIS




E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2021
TAGS: PREL PGOV UN CY
SUBJECT: WHAT NEXT AFTER PARIS?

REF: NICOSIA 294

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher; Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (U) Action requested in para 11.


2. (C) Summary: One week after the Papadopoulos -Annan
meeting in Paris, it is clear that the UN and UNFICYP have
considerable fence-mending to do with Ankara and the Turkish
Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots -- still angry over the
communique that seemed to indicate they had agreed to discuss
the status of Varosha, demilitarization, and similar
hot-button issues in "technical talks" with the Greek
Cypriots -- have suspended all communication with the UN
until "President" Talat returns from his hospitalization in
Istanbul. There is a risk that this freeze on communications
could seriously set back UN efforts to appoint a new third
member to the Committee on Missing Persons (CMP). Meanwhile,
the Turkish Cypriot leadership is increasingly open in its
suspicion of UN SRSG Michael Moller, whom they see as
reflexively sympathetic to the Greek Cypriot side. UNFICYP
is frustrated with what it sees as unwarranted Greek Cypriot
triumphalism and irritated that the Turkish Cypriots are
taking their cues from the Greek Cypriot press spin rather
than from the UN. In developing our own position on the
technical talks, it is quite possible that our interest in
supporting the UN and our interest in supporting Ankara's
EU-accession process will conflict. Our recommendation in
discussing the next steps with UNFICYP and others would be to
offer strong support for the talks as long as they are
limited to the ten topics agreed to by the Turkish Cypriot
side. In terms of the bigger picture, we are concerned that
Ankara has lost the initiative on the Cyprus issue and FM
Gul's January proposal seems unlikely to relieve Turkey of
its Cyprus obligations. We may want to have a frank
conversation with Ankara about putting a more serious Cyprus
package on the table and thus putting the burden back on
Tassos Papadopoulos. End Summary.

What Did They Agree To?
--------------


3. (C) Turkish Cypriot sources have told us that they -- and
Ankara -- are still quite angry about the communique that
emerged from the February 28 Paris talks. So far, the UN has
been unable to mollify them. FM Gul pointedly refused to see
SRSG Michael Moller on his recent visit to Turkey, pawning
him off on lower-level officials and speaking directly with
the UNSYG by phone to voice his disconQnt with the results
of the Paris meeting. Moller's request to meet with Talat in
his Istanbul hospital room was similarly rebuffed. Meanwhile
-- back on Cyprus -- the Turkish Cypriot authorities are
increasingly vocal in their suspicion and hostility towards
Moller. The Turkish Cypriots are well aware that Moller
spent a part of his childhood in Greece and speaks decent
Greek. In and of itself, this warrants enough evidence for
the Turkish Cypriots to suspect Moller of being reflexively
sympathetic to Greek Cypriot positions. "Presidential
Undersecretary" Rasit Pertev, who would likely head up
Turkish Cypriot participation in any technical level
dialogue, has been particularly vociferous in his criticism
of the SRSG. Our British colleagues told us that in their
last meeting Pertev had exclaimed, "I trust him (Moller) less
than I trust Papadopoulos."


4. (C) The Turkish Cypriots still seem somewhat uncertain
about how to respond to the challenge posed by the Paris
communique and the triumphalist Greek Cypriot spin. The
anticipated March 3 meeting to discuss the agenda for the
proposed technical-level talks never materialized and Pertev
told the UN that the Turkish Cypriots were freezing
communications with UNFICYP until Talat returned to the
island. The head of civil affairs at UNFICYP, Susan Allee,
expressed considerable frustration over the inclination of
the Turkish Cypriots to take their cues from the Greek
Cypriot press rather than the first-hand UN reporting on the
Paris talks. Allee told us that she and Moller had both been
taken aback by the Greek Cypriots aggressive spinning of the
Paris talks. An objective reading of the communique would
make clear that demilitarization, demining and
Famagusta/Varosha were not included as agreed agenda items in
the technical talks. The UN did not agree with the Greek
Cypriot interpretation of the communique, but was still
considering how best to respond.


5. (C) The Greek Cypriots, meanwhile, continue to muddy the
waters. In his most recent statements, President
Papadopoulos helpfully "explained" that "there are two
parallel procedures; one concerned with the preparation of
talks on substantial aspects of the Cyprus problem and the
other the creation of a better climate. One course depends
on the progress of the other and it is neither proper nor
accurate to say that what was agreed in Paris concerned only
measures that would make the operation of the Turkish Cypriot
regime easier." This interpretation of the Paris talks seems
wildly fanciful and does not track at all with the readout we
have from Moller (reftel).

What Were They Thinking?
--------------


6. (C) The Paris meeting represents a significant
pre-electoral gift to Tassos Papadopoulos, even though it was
likely intended as a vehicle for putting pressure on the
Greek Cypriot leader. Michael Moller is smart, experienced,
and capable, but he is also eager and ambitious to acquire
more turf. The Greek Cypriot leadership senses this
eagerness, and Papadopoulos seems clearly to have
out-negotiated the UN in preparing the text of the
communique. Holding technical-level talks is not a bad idea
(nor a new one),but the clumsy handling of the Paris meeting
puts the process at an immediate disadvantage. The Turkish
Cypriots feel like they have been victimized by some kind of
bait-and-switch, further undermining the already dim
prospects for these talks to produce much in the way of value
and substance. Ankara has also reportedly been sending
unambiguous signals to the Turkish Cypriots to toughen up
their position on EU aid. Turkish Cypriot Chamber of
Industries head Salih Tunar told us that on a recent trip to
Ankara, Turkish officials told him and Turkish Cypriot
Chamber of Commerce head Erdil Nami to be firm in rejecting
any attempt by the EU to impose conditions on the assistance.




7. (C) The Turkish Cypriot freeze on communication with the
UN threatens to undo the hard work that has gone into
identifying a new third member for the Committee on Missing
Persons (CMP). The Greek Cypriot side has already approved
the SYG's choice -- a Swiss national with considerable ICRC
experience named Christophe Girod -- but the UN is still
waiting for Talat's approval. There is a real risk of losing
Girod to another opportunity if the UN is unable to make him
a firm offer soon. That would be a serious setback to
efforts to reinforce and strengthen the work of the CMP to
the point where it can finally begin resolving outstanding
cases.

What Are We Going To Do About It?
--------------


8. (C) Questions of the UN's handling of the Paris talks
aside, we do need to decide how activist we want to be in
supporting the technical talks. Here there is a real risk
that our impulse to support the SYG and his role and our
desire to support Ankara will conflict. The Greek Cypriots
are already crowing that the Paris communique has supplanted
the Gul proposal from January linking Cypriot access to
Turkish ports to progress in easing Turkish Cypriot
isolation. So far, the UK has been considerably more
forward-leaning than we have in welcoming the "agreement" on
technical level talks. The UN will naturally be looking to
us for support, both in terms of defending Moller's
objectivity and professionalism with the Turkish Cypriots and
with the talks themselves. UNFICYP has already indicated an
interest in what our ACT program could do to support the work
of the various committees envisioned in the agreement. We
should think carefully about how we are going to respond.


9. (C) Our recommendation would be to offer complete and
unequivocal support for the technical level talks as they
were originally agreed by the Turkish Cypriots. This would
mean an agenda limited to the ten topics outlined in the
letters exchanged between Moller and Talat before the Paris
meeting: health, environment, water management, waste
management, money laundering, crime prevention, road safety,
immigration and trafficking, crisis management and
humanitarian issues. As Pertev explained to us, these are
areas where the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots will need
to work out modalities of cooperation "even if Cyprus remains
divided forever." Our further recommendation is that, when
asked about Famagusta/Varosha in the context of the
technical-level talks, we say that these talks cannot be a
substitute for a political-level process aimed at resolving
fundamental security, property, and other issues; we will
support the efforts of the UN and the parties to make quick
progress on all these fronts.


10. (C) At the same time, we believe it is important to have
a serious discussion with Turkey about the risks attendant to
losing the initiative on the Cyprus issue. Papadopoulos has
been relatively successful -- largely because of the EU
timetable -- in putting the ball back in Turkey's court
without having had to actually return serve. Gul's January
proposal has generated little sustained interest and it seems
unlikely to relieve Ankara of the burden of the Cyprus issue.
We may want to suggest to Ankara the possibility of
regaining the initiative in a way that serves its
EU-accession interests by putting a serious Cyprus package on
the table that would involve painful concessions on the part
of all concerned. This should be presented as parallel to
the technical talks, rather than a substitute. Both we and
Turkey want to maintain the centrality of the UN's role on
the Cyprus issue. Our own ideas in this regard would involve
something along the following lines:

Turkey agrees to:

-- Open its ports and airports to Cypriot traffic;
-- Return Varosha to Greek Cypriot control; and,
-- Stop blackballing Cyprus in international organizations.

The ROC agrees to:

-- Direct trade through the port of Famagusta under the
auspices of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce and/or of
the EU;
-- Direct flights out of Ercan airport, with the airport to
be under temporary EU administration; and,
-- Easing up on the restrictions imposed on the use of EU
assistance to the Turkish Cypriots.

This is a serious package that would be well received in
Europe. It is also highly unlikely that the Greek Cypriot
side would agree to this, or any other proposal that would
include legitimizing flights to and from Ercan airport.
Putting a set of ideas like this on the table, in addition to
creating a serious political debate in the Greek Cypriot
community, would allow Ankara to reclaim the initiative and
reduce the building pressure from the EU for Turkey to meet
its customs union obligations without the expectation of
further sweeteners.


11. (C) Post requests guidance from the Department to use
with UNFICYP and others in discussing next steps in the
technical committees.
SCHLICHER