Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NICOSIA317
2006-03-02 14:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

GOC "INCENSED" BY U.S. MESSAGE ON TURKEY AND CYPRUS

Tags:  PREL PGOV EU CY 
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VZCZCXYZ0012
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNC #0317 0611416
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 021416Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5646
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 4570
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 3519
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1140
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0427
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0484
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000317 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2021
TAGS: PREL PGOV EU CY
SUBJECT: GOC "INCENSED" BY U.S. MESSAGE ON TURKEY AND CYPRUS

REF: SECSTATE 16987

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher; Reason 1.4 (b) and (d

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000317

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2021
TAGS: PREL PGOV EU CY
SUBJECT: GOC "INCENSED" BY U.S. MESSAGE ON TURKEY AND CYPRUS

REF: SECSTATE 16987

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher; Reason 1.4 (b) and (d


1. (C) On March 2, Erato Marcoullis, Director of the MFA's
Cyprus Question Division, called in Polchief to complain at
considerable length about the message on Cyprus and Turkey
that reftel authorized EU posts to deliver as appropriate.
The GOC had obtained a copy of a non-paper version of the
points from Athens and strongly objected to the content.
Marcoullis told Polchief she had instructions to deliver a
"strong demarche" to us in response. (Note: We did ask
Marcoullis if her MFA had any other kind of demarche.) The
GOC, Marcoullis explained, was incensed at the United States'
interjecting itself into what was strictly an internal EU
affair. The United States reflexively took Turkey's side in
any dispute, and Marcoullis herself strongly suspected that
the Gul proposal from January 24 had, in fact, been drafted
in Washington.


2. (C) Marcoullis took particular offense at the language in
the U.S. paper noting our belief that "issues related to
Cyprus and Turkey, including those directly affecting the EU,
will only be resolved via a UN-negotiated comprehensive
settlement" It was "offensive" (and Marcoullis used this
word quite frequently in our conversation) for the United
States to insist that Turkey's EU obligations, and in
particular application of the customs union agreement, was in
any way an issue for the UN. This was strictly a matter
between the EU and Turkey, and the only role for the United
States that the ROC would welcome would be in making clear to
Ankara that it had no alternative to meeting its obligations.
Cyprus intended to make a formal complaint to the EU about
U.S. interference.


3. (C) Marcoullis further complained about the United
States circulating a position paper "behind our backs." At a
minimum, we should have provided Cyprus with a courtesy copy
of the U.S. position. The United States was always quick to
speak out publicly in support of Turkey, but we had been
noticeably silent on the issue of the Paris talks between
President Papadopoulos and UNSYG Annan. Within an hour of
Gul's proposal, the U.S. had been ready with a public
endorsement. Why the conspicuous silence on the Paris
meeting?


4. (C) Polchief stressed that there was nothing in the
reftel message on Cyprus and Turkey that we had not said both
publicly and privately many times. We had had this same
conversation with GOC officials -- including Marcoullis
herself -- on numerous occasions. There was nothing sinister
in the United States' not providing an advance copy of the
message to the GOC. We simply did not believe that such an
exercise would have been productive. The charge that the
United States had drafted the Gul proposal on the mutual
easing of restrictions was baseless. Our public statements
had made clear that we were prepared to welcome all creative
and original ideas aimed at reinvigorating the Cyprus
dialogue. If the GOC did not like the Gul proposal, it
should come forward with some ideas of its own. Moreover, we
could not accept that the issue of Turkish accession to the
EU, was of no interest to the United States. The EU, the
ROC, Ankara and the U.S. had a common interest in ensuring
that the accession process was productive and ultimately
successful. Cyprus could hold a firm, legalistic line on
Turkey's implementing the customs union agreement, but this
was likely to result in a political crisis at some point in
the next year that would serve no one's interest.
Alternatively, Cyprus could support a more creative approach
aimed at helping Turkey create the political space necessary
to fulfill its obligations. This was by far, the wiser
course of action.
SCHLICHER