Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NICOSIA294
2006-03-01 15:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

GREEK CYPRIOTS "FULLY SATISFIED" WITH PARIS TALKS

Tags:  PREL PGOV CY 
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DE RUEHNC #0294/01 0601558
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011558Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5632
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 4557
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 3515
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1134
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0423
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0472
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000294 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2021
TAGS: PREL PGOV CY
SUBJECT: GREEK CYPRIOTS "FULLY SATISFIED" WITH PARIS TALKS
AND THE NEW "BOTTOM UP" APPROACH; TURKISH CYPRIOTS SHOCKED
AND ANGRY

REF: NICOSIA 273

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher; Reason 1.4 (b)
and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000294

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2021
TAGS: PREL PGOV CY
SUBJECT: GREEK CYPRIOTS "FULLY SATISFIED" WITH PARIS TALKS
AND THE NEW "BOTTOM UP" APPROACH; TURKISH CYPRIOTS SHOCKED
AND ANGRY

REF: NICOSIA 273

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher; Reason 1.4 (b)
and (d)


1. (C) Summary: The February 28 meeting between Cypriot
President Papadopoulos and UN SYG Kofi Annan resulted in
agreement on a "bottom up" approach to the Cyprus issue that
would begin with technical-level talks aimed at preparing the
ground for the resumption of negotiations on a comprehensive
settlement. Predictably, the Greek Cypriot side is stressing
its "complete satisfaction" with the outcome of the meeting.
The pro-government press in the south is presenting the joint
statement as both an important step forward on the Cyprus
issue and a clear win for the Greek Cypriot side. In
contrast, Turkish Cypriot contacts told us that they had been
"shocked" by the content of the joint statement and the
apparent endorsement of Greek Cypriot ideas on
Famagusta/Varosha and demilitarization. For the Turkish
Cypriot side, these were fundamental issues that could only
be addressed in the context of an overall settlement.
UNFICYP COM Moller, who was present in Paris, told us that
Papadopoulos had seemed "hell bent on moving forward."
Moller understood that the Turkish Cypriots had some concerns
about the statement and said he planned to reach out to key
decision-makers in the north to smooth any ruffled feathers.
Moller stressed that he had agreement in writing from the
Turkish Cypriot side to pursue the idea of technical level
talks. Although Papadopoulos had asked for the SYG to
appoint a new special envoy, Moller told us that they SYG
had pushed back hard. There was a significant gap, Annan
told Papadopoulos, between the Greek Cypriot side's words and
its deeds. UN U/S Gambari might visit the island after
elections, but only if there had been real progress in the
technical level talks. While Talat would not relish the
mantle of the intransigent party, there is risk he may end up
trapped in that role by the competing demands of
Papadopoulos, the UN and the Turkish army. End Summary.

Greek Cypriots Predictably Pleased
--------------


2. (C) Predictably, Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos'

supporters have been waving the flag of victory following his
February 28 meeting in Paris with UN SYG Kofi Annan. House
President and AKEL leader Demetris Christofias described the
outcome of the meeting as "very positive" and stressed that
the technical level talks agreed to in the Paris meeting
would deal not only with CBMs but also with issues directly
related to a settlement such as demilitarization and the
development of a unified economy. The pro-government press
highlighted the communique negotiated in advance of the
meeting, emphasizing that the joint statement was fully in
line with the GOC position. (Note: the complete text of the
statement follows below in paragraph 15.) Local TV and radio
emphasized the GOC's satisfaction with the Paris talks and
predicted rapid and significant developments on the Cyprus
issue in the months ahead. Menelaos Menelaou from the
President's Diplomatic Office told us on March 1 that the
government was "completely satisfied" with both the
communique and the outcome of the talks. Menelaou expected
that UNFICYP COM Moller would move quickly to reach agreement
on an agenda and begin technical level talks between the two
sides. Menelaou confirmed for us that his boss, Tasos
Tzionis, would likely be in charge of the Greek Cypriot
side's participation.


3. (C) The opposition DISY party pointed out that the Greek
Cypriot side had not achieved its primary objective for the
meeting, the appointment of a new special envoy. DISY leader
Anastassiades called the joint statement a return to the past
and the unsuccessful 1994 confidence building measures. GOC
spokesman Lillikas countered DISY's charge by stressing that
UNFICYP COM Moller's role in the Cyprus process "will be
upgraded," adding that the agreement with the SYG gave the
Greek Cypriot side more than it had asked for.

The MFA's Take
--------------


4. (C) In a briefing for the Diplomatic Corps on March 1,
MFA PermSec Sotos Zakheos described the meeting as "very
positive," "excellent in tone," and "enormously
constructive." He also stressed that there was "very good
chemistry between the principals." Zakheos reported that a
decision had been made to establish a mechanism consisting of


UNFICYP COM Moller, a representative of President
Papadopoulos and a representative of Talat to work on a
"bottom up" approach to the Cyprus issue. This umbrella
mechanism would then agree on a number of sub-committees to
work on a range of technical issues. Each side, Zakheos
explained, had its own ideas about what issues to focus on.
The Greek Cypriot side, for example, would push for progress
on demining, the demilitarization of sensitive sites,
land-use issues, etc. Zakheous was particularly pleased that
the joint statement included a specific reference to the
GOC's Famagusta/Varosha proposal. The concept of engagement
went beyond CBMs. The idea was not simply to normalize or
ameliorate various aspects of the current situation, but
rather to prepare the ground for the earliest possible
resumption of meaningful negotiations. According to
Zakheous, Papadopoulos told the SYG that Gul's proposal's on
the simultaneous easing of restrictions "could not be
implemented" and Annan acknowledged that the GOT's customs
union obligations were unconditional.


5. (C) Zakheous noted that neither side used the phrase
"Annan Plan" in the course of the conversation. In Paris,
Papadopoulos also gave his approval to the nomination of a
new third (UN) member to serve on the Committee on Missing
Persons. Talat's illness had prevented him from approving
the name, which was why the appointment had not yet been
announced. (Note: We have since learned from CMP sources
that the presumptive third member is Christophe Girod, a
Swiss national and long-time ICRC official).

From The Horse's Mouth
--------------


6. (C) UNFICYP COM and SRSG Michael Moller, who was present
in the meeting, told us that he and the SYG were both pleased
with the substance and tone of the talks. According to
Moller, Papadopoulos was "hell bent on moving forward" and
was ready to meet with Talat (albeit only within the context
of the CMP). Papadopoulos stressed his personal commitment
to a Cyprus settlement and underscored his "wounded feelings"
at being portrayed as the new Dr. No. Moller understood that
the Turkish Cypriots had some reservations about the joint
statement and he intended to speak with Talat's advisor,
Rasit Pertev, to try and smooth the ruffled feathers. Moller
had agreement from Pertev in writing to the concept of a
"bottom up" technical process. The Turkish Cypriot side had
agreed to a list of issues for discussion that included
health, the environment, water, crime, and similar concerns.
The Turkish Cypriots were clearly unhappy that the joint
statement made specific reference to Greek Cypriot issues
such as demilitarization and Famagusta. Moller himself had
insisted on including the word "also" in the statement as a
way addressing the anticipated Turkish Cypriot concerns.
Moller noted that he would meet Friday morning with Pertev
and Tzionis to discuss the way forward. After that meeting,
Moller intended to travel to Ankara for meetings. He
stressed the important role the United States could play in
encouraging Ankara to be supportive of the technical
committees and to give Talat the negotiating room he needed
to reach agreements. This would be particularly important on
the issue of demilitarization and unmanning in the old city.


7. (C) Moller told us that -- as expected -- Papadopoulos
had pressed for the SYG to appoint a special envoy for
Cyprus. Annan had pushed back quite hard on this, observing
that there was still a significant gap between the Greek
Cypriot side's words and its deeds. Annan indicated that UN
U/S Gambari "might" visit Cyprus after the May elections, but
only if there had been real progress in the technical
committees.


Joint Statement "Shocks" Turkish Cypriots
--------------


8. (C) The Turkish Cypriot press has downplayed the
Annan-Papapdopoulos meeting, suggesting it produced "no
tangible results." This reflects the widely held belief in
the north that Papadopoulos had only sought the meeting to
burnish his own image, and that Greek Cypriot talk of
"preparing the ground" was only a ruse to camouflage their
unwillingness to engage in serious negotiations directly with
Talat. Turkish Cypriots remain skeptical that talk about
talks with the current Greek Cypriot administration will
actually lead anywhere.




9. (C) Turkish Cypriot officials, however, are aghast at the
statement issued by Papadopoulos and Annan after the meeting.
Kudret Akay, political advisor to "FM" Serdar Denktash,
expressed dismay that the SYG compromised his neutrality by
agreeing to any joint statement with Papadopoulos. He
wondered if Annan had "suffered a blow to the head" before he
co-signed the statement.


10. (C) Talat's Private Secretary, Asim Akansoy, focused on
the content of the statement. Talat (who is still in the
hospital) had been "shocked" when he read the Secretary
General's apparent endorsement of the idea that progress on
Famagusta (i.e., Varosha) and demilitarization were
preconditions for successful talks. These were fundamentally
settlement-related issues, Akansoy said, that would mainly
involve hard concessions from the Turkish Cypriot side -- and
therefore could only be addressed in the context of
"full-blown and comprehensive" talks between the two leaders.
Reclassifying such sensitive topics as preconditions for
talks or "technical confidence building measures" would "turn
the clock back" to before the Annan Plan.


11. (C) According to Akansoy, the Turkish Cypriots had
already called UNFICYP Chief Michael Moller to express their
dismay at the content of the joint declaration. The
"Presidency" had not decided if it would issue public
statement reflecting their concerns; "first, we have pick
ourselves up off the floor," Akansoy said. The only bright
spot, from the Turkish Cypriot perspective, was Deputy
Spokesman Ereli's statement that as far as the U.S. was
concerned, the Annan Plan remained the basis for further
talks.

Turkish Cypriots "Fear a Trap"
--------------


12. (C) While the Turkish Cypriots have repeatedly stated
their willingness to open a bicommunal dialogue under UN
auspices, they are likely to very wary of the sort of
technical talks suggested in the joint declaration. In a
discussion with us just prior to the Annan-Papadopoulos
meeting, Talat's U/S Rasit Pertev expressed fears that
UN-brokered technical talks on confidence building measures,
could represent another "Luxembourg trap." (COMMENT: Pertev
was referring to the fact that the Turkish Cypriots'
willingness to discuss Varosha and other settlement-related
issues in an EU framework last year had gotten them "nothing
but grief." It had, he said, led to an EU declaration
implying linkage between further help from Europe and Turkish
Cypriot concessions on the settlement questions of Varosha
and property (reftel). END COMMENT.)


13. (C) Putting issues of vital interest on the table during
the Luxembourg talks had not resulted in a good dialogue or
fair exchange, Pertev stressed, but had simply allowed
Papadopoulos to play up the idea that the Turkish Cypriots
were the intransigent side. Talat might agree to talks on
"purely technical issues," Pertev said, such as bird flu,
HIV, or maybe the Committee on Missing Persons. These were
issues of common interest that the two sides would "have to
discuss anyway," even if there was never a solution. But
there was a "fine line" the Turkish Cypriots would "not
cross." Talat, he suggested, would only consent to
discussion of settlement-related issues in the context of
comprehensive face-to-face talks between leaders.
Papadopoulos could not be allowed to say that he supported
UN-brokered dialogue on one hand, but then refuse to meet his
Turkish Cypriot counterpart.

COMMENT
--------------


14. (C) The Turkish Cypriots consider the SYG's joint
statement with Papadopoulos to be a poke in the eye, made all
the worse in light of a declaration made by the EU when it
approved its aid measure earlier in the week. The Turkish
Cypriots are clearly worried that "technical talks" on
confidence building measures could involve hard choices and
compromises on issues they consider vital -- without any
guarantee that Papadopoulos will make tough concessions of
his own, or even agree to meet Talat. Indeed, because
Varosha and demilitarization touch squarely on Turkish
military equities, Talat probably has very little flexibility
on these issues outside the context of comprehensive
settlement negotiations fully endorsed by Ankara. It remains
to be seen if the Turkish Cypriots' initial willingness to
engage in "technical talks" will translate into an actual
dialogue. Although Talat does not relish being the
intransigent party, he may end up trapped in this role by the
competing demands of Tassos Papadopoulos, the UN, and the
Turkish army.


TEXT OF JOINT STATEMENT
--------------


15. (U) Begin Text of the Statement issued following the
February 28 meeting between SYG Annan and President
Papadopoulos:

United Nation's Secretary-General Mr. Kofi Annan and
President Tassos Papadopoulos met in Paris today to review
the situation in Cyprus and examine modalities for moving
forward on the process leading to the reunification of the
island.

They agreed, as they have in the past, that the resumption of
the negotiating process within the framework of the
Secretary-General's Good Offices must be timely and based on

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careful preparation. To that end, the Secretary-General was
pleased to note that the leaders of both communities have
agreed that bi-communal discussion on a series of issues,
agreement on which are needed for the benefit of all
Cypriots, will be undertaken at the technical level. The
Secretary-General and President Papadopoulos expressed their

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common hope that these discussions would help restore trust
between the two communities as well as prepare the way for
the earliest full resumption of the negotiating process. The
Secretary-General noted that he had received assurances from

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the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, Mr. Talat, that
he shared the same aspirations.

The Secretary-General and Mr. Papadopoulos also agreed that
it would be beneficial for all concerned, and would greatly
improve the atmosphere for further talks, if progress could
be achieved on further disengagement of forces and
demilitarization on the island, on the complete de-mining of
Cyprus, and on the issue of Famagusta. They took note of the
recent decision by the European Union to release the much
awaited funds for the benefit of the Turkish Cypriot
community. In this context, they expressed their warm wishes
for the full and speedy recovery of Mr. Talat.

The Secretary-General and President Papadopoulos agreed to
continue their ongoing dialogue with the expressed aim at
accelerating the search for a comprehensive, fair and
mutually acceptable solution to the Cyprus problem.

End Text.
SCHLICHER