Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NICOSIA256
2006-02-23 15:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

GOC RATTLING THE VETO SABER OVER ACCESS TO TURKISH

Tags:  PREL PGOV CY TU 
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VZCZCXYZ0004
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNC #0256 0541535
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231535Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5599
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 4549
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 3505
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1133
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0421
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0463
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000256 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2021
TAGS: PREL PGOV CY TU
SUBJECT: GOC RATTLING THE VETO SABER OVER ACCESS TO TURKISH
PORTS


Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher; Reason 1.4 (b)
and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000256

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2021
TAGS: PREL PGOV CY TU
SUBJECT: GOC RATTLING THE VETO SABER OVER ACCESS TO TURKISH
PORTS


Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher; Reason 1.4 (b)
and (d)


1. (C) The Greek Cypriot political establishment is issuing
thinly veiled threats against Turkey's EU accession course,
following an unsuccessful February 22 attempt by a
Cypriot-flagged container ship, the Able F, to dock at the
Turkish port of Mersin. Government spokesman George Lillikas
issued a statement immediately after the incident in which he
asserted that "the government is taking due action towards
the Austrian EU Presidency, as well as to the European
Commission. This act by Ankara constitutes a serious
violation, inter alia, of the Customs Union Agreement which
exists between Turkey and EU. With its stance, Turkey has
proved yet another time that it refused to harmonize itself
with the acquis communautaire and is not convincing in its
commitment to proceed in its EU course, exhibiting respect
for its obligations." House President and AKEL party leader
Demetris Christofias described Ankara's refusal to allow the
Able F to dock as "totally wrong," adding that Ankara was in
breach of its obligations as an EU candidate country.


2. (SBU) Even before this most recent incident, the GOC's
rhetoric about Turkey had been heating up. In a press
conference last week, Lillikas warned that Cyprus would
"certainly" veto Turkey's EU accession course if Ankara did
not meet its obligations to the EU to open its ports and
airports to Cypriot traffic. President Papadopoulos has
affirmed that the "option of using our veto remains on the
table," but has sought to nuance Lillikas' direct threat by
stressing that the veto was "a last line of defense" in
protecting the interests of the ROC. By Papadopoulos' count,
Cyprus will have 71 veto opportunities in the course of
Turkey's accession talks, but he also stressed his hope that
"such a confrontation will not be required."


3. (C) Although many in Nicosia have their doubts, our
contacts at the MFA deny that the Able F's attempted port
call was a deliberate provocation on the part of the GOC.
"That doesn't mean," one MFA official hastened to add, "that
we won't insist on Turkey's complying fully with its EU
obligations." Unconfirmed reports in the GOC press that the
Able F has anchored off Mersin and refuses to leave until the
captain gets in writing the reasons the ship was denied
permission to dock, has further fueled speculation that this
was a planned event. In any event, the sharp up-tick in
aggressive GOC rhetoric seems aimed in part at setting the
stage for Papadopoulos' February 28 meeting with Kofi Annan
in Paris. Threatening a crisis in the EU encourages member
states to pressure the SYG to be more accommodating of Greek
Cypriot demands. We have heard from UNFICYP officials that a
number of key EU players -- and in particular the UK -- are
visibly eager for a new UN process that will ease the burden
the Cyprus issue has placed on EU decision-making. UNFICYP
Deputy Chief of Mission Susan Allee told us that the GOC had,
in effect, thrown down the gauntlet for the SYG and was all
but daring him to push back. Allee stressed that the UN's
expectations for the upcoming meeting had started out low and
continued to shrink.


4. (C) Comment: Papadopoulos seems to have returned from
his recent visit to Austria emboldened. The government's
pugnacious rhetoric regarding Turkey's EU obligations will
play well domestically and Papadopoulos senses he has
sufficient support in EU circles to make the threat of a veto
a credible, if still unattractive, option. Although it is
unlikely that the Able F was "sent" to Mersin by the GOC as a
deliberate challenge to Turkey, we suspect that the aborted
port call did not come as a surprise to the GOC. Whether
planned or not, the incident was a target of opportunity that
Papadopoulos and Lillikas have been unable to resist. The
demand for a written explanation from Turkey may well be an
effort to establish grounds for future GOC legal and
political challenges to Ankara. Cypriot shipping interests
see the restrictions on access to Turkish ports as a
significant competitive disadvantage and will continue to
press the government for results. It is easy to predict that
the issue of ships and planes will be a recurring motif in
the months ahead. Both the ROC and Turkey are inclined to
brinkmanship, and the most likely result is a serious crisis
in Ankara's EU accession process sometime in 2006.
SCHLICHER