"OSMOSIS" AND THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS: IT'S ALL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000024

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM CY
SUBJECT: "OSMOSIS" AND THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS: IT'S ALL
GREEK TO ME

REF: NICOSIA 2024

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher; Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Turkish Cypriots fear that the Greek
Cypriot side is increasingly disinterested in a bizonal,
bicommunal federal solution to the Cyprus problem, and is
intent on simply absorbing Turkish Cypriots into the ROC
through a process of "osmosis." Buoyed by the confidence and
real leverage that comes with EU membership, Turkish Cypriots
see the current Greek Cypriot leadership as committed to
undoing the long-standing consensus on federalism and
pursuing a unitary, centralized state in which Turkish
Cypriots would be afforded limited, minority rights.
Scholarships, ROC passports, free health care, and trade with
and through the south are understood as "Trojan carrots"
intended as bait to co-opt a desperate Turkish Cypriot
public. While President Papadopoulos did, in fact, use the
term "osmosis" in his last address to the UNGA, this word
seems at least as reflective of Turkish Cypriot anxieties as
it does of Greek Cypriot policies. Even paranoids have
enemies, however, and there is a long history on this island
of the Greek Cypriot majority whittling away at rights and
privileges for the Turkish Cypriots that they had previously
accepted. Moreover, there are many on the Greek Cypriot side
who have fixated on the idea of a "European solution" to the
Cyprus problem that bears more than a passing resemblance to
the Turkish Cypriots' understanding of "osmosis." Partly as
a consequence of this and more directly as a result of the
perceived failure by the EU to keep its promises on easing
Turkish Cypriot isolation, the Union's standing and
credibility in the north has eroded considerably. End
Summary.

Greek 101: The Genesis of Osmosis...a Study in Hubris
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2. (C) Increasingly, Turkish Cypriot fears that Greek
Cypriots are implacably intent on exercising dominion over
the entire island without resort to a bizonal, bicommunal
compromise have crystallized around a single Greek word:
"osmosis." In his introductory calls on the Turkish Cypriot
leadership, Ambassador Schlicher heard this same phraseology
from both "President" Talat and "Foreign Minister" Denktash
(reftel). Anxiety over "osmosis" is also cropping up
regularly in our conversations with Turkish Cypriot
academics, journalists and various political strap-hangers.
From the Turkish Cypriot perspective, "The Osmotic Solution"
(which sounds like either the title for a Robert Ludlum novel
or a New Wave band from the 80s) represents an affirmative
policy choice on the part of the Greek Cypriot leadership --
and in particular President Papadopoulos -- to force Turkish
Cypriots to accommodate themselves to ROC authority and Greek
Cypriot dominance.


3. (C) In this view, EU membership has so strengthened the
Greek Cypriot hand vis-a-vis both the north and Ankara that
the leadership in the south no longer feels constrained by
the 30-year-old mantra of bicommunal, bizonal federation.
Over time, the Turkish Cypriots argue, the Greek Cypriots
believe they can co-opt and absorb Turkish Cypriots through
economic hegemonism and the strategic use of "Trojan carrots"
(our terms, not theirs) such as EU passports, ROC-controlled
EU scholarships, subsidized tuition at Greek Cypriot private
schools, and managed opportunities for trade with and through
the south. Greek Cypriot insistence on maintaining the
political and economic isolation of the north are understood
by Turkish Cypriots as an effort to close down other outlets
and force Turkish Cypriots to engage with the outside world
through the "semi-permeable membrane" of the buffer zone. As
an added benefit for the Greek Cypriots, Turkish "settlers"
are barred from sharing in the spoils of ROC statehood.
Enticing the Turkish Cypriot elite to participate more fully
in ROC-controlled programs is one more tool available to the
Greek Cypriots to differentiate the Turkish Cypriots from
Turkish settlers and at least slow the creeping
legitimization of the settler community.


4. (C) The genesis of "osmosis" as the new term of art in
political circles in the north is evidently the last sentence
of Papadopoulos' speech to the 60th UNGA in New York last
September. The Cypriot President told delegates "we also
visualize that, with Cyprus' membership to the European Union
taking solid roots, a settlement would encompass an
integration of the currently occupied area to the
characteristics of a European society and the standards of
the acquis communautaire in full harmony and osmosis with the
rest of the island." This sentence is no less awkward or
ambiguous in the original Greek. "Osmosis" has not been a
significant word in the Greek Cypriot lexicon. In fact, the
President's UNGA speech is the only reference we can find to
a senior Greek Cypriot political figure actually using that
word publicly.

Even Paranoids Have Enemies
--------------


5. (C) Although this single and ambiguous reference to
"osmosis" seems like rather thin gruel to outsiders, it
resonates with the Turkish Cypriots' understanding of their
own history. The Turkish Cypriots can point to numerous
Greek Cypriot actions since the founding of the Republic
aimed at ensuring the long-term political and economic
dominance of the vastly larger Greek Cypriot community. From
the very beginning, Turkish Cypriots argue, Greek Cypriots
looked at their community as a threat that they needed to
both contain and dominate. Early on in the brief history of
the ROC, Greek Cypriots refused to allow Turkish Cypriots to
establish separate municipalities in the five major cities --
a right they theoretically enjoyed under the constitution --
arguing that these entities would be too small to be
economically viable. The thirteen changes to the
constitution that Archbishop Makarios introduced in 1963 were
pegged to "functionality," but seemed clearly designed to
strengthen Greek Cypriot control of the state at the expense
of Turkish Cypriot autonomy. The proposal included abolition
of veto powers at the executive level, eliminating the
requirement for separate majorities in adopting legislation
in key areas, and reducing the proportion of Turkish Cypriots
employed in the public sector.


6. (C) It is relatively easy to draw a straight line from
Makarios' thirteen points -- which ultimately precipitated
the political crisis and intercommunal violence that led the
UNSC to establish the UNFICYP mission in 1964 -- to
Papadopoulos' April 2004 speech rejecting the Annan Plan as
an acceptable solution to the Cyprus problem. A few quotes
from that speech are instructive:

-- "The Annan Plan does not lead to the reunification of the
two communities, but on the contrary promotes the permanent
division with restrictions on movement, settlement, the right
to acquire property, the exercise of political rights and
other divisive elements."

-- "(Under the Annan Plan) a separate economy was imposed in
the end. There will be no common monetary or fiscal policy
and no investments by Greek Cypriot businesses shall be
allowed in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state."

-- "(With the Annan Plan) the goal of the Turkish Cypriot
side for two peoples, with two states living separately and
simply cooperating is fully achieved."


7. (C) Since 2004, the rhetoric of the Papadopoulos
administration has continued to fuel Turkish Cypriot fears
that the Greek Cypriot objections to the Annan Plan in
reality represent a back-door rejection of the long-standing
consensus goal of bizonal, bicommunal federation. In an
interview with the influential daily Phileleftheros in
November, the President's Diplomatic Advisor, Tasos Tzionis,
sharply criticized both the framework of the Annan Plan
negotiations and the plan's underlying philosophy. Although
Tzionis stressed that this represented simply his "personal
views," Turkish Cypriots are convinced that this interview
was a deliberate attempt to nudge the settlement goal post
back in the direction of an "osmotic," unitary state.

The EU as Villain
--------------


8. (C) Greek Cypriots do not talk about "osmosis," but many
talk about their hopes for a "European Solution" to the
Cyprus problem. Greek Cypriots are attracted in particular
to the acquis' four freedoms concerning the movement of
goods, people, capital and services. Not coincidentally,
those advocating a European Solution are also chief among
those who argue that the EU should have a significantly
greater voice in future Cyprus negotiations. Some, but by no
means a majority, are prepared to say that the EU rather than
UN should have primary responsibility for the negotiating
process. Turkish Cypriots understand the talk of a "European
Solution" -- correctly in our view -- as code for a unitary
state with majority rule and very limited minority rights for
Turkish Cypriots. This is anathema for the leadership in the
north. The Turkish Cypriots' greatest fear is that the Greek
Cypriots are not (and, in fact, may never have been) serious
about a bizonal, bicommunal federal solution, but rather
intend to hold out for a controlling stake in any new state
that might emerge from negotiations.


9. (C) Meanwhile, the EU is sinking ever lower in Turkish
Cypriot estimations. The recent fiasco over the aid and
trade packages highlights what Turkish Cypriots see as the
EU's failure to deliver on its commitments. Among the 25,
Turkish Cypriots see only the UK as serious about easing
Turkish Cypriot isolation. The majority of member states are
seen as disinterested at best and, at worst, slavishly
deferential to GOC prerogatives on the Cyprus issue. The
decision to appoint a Greek Cypriot to head up the European
Commission Office on Cyprus has further undermined both the
standing and credibility of the EU in Turkish Cypriot eyes.


Comment
--------------


10. (C) Webster's defines "osmosis" as "a gradual, often
unconscious process of absorption." It may be more useful,
therefore, to think about osmosis in the Cyprus context as a
description of what Turkish Cypriots fear is happening to
their community rather than a deliberate and fully-conscious
Greek Cypriot policy. EU membership has made the carrots
available to the ROC significantly more enticing. Many
Turkish Cypriots seem prepared to compromise on certain
principles if the reward is great enough and the cost
seemingly small. Most Turkish Cypriots, for example, have
taken the plunge and applied for ROC passports. Rauf
Denktash once said that Turkish Cypriots who took this step
were traitors to their own people. Now, his own grandson has
a ROC passport. Each Turkish Cypriot will draw the line of
accommodation in a different place. Some will use the
hospitals in the south, but not the schools. Others will
exercise the right to a passport but not the right to vote.
The fear of at least some in the north is that this will
prove a slippery slope and that taking the first step may
make it easier, over time, for Turkish Cypriots to accept
greater GOC control over their affairs.
SCHLICHER