Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NICOSIA2052
2006-12-20 15:50:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

UN REP, P-5 AMBS TAKE STOCK

Tags:  PREL PGOV UNFICYP UNGA CY 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHNC #2052/01 3541550
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201550Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7353
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0730
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 002052 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/ERA, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP UNGA CY
SUBJECT: UN REP, P-5 AMBS TAKE STOCK


Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 002052

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/ERA, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP UNGA CY
SUBJECT: UN REP, P-5 AMBS TAKE STOCK


Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Hosting local Perm Five ambassadors and the
resident UN chief to a working lunch December 18, the
Ambassador orchestrated a tour d'horizon that touched on the
UN transition in New York, horsetrading over the UNFICYP
mandate renewal, developments on the UN negotiating track in
Nicosia, the December 17 municipal elections, Turkey's EU
track, and friction within the Cypriot MFA's ranks. UN
Special Representative Michael Moller opened the discussion
by refuting rumors he would soon abandon Cyprus for New York
and a position on incoming SYG Ban Ki-Moon's team. Job
jockeying was consuming his colleagues' days, however, as
Moon likely would fill fifty positions in the next few
months. Turning to the Cyprus Problem, Moller voiced
satisfaction with the UNFICYP renewal process, which he'd
witnessed first-hand in New York. While there, he also had
netted "seed money" to fund costs related to a potential UN
Good Offices mission re-start. The UN mediator would host
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot negotiators later December
18; he worried, however, that mutual mistrust still plagued
the sides' relations. Property issues likely would dominate
the meeting, Moller thought.


2. (C) Ambassadors broke down the results of Cyprus's
day-earlier local elections. All agreed the
something-for-everyone results gave neither the coalition nor
opposition a mandate, and were unlikely to force a Cyprus
Problem change of tack by President Tassos Papdopoulos.
Turkish EU accession also made the discussion, with the
Ambassador's British and French counterparts claiming that
Brussels had tired of the twice-yearly crises the process
brought. Germany hoped to focus its presidency on the EU
Constitution, not on enlargement issues, they added. Lunch
concluded with invitees dissecting Cypriot Foreign Minister
Lillikas's recent and future personnel moves. The FM hoped
to shake up the listless ministry, they concurred, but faced
opposition from potent unions. END SUMMARY.

--------------
Polishing Resumes in the Big Apple
--------------


3. (C) Moller days earlier had returned from New York, where
he had presented the Secretary General's report on Cyprus to
the Security Council. Numerous colleagues there were
lobbying hard for jobs in the incoming Ban Ki-Moon
administration. Not Moller. "I'd rather serve in Baghdad,"
the UN mediator chuckled. "Rumors of my imminent departure
are just that -- rumors." Personnel matters would consume
Moon's time for the near future, Moller asserted. First, he
would need to name his deputy. Sources close to the South
Korean claimed Moon wanted a female candidate from a
third-world nation; Egyptian Minister of State for
International Cooperation Fayza Abul-Naga, a Jordanian, and a
Saudi topped the prospect list. Up next were the UN's
dozen-plus under secretary slots, plus executive positions in
the specialized agencies. All told, Moller thought Moon
would replace fifty UN diplomats in the coming quarter.
Political Under Secretary Ibrahim Gambari, who brokered the
July 8 negotiating framework which UNFICYP was attempting to
shepherd, would move on, but not until late February.
"Hopefully we'll see movement before then," Moller added.
Cyprus did not figure high on the incoming SYG's priority
list, however.


4. (C) Security Council deliberations on the latest UNFICYP
mandate resolution had gone smoothly, especially compared to
the bickering that had occurred during the prior go-round in
June. Its language, while muted somewhat from earlier UK
drafts, sent the message that both Greek and Turkish Cypriots
needed to get serious, Moller asserted. Japan, always
concerned about its UN peacekeeping expenditures, had sought
to review UNFICYP troop levels. Moller's response -- that
UNFICYP could get no smaller without a reduced mandate --
seemed to satisfy Tokyo. Before departing New York, Moller
visited UN bean-counters and acquired "seed money" to fund
partially the technical committees and expert working groups
the Gambari Process envisaged. "But we'll still come around,
hat in hand, in the coming months," the SRSG promised. UK
High Commissioner Peter Millet agreed that the December
UNFICYP rollover exercise was nearly painless. "Gambari laid
out the premise of political equality of the communities, and
both leaders accepted it. As such, there was no reason for
the Greeks and Greek Cypriots to get bogged down in the
sides-versus-communities nonsense."

--------------
Getting the Local Process Unstuck

NICOSIA 00002052 002 OF 003


--------------


5. (C) Moller announced he would host Cypriot negotiators
Tasos Tzionis and Rasit Pertev at UNFICYP HQ later December

18. He intended to push hard on both. (Note: Moller's
deputy informed us December 19 that the Moller-Tzionis-Pertev
gathering, while "frank," offered no breakthroughs. End
Note) Fundamental mistrust characterized the Turkish
Cypriot-Greek Cypriot relationship, Moller lamented; building
trust appeared his toughest task. Tackling substance
appeared a distant prospect, with the sides still debating
process. The latest sticking point concerned real property.
Pertev saw land exchange as a final settlement issue, and
therefore grist for the expert working groups. Greek
Cypriots considered it a everyday life issue, however, and
thus a technical committee responsibility. Moller's pitch to
the disputing parties? Let both bodies tackle the real
estate problem.


6. (C) Rather optimistic, the SRSG thought as many as seven
working groups and nine technical committees could start work
immediately after community leaders Papadopoulos and Mehmet
Ali Talat assented. Their "green light" was not that far
off, Moller believed; he described the process of
synchronizing the sides' agendas as "two-thirds complete."
Similarly, he expected progress soon on confidence building
measures, primarily the long-delayed opening of the Ledra
Street checkpoint. Both communities had agreed in principle
to the step, Moller declared; details, especially concerning
resupply of Turkish troops along the Green Line, remained
unresolved. EU funding, channeled through its PFF program,
would cover "beautification" of the checkpoint surroundings,
he added. With enhanced CBMs and movement on Gambari, Moller
hoped to see the negative environment surrounding bi-communal
interaction to diminish somewhat.

-------------- --
Municipal Election Results No Boon for Solution
-------------- --


7. (C) From the UN process, the conversation segued into the
December 17 municipal elections. Cypriot voters had rewarded
Papadopoulos's AKEL-DIKO-EDEK coalition with mayorships in
five key municipalities. But opposition DISY, too, had
claimed victory, having garnered more votes than any other
single party. The ambassadors and Moller agreed the results
presented neither side a clear mandate, nor did they portend
a Cyprus Problem policy correction. Had AKEL's high-profile,
pro-solution candidates lost in Nicosia and Limassol, party
leaders might have taken a second look at the benefits of
coalition membership, believed French Charge Eric Sanson.
With wins, however, AKEL seemed content, and surely would
stay with Papadopoulos through the 2008 presidential
elections. To keep progressive, pro-solution AKEL voters in
the fold, all thought Papadopoulos would "play nice" on the
UN process, although he was likely to defer serious
substantive decisions as long as possible.


8. (C) How does Papadopoulos feel he is doing? the
Ambassador pondered. Domestic factors, mainly the election
results and the President's continued high approval numbers,
likely left him feeling fine, the Ambassador reasoned. On
foreign policy and his handling of the Cyprus Problem, the
story looked different. Nicosia's hard-line stance vis-a-vis
Turkey's EU accession had left Cyprus isolated at the recent
Council summit, and even daily of record "Phileleftheros" --
normally the staunchest of allies -- had criticized the
administration's strategies. Nonetheless, Papadopoulos was
unlikely to chart a major course change anytime soon.

-------------- -
Brussels "Fed up" with Turkey-Cyprus Bickering
-------------- -


9. (C) Speaking for his EU colleagues, High Commissioner
Millet noted Brussels' frustrations with the wrangling over
Turkey's EU accession, and Cyprus's intent to utilize it in
extracting CyProb concessions from Ankara. "Every six months
a crisis," he vented, and each kept the EU from tackling more
pressing matters. According to his German Foreign Ministry
contacts, Berlin hoped to focus on the EU Constitution, not
on accession, during its January-June 2007 Presidency. But
it was unlikely Germany could "hide" from Turkey issues for
long, Millet ventured, since pro-Turkey forces within the EU
would soon push to open those Acquis chapters which the
recent Council conclusions had not locked.


10. (C) Finland's presidency had erred in seeking to open
chapters at the COREPER immediately following the Council

NICOSIA 00002052 003 OF 003


summit, Sanson argued. Opposition from Cyprus was a
near-guarantee, as Papadopoulos -- feeling heat locally for
not delivering greater penalties for Turkey -- could
ill-afford another Brussels setback. Laying low for a brief
period appeared a better tactic; the German Presidency likely
would have faced little EU opposition in quietly pushing for
renewed negotiations at the technical level, the French
diplomat believed.


11. (C) Mentioning recent media accounts regarding Turkish
Cypriots' request of UK aviation authorities for direct
flights between north Cyprus and Great Britain, Russian
Ambassador Andrei Nestrenko asked Millet for the current
state of play. FCO legal experts continued to study the
application and relevant international conventions, the High
Commissioner replied. PM Tony Blair's recent message in
Turkey, that Britain wished to initiate direct air service if
international law permitted, was not hyperbole. The "if" was
mighty big, however. Millet relayed his government's
attorneys' initial findings: that requests to commence
international flights, under the Chicago Convention, must
originate in internationally recognized states. Grasping at
straws, "TRNC President" Talat was even seeking U.S.
assistance with UK regulators, the Ambassador added,
referring to the Turkish Cypriot leader's December 4 letter
to the Secretary. Washington would not attempt to influence
this internal British decision, he added. Miller made clear
that this would be the proper USG response.

--------------
Moves Afoot a the MFA
--------------


12. (C) Lunch concluded with ambassadors and Moller
analyzing RoC Foreign Minister George Lillikas's personnel
moves. Millet claimed Lillikas was furious with diplomats'
working hours; by five p.m., he was often left alone, and
personally had to respond to requests for instructions from
Cypriot ambassadors in western Europe and North America.
Effecting workplace changes meant taking on powerful unions,
however, always a challenge on Cyprus. Lillikas faced an
even tougher union battle, the Ambassador opined, should he
attempt to implement a pet project -- bringing in political
appointees for high-ranking MFA slots.


13. (C) The permanent secretary ("D" equivalent) would go to
a career diplomat, however. Lillikas continued to ponder
possibilities, the Ambassador noted, with Acting PermSec
Alexander Zenon and Cyprus Problem Political Director (U/S
equivalent) Erato Marcoullis -- the RoC's former ambassador
in Washington -- the leading candidates. At least two other
PolDir slots likely would turn over in coming months.

--------------
Comment:
--------------


14. (C) A convergence of factors leaves us guardedly
optimistic we'll see some CyProb movement on the UN track in

2007. Moller's decision to re-up is one. A solid mediator
equally frustrated with both communities' leaders, the Dane
has done commendable work keeping them on speaking terms; his
departure and his replacement's learning curve could have
cost us six months, easy. Similarly, Gambari's institutional
memory on Cyprus and the respect he commands here are
beneficial, even if, as Moller claims, he leaves DPA in two
months. Kofi Annan's last UNSC report on Cyprus,
particularly his admonition not to take UNFICYP's presence
for granted, garnered major press in south Nicosia and sent
the signal that the status quo does not satisfy Cyprus's
long-time mediator. The governing coalition's municipal
elections results were not so horrid as to force Papadopoulos
to soften his Cyprus Problem stance, but not so grand as to
convince him he could stall forever. Last, the latest
Turkey-EU crisis has passed, with the RoC definitely not
victorious in the European Council. From their European
partners' reactions in Brussels, Papadopoulos, Lillikas and
company must be getting the message that the EU wants out of
the CyProb business.


15. (C) In our private meetings and public comments, we will
push both sides to support the UN process and negotiate in
good faith. In our opening salvo, the Ambassador's New
Year's message, he urges the sides "to focus on what unites,
not what divides," in hopes of ending the unacceptable
division of the island. Public Affairs expects to place the
piece in leading dailies island-wide.
Schlicher