UN REP, P-5 AMBS TAKE STOCK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NICOSIA 002050

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/ERA, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP UNGA CY
SUBJECT: UN REP, P-5 AMBS TAKE STOCK

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Hosting local Perm Five ambassadors and
the resident UN chief to a working lunch December 18, the
Ambassador orchestrated a tour d'horizon that touched on
the UN transition in New York, horsetrading over the
UNFICYP mandate renewal, developments on the UN negotiating
track in Nicosia, the December 17 municipal elections,
Turkey's EU track, and friction within the Cypriot MFA's
ranks. UN Special Representative Michael Moller opened the
discussion by refuting rumors he would soon abandon Cyprus
for New York and a position on incoming SYG Ban Ki-Moon's
team. Job jockeying was consuming his colleagues' days,
however, as Moon likely would fill fifty positions in the
next few months. Turning to the Cyprus Problem, Moller
voiced satisfaction with the UNFICYP renewal process, which
he'd witnessed first-hand in New York. While there, he
also had netted "seed money" to fund costs related to a
potential UN Good Offices mission re-start. The UN
mediator would host Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot
negotiators later December 18; he worried, however, that
mutual mistrust still plagued the sides' relations.
Property issues likely would dominate the meeting, Moller
thought.


2. (C) Ambassadors broke down the results of Cyprus's
day-earlier local elections. All agreed the
something-for-everyone results gave neither the coalition
nor opposition a mandate, and were unlikely to force a
Cyprus Problem change of tack by President Tassos
Papdopoulos. Turkish EU accession also made the
discussion, with the Ambassador's British and French
counterparts claiming that Brussels had tired of the
twice-yearly crises the process brought. Germany hoped to
focus its presidency on the EU Constitution, not on
enlargement issues, they added. Lunch concluded with
invitees dissecting Cypriot Foreign Minister Lillikas's
recent and future personnel moves. The FM hoped to shake
up the listless ministry, they concurred, but faced
opposition from potent unions. END SUMMARY.

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Polishing Resumes in the Big Apple
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3. (C) Moller days earlier had returned from New York,
where he had presented the Secretary General's report on
Cyprus to the Security Council. Numerous colleagues there
were lobbying hard for jobs in the incoming Ban Ki-Moon
administration. Not Moller. "I'd rather serve in Baghdad,"
the UN mediator chuckled. "Rumors of my imminent departure
are just that -- rumors." Personnel matters would consume
Moon's time for the near future, Moller asserted. First,
he would need to name his deputy. Sources close to the
South Korean claimed Moon wanted a female candidate from a
third-world nation; Egyptian Minister of State for
International Cooperation Fayza Abul-Naga, a Jordanian, and
a Saudi topped the prospect list. Up next were the UN's
dozen-plus under secretary slots, plus executive positions
in the specialized agencies. All told, Moller thought Moon
would replace fifty UN diplomats in the coming quarter.
Political Under Secretary Ibrahim Gambari, who brokered the
July 8 negotiating framework which UNFICYP was attempting
to shepherd, would move on, but not until late February.
"Hopefully we'll see movement before then," Moller added.
Cyprus did not figure high on the incoming SYG's priority
list, however.


4. (C) Security Council deliberations on the latest
UNFICYP mandate resolution had gone smoothly, especially
compared to the bickering that had occurred during the
prior go-round in June. Its language, while muted somewhat
from earlier UK drafts, sent the message that both Greek
and Turkish Cypriots needed to get serious, Moller
asserted. Japan, always concerned about its UN
peacekeeping expenditures, had sought to review UNFICYP
troop levels. Moller's response -- that UNFICYP could get
no smaller without a reduced mandate -- seemed to satisfy
Tokyo. Before departing New York, Moller visited UN
bean-counters and acquired "seed money" to fund partially
the technical committees and expert working groups the
Gambari Process envisaged. "But we'll still come around,
hat in hand, in the coming months," the SRSG promised. UK
High Commissioner Peter Millet agreed that the December
UNFICYP rollover exercise was nearly painless. "Gambari
laid out the premise of political equality of the
communities, and both leaders accepted it. As such, there
was no reason for the Greeks and Greek Cypriots to get
bogged down in the sides-versus-communities nonsense."

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--------------
Getting the Local Process Unstuck
--------------


5. (C) Moller announced he would host Cypriot negotiators
Tasos Tzionis and Rasit Pertev at UNFICYP HQ later December

18. He intended to push hard on both. (Note: Moller's
deputy informed us December 19 that the
Moller-Tzionis-Pertev gathering, while "frank," offered no
breakthroughs. End Note) Fundamental mistrust
characterized the Turkish Cypriot-Greek Cypriot
relationship, Moller lamented; building trust appeared his
toughest task. Tackling substance appeared a distant
prospect, with the sides still debating process. The
latest sticking point concerned real property. Pertev saw
land exchange as a final settlement issue, and therefore
grist for the expert working groups. Greek Cypriots
considered it a everyday life issue, however, and thus a
technical committee responsibility. Moller's pitch to the
disputing parties? Let both bodies tackle the real estate
problem.


6. (C) Rather optimistic, the SRSG thought as many as
seven working groups and nine technical committees could
start work immediately after community leaders Papadopoulos
and Mehmet Ali Talat assented. Their "green light" was not
that far off, Moller believed; he described the process of
synchronizing the sides' agendas as "two-thirds complete."
Similarly, he expected progress soon on confidence building
measures, primarily the long-delayed opening of the Ledra
Street checkpoint. Both communities had agreed in
principle to the step, Moller declared; details, especially
concerning resupply of Turkish troops along the Green Line,
remained unresolved. EU funding, channeled through its PFF
program, would cover "beautification" of the checkpoint
surroundings, he added. With enhanced CBMs and movement on
Gambari, Moller hoped to see the negative environment
surrounding bi-communal interaction to diminish somewhat.

-------------- --
Municipal Election Results No Boon for Solution
-------------- --


7. (C) From the UN process, the conversation segued into
the December 17 municipal elections. Cypriot voters had
rewarded Papadopoulos's AKEL-DIKO-EDEK coalition with
mayorships in five key municipalities. But opposition
DISY, too, had claimed victory, having garnered more votes
than any other single party. The ambassadors and Moller
agreed the results presented neither side a clear mandate,
nor did they portend a Cyprus Problem policy correction.
Had AKEL's high-profile, pro-solution candidates lost in
Nicosia and Limassol, party leaders might have taken a
second look at the benefits of coalition membership,
believed French Charge Eric Sanson. With wins, however,
AKEL seemed content, and surely would stay with
Papadopoulos through the 2008 presidential elections. To
keep progressive, pro-solution AKEL voters in the fold, all
thought Papadopoulos would "play nice" on the UN process,
although he was likely to defer serious substantive
decisions as long as possible.


8. (C) How does Papadopoulos feel he is doing? the
Ambassador pondered. Domestic factors, mainly the election
results and the President's continued high approval
numbers, likely left him feeling fine, the Ambassador
reasoned. On foreign policy and his handling of the Cyprus
Problem, the story looked different. Nicosia's hard-line
stance vis-a-vis Turkey's EU accession had left Cyprus
isolated at the recent Council summit, and even daily of
record "Phileleftheros" -- normally the staunchest of
allies -- had criticized the administration's strategies.
Nonetheless, Papadopoulos was unlikely to chart a major
course change anytime soon.

-------------- -
Brussels "Fed up" with Turkey-Cyprus Bickering
-------------- -


9. (C) Speaking for his EU colleagues, High Commissioner
Millet noted Brussels' frustrations with the wrangling over
Turkey's EU accession, and Cyprus's intent to utilize it in
extracting CyProb concessions from Ankara. "Every six
months a crisis," he vented, and each kept the EU from
tackling more pressing matters. According to his German
Foreign Ministry contacts, Berlin hoped to focus on the EU
Constitution, not on accession, during its January-June
2007 Presidency. But it was unlikely Germany could "hide"

NICOSIA 00002050 003 OF 004


from Turkey issues for long, Millet ventured, since
pro-Turkey forces within the EU would soon push to open
those Acquis chapters which the recent Council conclusions
had not locked.


10. (C) Finland's presidency had erred in seeking to open
chapters at the COREPER immediately following the Council
summit, Sanson argued. Opposition from Cyprus was a
near-guarantee, as Papadopoulos -- feeling heat locally for
not delivering greater penalties for Turkey -- could
ill-afford another Brussels setback. Laying low for a
brief period appeared a better tactic; the German
Presidency likely would have faced little EU opposition in
quietly pushing for renewed negotiations at the technical
level, the French diplomat believed.


11. (C) Mentioning recent media accounts regarding
Turkish Cypriots' request of UK aviation authorities for
direct flights between north Cyprus and Great Britain,
Russian Ambassador Andrei Nestrenko asked Millet for the
current state of play. FCO legal experts continued to
study the application and relevant international
conventions, the High Commissioner replied. PM Tony
Blair's recent message in Turkey, that Britain wished to
initiate direct air service if international law permitted,
was not hyperbole. The "if" was mighty big, however.
Millet relayed his government's attorneys' initial
findings: that requests to commence international flights,
under the Chicago Convention, must originate in
internationally recognized states. Grasping at straws,
"TRNC President" Talat was even seeking U.S. assistance
with UK regulators, the Ambassador added, referring to the
Turkish Cypriot leader's December 4 letter to the
Secretary. Washington would not attempt to influence this

SIPDIS
internal British decision, he added. Miller made clear
that this would be the proper USG response.

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Moves Afoot a the MFA
--------------


12. (C) Lunch concluded with ambassadors and Moller
analyzing RoC Foreign Minister George Lillikas's personnel
moves. Millet claimed Lillikas was furious with diplomats'
working hours; by five p.m., he was often left alone, and
personally had to respond to requests for instructions from
Cypriot ambassadors in western Europe and North America.
Effecting workplace changes meant taking on powerful
unions, however, always a challenge on Cyprus. Lillikas
faced an even tougher union battle, the Ambassador opined,
should he attempt to implement a pet project -- bringing in
political appointees for high-ranking MFA slots.


13. (C) The permanent secretary ("D" equivalent) would go
to a career diplomat, however. Lillikas continued to
ponder possibilities, the Ambassador noted, with Acting
PermSec Alexander Zenon and Cyprus Problem Political
Director (U/S equivalent) Erato Marcoullis -- the RoC's
former ambassador in Washington -- the leading candidates.
At least two other PolDir slots likely would turn over in
coming months.

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Comment:
--------------


14. (C) A convergence of factors leaves us guardedly
optimistic we'll see some CyProb movement on the UN track
in 2007. Moller's decision to re-up is one. A solid
mediator equally frustrated with both communities' leaders,
the Dane has done commendable work keeping them on speaking
terms; his departure and his replacement's learning curve
could have cost us six months, easy. Similarly, Gambari's
institutional memory on Cyprus and the respect he commands
here are beneficial, even if, as Moller claims, he leaves
DPA in two months. Kofi Annan's last UNSC report on
Cyprus, particularly his admonition not to take UNFICYP's
presence for granted, garnered major press in south Nicosia
and sent the signal that the status quo does not satisfy
Cyprus's long-time mediator. The governing coalition's
municipal elections results were not so horrid as to force
Papadopoulos to soften his Cyprus Problem stance, but not
so grand as to convince him he could stall forever. Last,
the latest Turkey-EU crisis has passed, with the RoC
definitely not victorious in the European Council. From
their European partners' reactions in Brussels,
Papadopoulos, Lillikas and company must be getting the
message that the EU wants out of the CyProb business.


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15. (C) In our private meetings and public comments, we
will push both sides to support the UN process and
negotiate in good faith. In our opening salvo, the
Ambassador's New Year's message, he urges the sides "to
focus on what unites, not what divides," in hopes of ending
the unacceptable division of the island. Public Affairs
expects to place the piece in leading dailies island-wide.
Schlicher