Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NICOSIA1869
2006-11-02 09:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

TALAT ON FINNISH PROPOSAL, UN PROCESS

Tags:  PGOV PREL EUN UNFICYP TU CY 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHNC #1869/01 3060922
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 020922Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7153
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0664
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 001869 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL EUN UNFICYP TU CY
SUBJECT: TALAT ON FINNISH PROPOSAL, UN PROCESS

REF: NICOSIA 1842

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 001869

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL EUN UNFICYP TU CY
SUBJECT: TALAT ON FINNISH PROPOSAL, UN PROCESS

REF: NICOSIA 1842

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. In a November 1 meeting with Ambassador
Schlicher, Turkish Cypriot "President" Mehmet Ali Talat was
pessimistic about the prospects of the Finnish proposal on
Varosha/ports -- and criticized the EU process for making
"unfair" and one-sided demands of his community for the sake
of Turkey and the ROC. He suggested that the Finns, Cyprus
problem neophytes, had been maneuvered into presenting what
was essentially a reheated version of an earlier,
unacceptable Papadopoulos proposal. Talat said that the
Turkish Cypriots were nevertheless ready to negotiate in good
faith -- starting with his November 3 meeting in Brussels
with FM Tuomioja and in subsequent proximity talks Talat's
representatives plan to attend in Helsinki. Talat claimed to
have no idea whether or not Turkey would attend the Helsinki
talks. On the UN track, Talat stressed that the current
deadlock was the result of Greek Cypriot unwillingness to
move forward; Papadopoulos wanted to "cripple" the UN process
so it would not undermine his ability to extract concessions
from Turkey in the EU forum. Ambassador Schlicher pressed
Talat for flexibility with both the EU and UN; Talat agreed
that it would not be in the Turkish Cypriot interest to be
responsible for a failure on either track. END SUMMARY.

FINNISH PROPOSAL "UNFAIR..."
--------------


2. (C) In a November 1 meeting with Ambassador Schlicher,
Turkish Cypriot "President" Mehmet Ali Talat expressed
several misgivings about Finnish efforts to broker a
Varosha/ports/trade deal. The benefits on offer for the
Turkish Cypriots, he said, were minimal, especially since the
economically important Ercan Airport was not on the table.
As it stood now, Talat said, the Greek Cypriots stood to gain
a great deal -- access to Turkish ports, the prospect of a
return to Varosha, and the surrender of Turkish Cypriot
"sovereignty" over the operations of Famagusta port.
(COMMENT: Our understanding from the local Finnish Ambassador

(reftel) is that they have proposed a Commission role in the
management of trade, but not of the port itself, as Talat
contends. END COMMENT).


3. (C) The Finns, Talat complained, did not understand the
Cyprus problem and had been maneuvered by the Greek Cypriots
into offering a warmed-over version of Papadopoulos's
original, unacceptable proposal on Varosha. For its part,
the EU was inherently biased. "Greek Cypriot" membership had
skewed the Union's ability to act as an honest broker, Talat
claimed, and as a result the EU was now reneging on its 2004
post-referendum promise of direct trade -- which the Turkish
Cypriots had already earned with their "yes" to the Annan
Plan. Talat said the GOC would certainly seek to complicate
the implementation of any direct trade package adopted as
part of the Finnish deal, as it had with the long-delayed
financial aid measure. Although the Finnish compromise could
benefit the Greek Cypriots and even Turkey, the Turkish
Cypriots would probably get nothing in exchange for their
concessions.


4. (C) Ambassador Schlicher refuted the idea that the Finnish
proposal was unfair, noting that it contained plusses and
minuses for each side. The Greek Cypriots were unhappy that
the Finnish proposal did not envision the immediate and
unconditional return of Varosha. He acknowledged that the EU
had been slow to fulfill its 2004 commitments to the Turkish
Cypriots, but noted the Union's financial aid package had
finally been approved despite GOC objections. The Finnish
presidency was now engaged in an honest effort to move
forward on trade for the Turkish Cypriots in a way that would
also avert a crisis in Turkey's accession process. The
Turkish Cypriots, he stressed, would get no closer to ending
their isolation by being inflexible with the Finns.

... BUT WE'LL PLAY BALL. WILL TURKEY?
--------------


5. (C) Talat agreed that it was not in his community's
interest to be responsible for a Finnish flame-out, and
acknowledged that continued progress on Turkish EU accession
was a prerequisite for a solution to the Cyprus problem.
Therefore, he said, he was "ready" to negotiate on the
Finnish proposal. First, Talat would travel to Brussels on
November 3 for a meeting with FM Tuomioja. His "Foreign
Minister" Turgay Avci and "presidential undersecretary" Rasit
Pertev would attend FM-level talks in Helsinki. Oddly, Talat
said he had been under the impression these would be direct
talks -- which would be "better" than proximity talks -- but
said the Turkish Cypriots would nonetheless participate "in
good faith."

NICOSIA 00001869 002 OF 002




6. (C) Asked about Turkey's participation in the Helsinki
talks, Talat said he understood and supported the GOT's
desire to include Greece in the talks. Negotiations without
GOG representatives would set a bad precedent for the UN
track, where Cyprus's "guarantor powers" were traditionally
included in tandem. Ultimately, however, Talat said he did
not know whether the Turks would attend the talks if their
conditions were not met.

UN TRACK: "GREEK CYPRIOTS TO BLAME" FOR DEADLOCK
-------------- ---


7. (C) Turning to the UN track, Talat stressed that he was
ready and eager for an "early resumption of talks." This was
in his interest since he wanted to see a lasting solution on
the island -- and in the interest of Turkey, whose EU
accession would be continually "poisoned" by any ongoing
settlement deadlock. Talat expressed hope that the Gambari
Process would be a success. He supported the UN's latest
bridging proposal, the substance of which the Turkish
Cypriots had negotiated "sincerely" with SRSG Moller.


8. (C) The problem, Talat insisted, was the Greek Cypriots --
who at first objected to the specific timelines in the
proposal and then (after those timelines were softened to
meet their concerns) raised objections over the UN's plans to
put the proposal in writing. Talat suggested that the real
Greek Cypriot goal was to "cripple" the UN process, where
both sides were on an equal footing, by keeping it as vague
and non-committal as possible. Meanwhile, Papadopoulos would
continue to press for concessions from Turkey in the EU
forum, where the Greek Cypriots enjoyed the upper hand.


9. (C) Ambassador Schlicher noted that the UN had not
accepted Greek Cypriot demands for an open-ended process. The
Turkish Cypriots had shown the right attitude by engaging
Moller on the substance of the bridging proposal; the GOC's
recent public rift with Moller and the UN was evidence that
Papadopoulos was feeling uncomfortable. Continued Turkish
Cypriot flexibility and engagement on the UN track would keep
the pressure on Papadopoulos, take some of the pressure out
of Turkey's EU accession, and increase the chances of
renewing active and meaningful settlement talks.

COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) Although Talat was concerned that the Finnish
proposal might be detrimental to Turkish Cypriot interests,
he seemed nonetheless willing to give it the old college try.
Having been down this road before (with the unsuccessful
2005 Luxembourg talks),he is understandably skeptical. But
Talat recognizes that the stakes are higher this time and,
especially since he knows that Ankara, Nicosia, and Brussels
are the real decision-makers, has a pragmatic streak. He
would probably be willing to brave domestic political
criticism and accept a less-than-perfect deal if 1) he felt
that it offered at least some tangible benefits for his
community, 2) he felt that it furthered prospects for a
Cyprus settlement by averting a Turkey-EU train wreck, and 3)
he was confident that a flexible approach had Ankara's full
support. But the 64,000 YTL question is whether Turkey will
join him and engage in serious give-and-take in Finland at
the suggested proximity talks. Only if this happens will
Papadopoulos be put back on the spot and forced to make a
choice between "yes" and "no." END COMMENT.
SCHLICHER