Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NICOSIA1842
2006-10-27 16:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

UN, FINNS OFFER UPDATES ON THEIR RESPECTIVE EFFORTS

Tags:  PGOV PREL UNFICYP TU EUN CY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2672
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #1842/01 3001648
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271648Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7122
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0660
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 001842 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP TU EUN CY
SUBJECT: UN, FINNS OFFER UPDATES ON THEIR RESPECTIVE EFFORTS

REF: A. NICOSIA 1758

B. NICOSIA 1768

C. NICOSIA 1812

D. NICOSIA 959

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 001842

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP TU EUN CY
SUBJECT: UN, FINNS OFFER UPDATES ON THEIR RESPECTIVE EFFORTS

REF: A. NICOSIA 1758

B. NICOSIA 1768

C. NICOSIA 1812

D. NICOSIA 959

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. Top UNFICYP officials privately outlined for
us the UN's latest plan to unblock the current deadlock in
the Gambari Process. A last-minute snag over procedure
threatens to delay the start of work by the technical and
substantive committees, however, and UN officials privately
worry that a lack of goodwill from Papadopoulos could combine
with a lack of buy-in from Ankara to hamper real progress
between Greek and Turkish Cypriot negotiators. As for the
Finnish ports/Varosha proposal, Turkey has played coy, the
Turkish Cypriots have tabled a maximalist list of demands,
and GOC negotiator Tzionis sounded a "surprisingly" flexible
tone to the Finns. Wary of Papadopoulos's proven skill at
the "blame game," local Finnish Ambassador Piipponen said the
Greek Cypriots nonetheless seemed truly interested in
anything that would produce a positive public perception that
there was movement on Varosha. The immediate problem, he
felt, was Turkey's strategy of last-minute brinkmanship,
which could easily backfire. The Finnish MFA DG will visit
Turkey and Cyprus next week for further consultations, and
will suggest discreet three-way proximity talks in an effort
to produce a "yes" to the Finnish proposal.


2. (C) COMMENT: The best approach in the critical weeks ahead
will be unwavering U.S. public support for the separate but
interlocking efforts of the Finns and the UN. Any U.S. moves
should avoid providing the parties with an excuse for
indecision and inaction. At the same time, we must weigh in
discreetly but firmly with the Turks to get them to "yes" so
that Papadopoulos might be cornered into "no," or into making
some real, hard trade-offs. Only by returning to their
policy of being "one step ahead" on Cyprus will Turkey be
able to wrong-foot the GOC, isolate Papadopoulos within the
EU, and stave off December's looming train wreck. END
SUMMARY AND COMMENT.


UN TRACK: BRIDGING PROPOSAL ALMOST READY
--------------


3. (C) In a meeting with poloffs on October 24, UNFICYP DCM
Wlodek Cibor outlined the UN's planned next steps to
kick-start the deadlocked Gambari Process (refs a and b).
After much shuttle diplomacy over the past month, he said,
SRSG Moller had arrived at a bridging proposal that was
agreeable in substance to both sides and could allow talks to
resume "before the end of November." The details of the UN
proposal are as follows:

-- First, the two communities' technical and substantive
committees would meet intensively over a 7-day period.
During this Phase I, the sides would work out agendas, common
frames of reference, meeting procedures, etc.

-- At the end of this first phase, the two leaders would meet
and issue a joint statement blessing the committees' work so
far and kicking off a second phase. In this Phase II, the
committees would begin technical talks in earnest, and would
also start to tackle issues of substance. The leaders would
meet from time to time throughout, whenever they (both) felt
it necessary to help move this process forward.

-- At the end of the second phase, the two sides would have
progressed as far as they could go without outside help,
Cibor said (e.g., having agreed on some technical
cooperation, put specific proposals on the table regarding a
range of substantive topics, and perhaps even engaged in some
preliminary negotiations). The two leaders would then issue
a joint appeal for the UNSYG to resume his Good Offices
Mission and restart full-blown settlement talks.


4. (C) The UN originally wanted Phase II to last no longer
than three months, Cibor told us, but the Greek Cypriots
balked at such an "asphyxiating time line." The Turkish
Cypriots predictably counter-balked at the idea the process
could be open-ended, he said, so the UN settled on more
ambiguous language calling for Phase II to be finished "in
the first part of 2007."

UN TRACK: WHERE THERE'S NO WILL, IS THERE A WAY?
-------------- ---


5. (C) On October 26, however, Moller told Ambassador
Schlicher that the UN's plan had hit a snag thanks to a
Turkish Cypriot demand that the bridging proposal be
submitted to the sides in writing, not orally as insisted by
the Greek Cypriots. Moller said he planned to meet Pertev

NICOSIA 00001842 002 OF 003


and Tzionis together on October 30 to try to work out a
compromise. Even if this impasse can be overcome, however,
the process itself faces real long-term hurdles. By all
accounts, the atmosphere between the two sides was very bad;
Moller's October 30 meeting with Pertev and Tzionis will be
their first three-way talks in at least a month.


6. (C) UN officials therefore worry that the coming months
offer no guarantee of success. Moreover, they now note a
negative mood and trends from the Greek Cypriots toward the
UN and the settlement process. Cibor privately pointed to a
recent case in which the GOC "lied" to the UN regarding a
cross-Green Line criminal case, the latest round of
politically motivated witch-hunting over UNOPS funding prior
to the 2004 Annan referendum (ref c),and the October 20
"boycott" by ROC officials of UNFICYP's UN Day Reception.
Furthermore, UN officials remain worried about the Turkish
Cypriots, whose hatred of Moller and silly objections over
protocol were the main stumbling block to progress through
most of the summer. Moller has reiterated his concerns that
Turkey might not be willing to give Talat the leeway he
needed to be flexible and strike a deal.


7. (C) UN officials note that while it is too soon to tell
what the UN's approach to Cyprus would be under Ban Ki-moon,
the new SYG is unlikely to place Cyprus high on his agenda if
the current deadlock continues. Moller told the Ambassador
he was considering preparing a transition report on Cyprus
for the new UN administration that would highlight the
ongoing gap between the parties' words and deeds -- and that
absent any progress, such a report could have an impact on
the SYG's recommendations regarding UNFICYP's mandate
renewal. Cibor, meanwhile, hinted that Moller (a career UN
man who is "well respected" in New York but, thanks to his
posting here, "not too close" to the outgoing crowd) might be
plucked away to help the new SYG set up shop in headquarters.
Moller reportedly has little interest in sticking around if
the current deadlock cannot be overcome.

FINNISH TRACK: TURKS PLAY COY
--------------


8. (C) Meanwhile, in an October 26 meeting, local Finnish
Ambassador Riisto Piipponen provided a readout of recent
Finnish contacts with Cypriots and Turks to Ambassador
Schlicher. According to Piipponen, Turkish U/S Apakan had
taken a positive tone in a recent meeting on the margins of
the Luxembourg GAERC, but had not come close to "yes." He
had posed many questions and a few requests for amendments to
the Finnish plan, including the desire for a permanent
arrangement (rather than a temporary one) for trade through
Famagusta, and a request for specifics on the role of the EU
in the administration of the port. According to Piipponen,
the Finns noted their desire for the EU (working with the
Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce) to have a role in
controlling trade, but not in controlling the port itself.
This "light touch" approach, the Finns believe, suited all
sides' needs: the Turkish Cypriots would maintain the status
quo for their port officials; the Turks could continue to use
the port for their military needs; while the Greek Cypriots
knew that pressing too much on port issues -- including the
Turkish military's use of the port -- could endanger their
prospects of getting something meaningful on Varosha.


9. (C) Apakan nonetheless emitted some signals that
could/could be used later to justify a "no" to the Finns. He
said that the Varosha issue "complicates" the Finnish
proposal, suggested that Varosha's owners could use the
recently-established "TRNC" property claims commission (ref
d) to get their property back, and tried to press the
argument that the obligations of the Additional Protocol were
connected only to goods, not to ships and planes. He also
queried whether the EU sought a formal parliamentary
ratification of the implementation of the Protocol, or
whether de facto implementation would be sufficient.
Overflight and landing rights were not included in the
requirements of the Protocol, said Apakan; yes, they are,
replied the Finns. Apakan did not insist on inclusion of
Ercan airport in the Finnish proposal, but said that Talat
would so demand, adding that it was the Turkish Cypriots, not
Ankara, who would have to agree to the deal. The Finns
reportedly pressed back on this point, telling Apakan that
"we are not going to play stupid games. We know who makes
the decisions relevant to Varosha and Famagusta."

FINNISH TRACK: GOOD CYPRIOTS, BAD CYPRIOTS, AND THE TURKS
-------------- --------------


10. (C) "TRNC Presidential" U/S Pertev had visited Helsinki
on Thursday, October 19, and presented a truly maximalist
list of demands, including the addition of Ercan and the port
of Kyrenia to the Finnish proposal, an end to "TRNC's social

NICOSIA 00001842 003 OF 003


and cultural isolation," two Turkish Cypriot seats in the
European Parliament, and a Turkish Cypriot successor to EU
Commissioner Kyprianou. According to Piipponen, Pertev
pressed for the wider concept of island-wide "free trade" and
echoed Turkish desires for a permanent, not a temporary,
arrangement. The Finns reportedly listened politely, but
stressed that their proposal helped address Turkish Cypriot
isolation, while respecting the Turkish Cypriot Famagusta
equities. Ankara would in the end have to make the tough
calls on Varosha and Famagusta, they stressed.


11. (C) ROC Presidential Diplomatic Adviser Tzionis had
visited Helsinki on October 20. The Finns found him "ready
to move if the Greek Cypriots can get some satisfaction on
the question of access." The Greek Cypriots still hoped for
a "clear prospect of return" of owners to their properties,
without fixing timelines. They were open to partial or
gradual implementation, according to Piipponen. They, did,
however, continue to draw a red line around the opening of
Ercan. Piipponen, known locally as very dubious of
Papadopoulos's intentions, said he was surprised at how
positive the Greek Cypriots had been. While aware that
Papadopoulos wants to prepare himself for a new round of the
"blame game," Piipponen thinks that the Greek Cypriots also
are seriously interested in anything that would produce a
positive public perception that there is movement on Varosha.


FINNISH NEXT STEPS: SUGGESTED DISCREET PROXIMITY TALKS
-------------- --------------


12. (C) Piipponen confirmed that Helsinki was holding firm on
its proposal, fleshing out details with the parties, but
telling them that any additions to the proposal must be
negotiated between the parties. They do not want
"subtractions" from the proposal. As a next step, Finnish
U/S Halonen will visit Ankara, Nicosia, and Lefkosa next week
to propose discreet proximity talks to all three. The Finns
would like to hold these proximity talks before the November
8 progress-report deadline. But Helsinki was promoting the
idea that the November 8 report should be descriptive, not
prescriptive, since this would be the best means of keeping
hope for an agreement alive before the December Council
meeting. Asked when the Finns intend to commit their
proposal to writing, Piipponen said that "we will begin to
write it down when we know they are really negotiating a
compromise." His government had various drafts reflecting
various permutations the negotiations might take. Piipponen
added, "The biggest problem right now is with Ankara. They
need to make their intentions known. They will want to hold
out until December and create a crisis, but this is a
European bet that they easily could lose."

OUR BEST APPROACH: DISCREET BUT FIRM
--------------


13. (C) COMMENT: In the critical weeks leading up to the
December European Council meeting, we can play a helpful role
in staving off an accession trainwreck. First, we must
continue to back vigorously the UN's efforts to relieve
pressure by relauching movement on the settlement track.
Embassy Nicosia will keep supporting Gambari/Moller and
pressing both communities to stop playing games and get down
to business; Ambassador pressed this line with FM Lillikas on
October 27, and will hit the message hard in his November 1
meeting with Talat, and in subsequent contacts on both sides.
We must also support the Finnish initiative. Here, our
approach should be Hippocratic: First, do no harm. The Finns
here are concerned that any high-profile U.S. diplomacy could
distract attention from their proposal and provide both
Turkey and Papadopoulos with an excuse for indecision and
inaction.


14. (C) Our best approach at this delicate phase is, even as
we press Papadopoulos and Lillikas, to weigh in discreetly
but firmly where we have the most credibility -- with the
Turks and Talat. We must encourage them to seize back the
initiative by saying "yes" to the EU. Current Turkish and
Turkish Cypriot stonewalling tactics (in which Ankara plays
coy about taking a tough decision and Talat rubbishes the
Finnish initiative) have effectively shifted the mantle of
intransigence away from the Greek Cypriot side. Papadopoulos
has been able to stick comfortably to his principled
insistence on Turkey fulfilling it legal obligations, while
Ankara tries to nickel-and-dime the Finns. We think
Papadopoulos needs to feel unified EU and international
pressure, but this pressure cannot build in the absence of
known Turkish positive intentions. END COMMENT.
SCHLICHER