Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NICOSIA1691
2006-09-29 13:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

TURKISH CYPRIOT CABINET UNVEILED

Tags:  PGOV PREL ECON EAID PINR TU CY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4815
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #1691/01 2721310
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 291310Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6970
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0637
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NICOSIA 001691 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EAID PINR TU CY
SUBJECT: TURKISH CYPRIOT CABINET UNVEILED

REF: A. NICOSIA 1607

B. 05 NICOSIA 760

C. 05 NICOSIA 1869

D. NICOSIA 203

E. DIXON/CLEGG-TRIPP EMAIL (09/20/2006)

F. NICOSIA 959

G. NICOSIA 977

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NICOSIA 001691

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EAID PINR TU CY
SUBJECT: TURKISH CYPRIOT CABINET UNVEILED

REF: A. NICOSIA 1607

B. 05 NICOSIA 760

C. 05 NICOSIA 1869

D. NICOSIA 203

E. DIXON/CLEGG-TRIPP EMAIL (09/20/2006)

F. NICOSIA 959

G. NICOSIA 977

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. Turkish Cypriot "PM" Soyer has unveiled his
new cabinet, a coalition with the newly-formed Freedom and
Reform Party (OP),which has replaced the DP of former "FM"
Serdar Denktash as the center-left CTP's junior governing
partner. The new cabinet contains some new faces -- most
notably OP leader Turgay Avci as "FM" and "Deputy PM" -- but
is unlikely to produce any major shifts in policy, either
domestically or on the Cyprus problem. Most observers agree
that by ditching the obstreperous Serdar in favor of a
wobbly, politically untested partner like OP, Soyer has
strengthened his grip on the levers of power. The new
cabinet is expected to push forward on CTP's plans for
"public administration reform," which Soyer says will
rationalize how the "TRNC" is run, but which critics point
out will further concentrate patronage power in CTP's hands.
This reshuffle has been badly received by the Turkish Cypriot
public, caused friction within the CTP, and put a definitive
end to whatever honeymoon the party may have still enjoyed
after winning recent elections with a pro-reform,
pro-settlement platform. END COMMENT.

CTP TIGHTENS IT GRIP
--------------


2. (C) "TRNC PM" Ferdi Soyer announced his new cabinet on
September 25; the new "government" took office after it was
approved by "President" Talat the following day, and is
expected to be officially ratified by the Turkish Cypriot
"parliament" within a week or so. The new cabinet is a
coalition between Soyer's (and Talat's) center-left CTP and
the newly-created OP -- a motley crew of four right-wing "MP"
defectors led by Turgay Avci, as well as assorted other local
politicians and activists, who coalesced into a party earlier

in the month. The sudden appearance of the OP provided the
CTP (whose 25 "MPs" leave them just shy of a majority in the
50-seat legislature) with an alternative to their previous
junior partner, the DP of outgoing "FM" Serdar Denktash --
and led to speculation that the CTP, and perhaps the ruling
AKP in Turkey, had engineered the whole thing to get rid of
Serdar (ref a).


3. (C) The new cabinet leaves the CTP in control (more or
less) of the portfolios it held during the last "government,"
and (more or less) gives OP the keys to "ministries"
previously occupied by DP. CTP insiders tell us that the
goal of their coalition talks with OP was to keep the
previous 7-3 balance generally intact, but to open the way
for "public sector reform" which the DP had previously
blocked. In exchange for being plucked from obscurity and
offered high-profile seats in the "government," the OP has
apparently agreed carte-blanche to CTP proposals to
"streamline and rationalize" several "ministries" and
sub-cabinet departments. Critics point out, however, that
this rationalization has, in effect, concentrated budgetary
power and patronage machinery in the hands of the CTP.


4. (C) For example, the DP-run "Ministry of Agriculture and
Forestry" has been split in two, with the CTP assuming
control of the "Agriculture Ministry" and the OP taking over
a newly-created "Ministry of Environment and Natural
Resources." This will give the CTP a greater say in farming
and farm subsidy policies -- which should help the party make
inroads among villagers in the rural heartland, who have
always been skeptical of the CTP's center-left,
pro-settlement rhetoric. The newly-created Environment
"Ministry" will have some say in, for example, doling out
construction permits. But significant authority in this
field remains with the CTP's Interior "Minister," so the OP
will presumably not be able to block project permits for CTP
allies without a fight. (Construction permits for their
respective cronies were a major source of friction between
CTP and DP.) The former CTP-run "Ministry of Youth and
Sports" has been abolished, but that body's lucrative
licensing authority over sports betting (not to mention the
"TRNC State" Lottery) is expected to be moved to the "Prime
Ministry", and thus remain in CTP hands. Similarly, the
Tourism Fund that was previously controlled by the "Economy
and Tourism Ministry" (which drew its money from casino
licensing and other fees, and was spent entirely off budget
to support tourism projects -- at the discretion of Serdar's
notoriously corrupt DP) will be folded into the regular
budget overseen by Finance.

NICOSIA 00001691 002 OF 004



CABINET LINE-UP AND NEWBIE BIOS
--------------


5. (SBU) The "ministers" who remain unchanged include the
following (whose bio information was reported when they were
first appointed in 2005, ref b):

-- "Prime Minister" Ferdi Soyer (CTP);

-- "Finance Minister" and coordinator of foreign aid Ahmet
Uzun (CTP);

-- "Interior Minister" Ozkan Murat (CTP);

-- "Transportation Minister" Salih Usar (CTP);

-- "Health Minister" Esref Vaiz (CTP);

-- "Labor Minister" Sonay Adem (CTP); and

-- "Education Minister" Canan Oztoprak (CTP).


6. (C) New faces in the cabinet are:

-- "Foreign Minister" and "Deputy Prime Minister" Turgay Avci
(OP). Born in Larnaca in 1959, Avci (av-JEE) is a long-time
Embassy contact. He studied engineering at the American
University of Beirut, and later took graduate degrees in
administration and management from Cukurova University in
Turkey and Eastern Mediterranean University in Famagusta,
where he served for many years as Vice Rector, head of the
Management Department, and Director of the Tourism School.
He is married with 2 kids and speaks English (well enough to
such slang as "aw, c'mon man") and Arabic (less well). Avci
was a latecomer to politics. He was first elected to
"parliament" on the anti-settlement UBP ticket in 2003, and
reelected in 2005. Ostensibly a nationalist, he nonetheless
insists he is a "moderate" on the Cyprus problem, and
encouraged his son to attend a USG-sponsored bicommunal
summer camp in Colorado in 2006. When the UBP suffered a
leadership crisis in 2005 (refs c and d),the ambitious Avci
hoped that fellow Famagustan, former "PM" and party power
broker Dervis Eroglu, might eventually back him for the
party's top job -- a hope boosted by Avci's 2006 appointment
to the heir-apparent position of SYG. But Avci appears to
have given up on the UBP in recent months when it became
clear Eroglu would not back him as successor to outgoing
leader Huseyin Ozgurgun. His sudden decision to defect, form
OP, and join forces with the CTP (which came at a convenient
time for the ruling party) has led to charges that Avci is a
political opportunist who accepted bribes to make his move.
These allegations, Avci's vaguely twerpy appearance (think
Principal Rooney from "Ferris Bueller's Day Off"),and the
fact that he had zero name recognition outside Famagusta
until a few weeks ago all suggest that Avci will have a
difficult time attracting support to the embryonic OP,
serving as a counterbalance to CTP within the coalition, or
contributing significantly to the "TRNC's" efforts to gain
support from abroad.

-- "Minister of Tourism and Economy" Enver Ozturk (OP). Born
in 1964 in Gaziantep, Ozturk studied law in Istanbul and is
married with two kids. He is one of the few mainlanders to
occupy a prominent office in the "TRNC." This, and the fact
that several of his party's other founding members are also
non-Cypriot Turks, has fueled speculation that Turkey's
ruling AKP is quietly backing OP in hopes of creating a
pliant "settler" party to do its bidding on the island. But
Ozturk, who has a well-deserved reputation as a nationalist
wingnut, seems an unlikely tool of the Islamist AKP. He was
once a prominent member of the far-right MAP (which is
arguably even further on the nationalist fringe than its
mainland sister party MHP),and remained a favorite of the
kooky Volkan Newspaper when he crossed to UBP, where he
became D/SYG. Most recently, Ozturk was the lead attorney in
the UBP's "Supreme Court" case against the "TRNC's" new
property law (earning him further scorn from AKP -- ref e and
f),although he issued a public statement sheepishly
back-tracking his opposition to the law once it became clear
he would be joining the "government" which had drafted it.
Ozturk may prove a difficult interlocutor on issues of
concern to the USG, such as CyPEG-sponsored sustainable
tourism initiatives or better regulation of the casino and
off-shore banking industries. Several CTP insiders are
privately uneasy with their party's decision to partner up
with Ozturk, and say they are already preparing to "work
around him" in the new "government."

-- "Minister of Agriculture" Onder Sennaroglu (CTP). Born in
1957, Sennaroglu is a relative newcomer to the CTP. Long an
establishment man, he worked for years at various "state"-run

NICOSIA 00001691 003 OF 004


agricultural credit organizations, then fit neatly on the
nationalist UBP ticket when he was first elected to
"parliament" in 1998. Like many other Turkish Cypriots,
however, he saw the writing on the wall as anti-Denktash,
pro-settlement opinion began to pick up steam in 2003, and he
resigned from the UBP. Recognizing that he could be viewed
as a friend to the farmers, however, CTP recruited him to run
again in 2005, this time on their ticket, and he won a seat
for the party in the traditionally hostile Iskele/Karpass
region. Sennaroglu reportedly won this appointment after
threatening to quit CTP if he was not given a "ministry,"
which would have complicated the party's parliamentary math.
Soyer's decision to give into Sennaroglu's "blackmail" has
reportedly caused some friction in the CTP, home to many
other jealous aspiring "ministers." Sennaroglu is unlikely
to take a forward-leaning stance on potentially controversial
issues like subsidy reform or agricultural exports to the EU
through the south (ref g),where higher-ups will still call
the shots for political reasons.

-- "Minister of Environment and Natural Resources" Asim Vehbi
(OP). Born in 1966 in Nicosia, Vehbi received his BA in
business from Northern Michigan University in Marquette, and
later earned an MA in international relations at Lefke in
north Cyprus. He speaks English very well and is married
with two children. Although he dabbled in politics (he was a
member of Serdar's DP until recently),and worked briefly as
a manager at a textile company, Vehbi has spent most of his
career in the Turkish Cypriot higher education sector; he has
with little apparent background or expertise on environmental
questions. His most recent position was at Girne American
University, where he coordinated the school's marketing and
staff/faculty recruitment efforts, an uphill task for the
gregarious Vehbi, whose young university is saddled with
amateurish management and a fly-by-night reputation. Sources
close to Talat tell us that Vehbi was appointed because he is
a Cypriot, not a Turk like so many others in OP, and the CTP
wanted to deflect accusations that it was giving over too
much influence to settlers or their alleged backers in AKP.
Nonetheless, his management background suggests Vehbi might
have the makings of a competent interlocutor who could help
improve the Turkish Cypriots' ability to absorb foreign aid
-- especially from the EU, which plans to spend significant
portions of its promised package on environmentally-related
projects. It is interesting to note, however, that one week
prior to the "government" reshuffle, Vehbi applied for the
Political Section's vacant Turkish Cypriot FSN position -- an
odd contrast to the high-flying post to which he has just
been appointed. This could be interpreted as evidence of the
dearth of meaningful job opportunities for ambitious
English-speaking Turkish Cypriots, proof that Vehbi's
appointment was designed to ensure the "ministry" was
controlled by a relative political light-weight who would be
unable to challenge the CTP -- or both.

COMMENT
--------------


7. (C) It is unlikely this cabinet will introduce any major
policy shifts on issues of concern to the United States. The
UN process, the Cyprus problem, relations with Europe and the
U.S., and other key foreign policy matters have traditionally
been controlled by the "President," whose status as the
universally and directly-elected representative of the
Turkish Cypriot community gives him the authority and
legitimacy to speak in fora where the "FM" of the
unrecognized "TRNC" would not be welcome. As was the case
with Serdar, "FM" Avci is likely to remain sidelined with
relatively marginal tasks like representing the "Turkish
Cypriot State" at the OIC or drumming up potential diplomatic
support in Africa, Azerbaijan, or Central Asia.


8. (C) Meanwhile, most of the "ministers" with whom the
Embassy has developed good working relationships remain in
place -- such as Education "Minister" Cenan Oztoprak, a key
interlocutor for CyPEG's workforce development project, or
Finance "Minister" Ahmet Uzun, an increasingly helpful
contact for our AID mission in his capacity as coordinator of
incoming foreign assistance. Ozturk (who replaces a good
Embassy contact, Dervis Deniz, at Economy) is a wildcard who
could play a counterproductive role on issues like casino
regulation, intra-island trade, and harmonization with the EU
acquis. But since CTP seems set to call even more shots in
the new "government" than it did in the old one, Soyer, Uzun,
or even Talat may turn out to be the real decision-makers on
sensitive issues that used to fall under Economy when Serdar
was in charge.


9. (C) The paucity of new faces in the "government" belies
the seriousness of this cabinet reshuffle, which has seen
power concentrated in CTP's hands to an unprecedented extent
-- and produced an equally novel situation in which nobody

NICOSIA 00001691 004.2 OF 004


from the Denktash clan occupies high office in the "TRNC."
But the reshuffle will have a political cost for all
involved. Public reaction to the new "government" has been
overwhelmingly negative, with Turkish Cypriots assuming the
worst about CTP's thirst for power, Avci's ambition and lack
of conviction, and AKP's readiness to interfere in local
politics the way successive Turkish governments used to do in
the bad old days. Many observers are convinced Soyer ditched
Serdar, with the blessing of Erdogan, in order to pave the
way for unacceptable Turkish "concessions" to the EU on the
opening of ports -- and accuse the AKP and CTP of preparing
to sell out the Turkish Cypriots.


10. (C) Even within the CTP there are those, including Talat,
who quietly question the wisdom of a move that could spur UBP
and DP to unite into a more effective opposition, invite a
response from Denktash and the "Deep State," or simply
tarnish CTP's popularity over the long term. In any case,
the honeymoon for the party -- which was elected on a
platform of reunification with the Greek Cypriots and
internal reform -- is over. END COMMENT.

SCHLICHER