Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NICOSIA1549
2006-09-13 04:00:00
SECRET
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

CYPRIOTS REVEAL NEXT STEPS ON M/V GREGORIO

Tags:  KNNP PARM PREL MNUC EWWT PHSA CY GR 
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S E C R E T NICOSIA 001549 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, ISN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2016
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL MNUC EWWT PHSA CY GR
SUBJECT: CYPRIOTS REVEAL NEXT STEPS ON M/V GREGORIO

REF: A. NICOSIA 1503

B. NICOSIA 1486

C. NICOSIA 1396

D. NICOSIA 1379

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

S E C R E T NICOSIA 001549

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, ISN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2016
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL MNUC EWWT PHSA CY GR
SUBJECT: CYPRIOTS REVEAL NEXT STEPS ON M/V GREGORIO

REF: A. NICOSIA 1503

B. NICOSIA 1486

C. NICOSIA 1396

D. NICOSIA 1379

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (S) SUMMARY: Cypriot investigations into the activities,
crew, and cargo of the M/V Gregorio I (Reftels) are nearly
complete. Foreign Ministry officials informed the Embassy
September 12 that the 21 vehicles in the vessel's holds
comprised an air defense system; their search had uncovered
no "offensive" weapons, however. Additionally, MFA experts
had found no applicable EU or United Nations sanctions to
prevent purported end user Syria from importing the trucks.
EU law mandated that Cyprus treat the interdiction as an arms
export matter; the RoC would quarantine the Gregorio's haul
until destination country Syria filed standard paperwork,
sought an arms import license, and pledged it would not
re-export the goods to third countries. The RoC's desire to
maintain sound relations with Syria necessitated this careful
approach, the MFA officials added. In a separate meeting
September 10, Embassy personnel approached the Cypriot police
chief with request to photograph the materiel. That request
was refused. Post is attempting to confirm word that a
Cyprus court has ordered the shipment's formal confiscation.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Ambassador Erato Marcoullis, director of the Foreign
Ministry's Cyprus Question division, provided the DCM
September 12 a readout of the RoC's investigation into the
M/V Gregorio, a Panamanian-flagged, Greek-owned freighter
suspected of trafficking illicit materiel from North Korea to
Syria. Investigators at the port of Limassol had nearly
completed their work. Marcoullis was unable to supply the
DCM a detailed report of their actions, but summarized the
main findings. The Gregorio's cargo bays held 21
Isuzu-manufactured vehicles: three command/control trucks,
plus 18 mobile military radars. Together, they comprised an

air defense system, Cypriot experts believed. They had
discovered no "offensive" weapons, Marcoullis clarified, such
as missiles, launchers, or anti-aircraft ammunition.
Additionally, the 2,556 metal pipes found aboard the Gregorio
appeared to be irrigation-related -- Cyprus had imported
similar plumbing from China for water works in the south, she
claimed.


3. (C) Cyprus had grounds to detain temporarily the Gregorio
and its cache, Marcoullis asserted, owing to discrepancies in
the cargo manifest, which noted the vessel was carrying
meteorological equipment. Ministry experts had found no
applicable EU or UN directives that prohibited trade in radar
systems between North Korea and Syria, however. As such, the
RoC was treating the case as an arms export matter; since the
M/V Gregorio had "for some reason" made port in an EU
country, EU rules would apply. End users in Syria, should
they want the trucks, must obtain a certificate from the SARG
allowing their import, affix supporting documentation, and
submit the package to the RoC's Commerce Ministry. Commerce,
assisted by an advisory committee whose members hailed from
the Foreign, Defense, Labor, and Interior Ministries, would
make a final decision on granting the export license.


4. (C) MFA officials September 11 had raised the M/V
Gregorio with the Syrian ambassador here, Marcoullis
revealed, highlighting the manifest's discrepancies and
outlining the process the SARG must follow to import the
shipment legally. The Syrian claimed he had no prior
knowledge of what the Gregorio had been carrying, and did not
mention whether the SARG would seek to gain possession of the
trucks. Marcoullis believed that the RoC's customs
regulations would allow permanent confiscation of the
Gregorio's cargo should the Syrians choose not to pursue its
import. As Cyprus did not want to "make an enemy" of the
SARG, it was treading carefully on the M/V Gregorio matter.


5. (C) The DCM complimented Cyprus's efforts so far and
reiterated the USG's offer to provide technical assistance on
an if-asked basis. Marcoullis afterwards was polite but
non-commital. She would continue to provide updates,
however, as circumstances merited. Later September 12, a
locally engaged employee from Post's Export Control and
Border Security (EXBS) office, conducting unrelated business
in Limassol, overheard a phone conversation of a frequent
interlocutor. From the call he deduced that a Cyprus court
had ordered the M/V Gregorio I's cargo to be confiscated. We
are attempting to confirm this fact with Marcoullis's staff.


6. (C) In a separate meeting September 11, an Embassy
officer, acting under his agency's instructions, approached
the Cypriot police chief to obtain digital photographs of the
satellite vehicles. The RoC official refused the request. In
subsequent written correspondence, he stipulated that "due to
the sensitivity of the matter," any future requests must be
channeled through the Foreign Ministry.
SCHLICHER