Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NICOSIA1099
2006-07-12 13:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

ERDOGAN IN CYPRUS: FIRST, DO NO HARM

Tags:  PGOV PREL UNFICYP EUN TU CY 
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DE RUEHNC #1099 1931303
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 121303Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6407
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0992
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0588
C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 001099 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP EUN TU CY
SUBJECT: ERDOGAN IN CYPRUS: FIRST, DO NO HARM

REF: A. NICOSIA 1088

B. LIBBY-SILLIMAN EMAIL (7/11/2006)

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

This is an action request. See paragraph 5.

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 001099

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP EUN TU CY
SUBJECT: ERDOGAN IN CYPRUS: FIRST, DO NO HARM

REF: A. NICOSIA 1088

B. LIBBY-SILLIMAN EMAIL (7/11/2006)

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

This is an action request. See paragraph 5.


1. (C) Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan's planned July 20 visit
to the "TRNC" comes at a potentially awkward moment, given
the just-concluded Gambari agreement (ref a) and the looming
likelihood of a Cyprus-related crisis between the EU and
Turkey over accession this fall. The official purpose of the
visit is to participate in celebrations marking the 32nd
anniversary of the 1974 "Peace Operation" (he will also open
a school and sign a financial aid protocol) but because this
is Erdogan's first Cyprus trip as prime minister, his
presence on the island takes on an added symbolic
significance.


2. (C) From our perspective, and that of our Turkish Cypriot
contacts, Erdogan's visit seems intended as a gesture to
protect his nationalist flank at home by demonstrating
solidarity with the "TRNC." Fresh pictures of Erdogan,
standing shoulder to shoulder with military brass, Rauf
Denktash, and the "TRNC" cabinet as fighters fly overhead,
may indeed help Erdogan at home. But they could place
Turkish Cypriot leader Talat in an awkward position by
feeding the suspicions of Greek Cypriots and others that he
is fully subordinate to Ankara -- at the very moment he needs
to be seen as a credible interlocutor who can deliver in
upcoming UN-brokered talks.


3. (C) Yet, some good could come of Erdogan's visit if he
uses the opportunity to express unequivocal support both for
Talat and for the upcoming UN-brokered process. Sources
close to Talat tell us that they have gotten some "mixed
signals" from Ankara (ref b) about the Gambari process.
Talat is aware that he has angered some on the mainland by
agreeing to a joint statement that did not mention the Annan
Plan and "gave into Greek Cypriot demands" to discuss both
substance and day-to-day matters. The Turkish Cypriot
leadership took nervous note of Namik Tan's remarks about the
Gambari visit, which was spun in the local press as "Turkey
does not support the technical talks." Talat plans to use
his time with Erdogan to "explain" the Gambari agreement to
the Turkish PM; the Turkish Cypriots' number-one deliverable
for the visit will be to ensure Erdogan's support of both the
agreement and the man who negotiated it.


4. (C) In addition to using his visit to reinforce Talat's
position in Cyprus talks, Erdogan could do himself a world of
good with the Europeans by avoiding harsh rhetoric about
ports and planes. This may require some intestinal
fortitude; both nationalists at home and Turkish Cypriots
here will no doubt be anxious to hear, once again, that the
GOT is not planning to "abandon" the Turkish Cypriots. But
the GOT's tired, give-no-quarter soundbites on this issue
play right into the hands of Greek Cypriot hard-liners and
crypto-opponents of Turkey's EU-accession process, who would
like to see Papadopoulos stick it to Turkey this fall.
Resident European ambassadors will be watching Erdogan's
visit closely; he needs to give Turkey's beleaguered friends
in the EU something to work with.


5. (C) Post requests that the Department and Embassy Ankara
approach the GOT (at both the AKP/political and technocratic
levels),to reinforce this message. Erdogan's visit to
Cyprus should be used to bolster Talat, support the UN
process, and do no harm with the EU.
SCHLICHER