Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NEWDELHI995
2006-02-09 13:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

WITH AN EYE ON CHINA, PRESIDENT KALAM TO "ENGAGE"

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM PTER SNAR IN BM 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NEW DELHI 000995 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PTER SNAR IN BM
SUBJECT: WITH AN EYE ON CHINA, PRESIDENT KALAM TO "ENGAGE"
IN BURMA

REF: 05 NEW DELHI 0934

NEW DELHI 00000995 001.2 OF 005


Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NEW DELHI 000995

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PTER SNAR IN BM
SUBJECT: WITH AN EYE ON CHINA, PRESIDENT KALAM TO "ENGAGE"
IN BURMA

REF: 05 NEW DELHI 0934

NEW DELHI 00000995 001.2 OF 005


Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: Signaling GOI intentions to step up
engagement with Rangoon despite its concerns about democracy,
President Kalam will make a "goodwill visit" to Burma on
March 8-10. This will be the highest level visit from India
to Burma since Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi traveled to
Rangoon in 1987. The trip, which will occur only days after
President Bush comes to India, is intended to return the
October 2004 visit by military leader Senior General Than
Shwe and follow up on discussions of defense, cross-border
security, and energy cooperation. Responding to our
inquiries about this visit, the Ministry of External Affairs
emphasized that the Indian leadership continues to raise
concerns about the lack of democracy during all its
high-level meetings with the State Peace and Development
Council (SPDC),but must look after the country's national
interests by engaging with the junta. At a February 6-7
seminar on India's Role for National Reconciliation in Burma,
Indian participants called on the GOI to postpone the visit
until the SPDC releases Aung San Suu Kyi and provides "full
and unrestricted access" to the UNSG's Special Envoy on
Myanmar. Questioning whether engagement with the regime was
in India's best interest, participants discussed Burma's
increasing instability, the junta's "insincere" security and
energy cooperation and India's inability to compete with
China's influence. The GOI knows that the US will not be
happy about the trip or its timing, but is determined to move
forward with its relationship with Burma. U/S Burns may wish
to use one of his next calls with FS Saran to underline our
concerns. End Summary.

Its Been So Long...
--------------


2. (C) MEA Burma Desk Officer Pooja Kapoor confirmed that
President Kalam will travel to Burma from March 8-10 on a
"goodwill" visit that local media say was postponed to occur

after the POTUS visit to Delhi. Kapoor noted that since
Senior General Than Shwe visited India in October 2004, the
Burmese have been pressing for a return visit. She indicated
that there was no other specific reason for the visit, but in
addition to following up on energy and security cooperation,
the President would likely focus the trip around his
interests in science and education (themes Kalam emphasized
on a recent visit to South East Asia). This will be the
highest-level visit from India to Burma since Prime Minister
Rajiv Gandhi traveled to Rangoon in 1987 and President
Kalam's only visit to an immediate neighbor since he took
office in 2002. In addition to meeting with Senior General
Than Shwe in Rangoon, Kalam may also visit Mandalay and Bago,
MEA indicated.

India Can't Afford to Isolate Burma
--------------


3. (C) MEA's Kapoor emphasized that the Indian leadership
takes every opportunity to push for democracy in Burma and
the release of Suu Kyi, but given Burma's proximity and

NEW DELHI 00000995 002.2 OF 005


importance for the country's national interest, the GOI must
pursue a policy of engagement. On his return from the East
Asian Summit in December, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
called publicly for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and
encouraged the GOB to move towards democracy, but couched
this statement by saying that it was not his "purpose" to
advise the military junta on what it should do, and it was up
to the Burmese people to solve their own problems (Reftel).
Kapoor listed security and energy cooperation, growing
Chinese influence, and links to India's sensitive Northeast
region as reasons why the GOI could not afford to isolate the
military regime. Although New Delhi would prefer a
democratic Burma and "finds it difficult to get too close to
the regime," India "always has to keep these other interests
in mind." Kapoor noted that the GOI sees a huge opportunity
for further engagement in Burma, but is held back because of
its democracy and human rights concerns.

Heck No, He Shouldn't Go
--------------


4. (SBU) A March 6-7 seminar sponsored by the Asian Center
for Human Rights (ACHR) and Mizzima News on India's Role for
National Reconciliation in Burma called on the GOI to
postpone the visit until the SPDC releases Aung San Suu Kyi
and provides "full and unrestricted access" to the UNSG's
Special Envoy on Myanmar and Special Rapporteur on the
Situation of human rights in Myanmar. A declaration issued
at the seminar criticized the timing of the Indian visit and
expressed concern about the GOI's "unstinted" support for the
ruling military junta and increasing cooperation in defense,
infrastructure development, communications, and hydrocarbon
exploration. Representatives of Indian civil society
organizations, human rights groups and political parties
discussed plans to protest the visit through a signature
campaign and possible protests in Calcutta during the visit.
Revolutionary Socialist Party MP Abani Roy, who is one of
twelve members of the recently formed Indian Parliamentary
Forum for Democracy in Burma promised to "try to arrange a
meeting with Kalam to urge him not to go to Burma unless the
SPDC releases ASSK and he is allowed to talk about the
restoration of democracy."


5. (SBU) While acknowledging that India needed a working
relationship with the military regime, Editor of Mizzima News
Soe Myint argued that India should take a more balanced
approach to engaging the junta and pressing for democracy.
Former Deputy Director of RAW (India's external intelligence
service) B.B. Nandi charged that the GOI's "pragmatic policy"
has gone overboard in befriending and appeasing the junta.
Myint worried that India's "constructive engagement" and the
public show of support that the junta will derive from
President Kalam's visit is offsetting the Western policy of
disengagement. He emphasized that a visit by the President
of the world's largest democracy at a time when the internal
situation in Burma is deteriorating, the US and EU are
putting more pressure on the regime, and Nehru Peace Prize
winner ASSK continues to live under house arrest, will send
the wrong signal and show that India is only "paying lip
service" to democracy in Burma.


NEW DELHI 00000995 003.2 OF 005


Seminar Examines India's National Interest
--------------


6. (SBU) Discussion at the Seminar on India's Role for
National Reconciliation in Burma focused on whether the GOI's
policy of engagement with Burma was truly in the country's
best interest. ACHR Director Suhas Chakma observed that
India's policy of engaging Burma has not effectively
stabilized the Northeast, countered Chinese influence, or
yielded energy rewards. Chakma, like other speakers, shared
concerns that Burma's military regime was contributing to an
increase in drug and small arms trafficking, the profits and
weapons of which end up with Northeast insurgent groups.
Although Rangoon has stepped up counter-insurgency
cooperation, BBC Correspondent for Northeast India Subhir
Bhaumik explained that Burmese operations are limited to the
Kaplang faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim
(NSCN) insurgent group, which wants to reintegrate sections
of Burma into a Naga homeland. The spread of in HIV/Aids and
increased numbers of Burmese refugees coming to India will
also have a destabilizing effect on India's Northeast. When
asked about Burmese security cooperation, Observer Research
Foundation Asian analyst Vijay Sakuja commented that India
and Burma had only begun border cooperation three years ago,
and that visible improvement would require more time.


7. (C) Participants also raised the SPDC's December 2005
decision to sell 6.5 trillion cubic feet of gas to China as
proof that India will never be able to offset Chinese
influence or depend on Burma as a reliable energy supplier.
Former Deputy Director of RAW Nandi reported that the Burmese
agreed to sell gas to China from Block A1, where India's ONGC
Videsh Ltd. and GAIL hold a 30 percent stake. He claimed
South Korea's Daewoo and Korea Gas hold the other seventy
percent stake. This Burmese decision, which came to light
during Petroleum Ministry Joint Secretary for Gas Ajay
Tyagi's mid-January trip to Rangoon to discuss progress on
the India-Burma pipeline, caused Tyagi to cut the trip short
and should make the GOI to reconsider its energy sources,
Nandi argued. MEA's Kapoor noted that some gas had been
promised to China in December, but the media had exaggerated
this story and Burma would only make a final decision after
it finished calculating projected gas reserves in the A1
Block.

India's Troubled Transfer
--------------


8. (C) Another illustration of India's delicately poised
agenda with Rangoon is the proposed Indian transfer of
several British BN-2 Islander maritime patrol aircraft to the
Burmese Navy. This transaction has set off a controversy
between the UK and the Indian Ministry of Defense over
sanctions on the supply of spares. A recent India Today
article reported that during Navy Chief Arun Prakash's visit
to Rangoon in January, he proposed the transfer of three old
Indian Navy Islander aircraft to the Burmese Navy. The
transfer is another step in the Indian military's plan of
engagement, under which all three military chiefs have
visited Rangoon in the last year. As part of India's
maritime diplomacy with countries on the ocean rim, India has

NEW DELHI 00000995 004.2 OF 005


made similar transfers to the Seychelles and Vietnam.
Although the Islander is an unarmed civilian transport
aircraft and the 30 year old Islander deal did not have a
clause governing third-party sale or transfer, the transfer
could be subject to EU sanctions imposed against the military
regime in Burma. The Brits told us that the High
Commissioner merely warned the GOI informally that if India
supplies Islander aircraft to Burma, the UK would have to
look very carefully at the spares supplies for the aircraft.
Feeling "threatened" by sanctions, India Today explained, the
Navy protested the British warning and announced that it is
going ahead with the aircraft transfer at "friendship
prices." The UKHC has not been notified of a final decision
on the transfer, and is trying hard to downplay what High
Commissioner Michael Arthur has called "a little Myanmar
issue."

Comment: India Only Willing to
Go So Far On Democracy in Burma
--------------


9. (C) Both publicly and privately the GOI has made clear
its discomfort with the current political trajectory in Burma
(Reftel). Nonetheless, there are several limiting factors to
our dialogue on Indian policy towards Burma. New Delhi
believes it has a balanced policy of raising democracy
concerns with the SPDC, both publicly and privately, while
maintaining a working relationship with its neighbor, and
points to the December ASEAN Summit as proof. However, the
GOI is not willing to stick its neck out on this issue and
risk losing out on security, energy, economic, and
counter-insurgency cooperation with one of its only neighbors
proactively seeking better relations. Moreover, as long as
China continues to deepen its military involvement in Burma
and compete for energy reserves, India's views its engagement
with Rangoon as a strategic imperative. The GOI likes to
remind us about our own strategic imperatives with Pakistan.
For instance, when Ambassador Mulford raised the Kalam visit
at a recent dinner with MEA Joint Secretary (Americas)
Jaishankar in attendance, asking "How should President Bush
react to the news that Kalam is going to Burma just after his
own visit to India?" Jaishankar responded "exactly the same
as we will react to your President traveling to Pakistan."
In this context the GOI claims that just as US strategic
imperatives require us to soft pedal the GOI's absence of
democracy in Pakistan, military competition with China does
not allow the luxury of a stringent Indian line on Burmese
democracy. We continue to press the Indians, who also must
contend with strong local sympathy for the Burmese democracy
movement, Indian human rights group and the Indian
Parliamentary Forum for Democracy in Burma, but don't expect
any of these pressures will cause the GOI to reconsider the
upcoming visit or significantly change the direction of
Indian foreign policy. We believe it will be very difficult
to turn the GOI around on this. U/S Burns may wish to use
one of his periodic calls with FS Saran to underline our
concern about the Kalam visit and to urge a strong message by
Kalam on democracy.


10. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website:
(http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/)

NEW DELHI 00000995 005.2 OF 005


MULFORD