Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NEWDELHI8356
2006-12-15 01:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

HOME MINISTRY AGREES TO CLOSER COUNTERTERRORISM

Tags:  PTER PREL PGOV PARM KISL PK BG IN 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 008356 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2026
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV PARM KISL PK BG IN
SUBJECT: HOME MINISTRY AGREES TO CLOSER COUNTERTERRORISM
COOPERATION WITH THE U.S.

NEW DELHI 00008356 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Geoffrey Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 008356

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2026
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV PARM KISL PK BG IN
SUBJECT: HOME MINISTRY AGREES TO CLOSER COUNTERTERRORISM
COOPERATION WITH THE U.S.

NEW DELHI 00008356 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Geoffrey Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In an extremely collegial exchange, S/CT
Deputy Coordinator for Counter Terrorism Virginia Palmer
identified several areas for future counterterrorism (CT)
cooperation in a Dec. 8 meeting with three senior Ministry of
Home Affairs (MHA) officials, who briefed her on the current
situation in Kashmir as well as discussed India's CT efforts.
Both sides agreed to share information on terrorist groups
that side-step a UN ban by adopting pseudonyms. Noting the
success of recent terrorist financing prevention efforts,
Palmer briefed on cash courier training efforts, and urged
India to adopt Financial Action Task Force recommendation
nine, requiring physical measures to detect cross-border
currency trafficking. Joint Secretary (Internal Security) L.

C. Goyal replied that it could be done in June or July of

2007. Joint Secretary (Kashmir) Mitali Sen Gavai outlined a
cohesive, three-pronged counterinsurgency strategy. She said
Kashmir separatists have no political or public support in
Jammu and Kashmir, but derive support from Pakistan, whose
agents, she says, also "infiltrate" India via the porous
Bangladeshi border. END SUMMARY.


TERRORIST FINANCE AND SAFE HAVENS
--------------


2. (C) In a December 8 meeting, S/CT Deputy Coordinator for
Counter Terrorism Virginia Palmer met with MHA Special
Secretary (Internal Security) G. S. Rajagopal, and his

SIPDIS
deputies, Joint Secretary (Internal Security) L. C. Goyal
and Joint Secretary (Kashmir) Mitali Sen Gavai. Goyal noted
that, though the UN has banned Kashmiri terrorist groups
Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaeesh-i-Muhammed, many countries are not
honoring their obligations to suppress these groups, citing
Pakistan and Bangladesh as examples. He emphasized the case
of the man suspected to be behind the 1993 terror bombings in

Mumbai, Dawood Ibrahim. He said, "we know full well he is
living in Pakistan, yet Pakistan does nothing about it." He
lamented that the UN has also chosen not to react effectively
to the fact that these groups simply change their names to
side-step the ban and continue operating, citing the name
change of Lashkar-e-Taiba to Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD). Palmer
also expressed dissatisfaction that China had placed a hold
on a U.S. request to designate (in the UN's 1267 committee)
Jamaat-Ud-Dawa as a terrorist organization. Palmer asked
Goyal about the possibility of joint demarches urging that
the hold be lifted. Goyal replied that it would not help to
simply ban the organization, because it would simply change
its name again. He suggested that designation of the group's
leadership would be more effective, adding that it was
necessary to gather strong intelligence on the leadership,
and to create dossiers for them. Palmer urged increased
GOI-U.S. information sharing, and Goyal agreed. Palmer added
that the dossiers would be more helpful if they were at a
lower level of classification, so they could be disseminated
more widely within the CT community.


NEW DELHI 00008356 002.2 OF 003



3. (C) Palmer asserted that UNSCRs 1267 and 1373 (banning
terrorist financing and support thereof) are good documents,
but suggested more could be done to enforce 1373's provisions
requiring states to deny terrorists safe haven. Goyal
replied that the UN Counterterrorism Committee should be
given teeth, to pressure countries that are lagging behind on
their obligations. Palmer noted that many countries do not
comply, citing a lack of capacity in their border control,
policing, and training. She suggested that UN
Counterterrorism Executive Directorate should provide
capacity when and where needed, but that afterwards, a
mechanism should be developed to hold countries accountable
for using that new capacity and complying with their UNSCR
1373 obligations.


4. (C) According to Goyal, most of the funding for terrorism
in India comes from overseas, channeled through Islamic NGOs
and charities. He noted that India has mechanisms in place
to try to control this, including the Terrorist Financing Law
of 2005, the Finance Intelligence Unit, and the Foreign
Contribution Regulation Act. Goyal added that the Act is
being amended so that Indian banks will soon have reporting
requirements on the flow of funds, origins and destinations,
to track suspicous transactions. Palmer asked if the office
overseeing charitable organizations was adequately staffed,
and Goyal affirmed that it is. Palmer urged India to adopt
Financial Action Task Force recommendation nine (NOTE: A
recommendation requiring countries to have measures in place
to detect the physical cross-border transportation of
currency. END NOTE.). Goyal replied that it could be done
in the next monsoon session of the Indian parliament, in June
or July of 2007.


5. (C) Palmer remarked that the international effort to
clamp down on financial institutions to prevent terrorist
financing has been so successful, the U.S. has noticed that
many terrorist groups are resorting to cash couriers,
especially in the Philippines and the Gulf. She added that
the Departments of Home Security and the Treasury are
conducting cash courier training programs to train
enforcement officials to help spot and interdict cash
couriers, and invited GOI participation in what we hope will
develop as a worldwide effort to increase the effectiveness
of efforts to interdict terrorist cash couriers.

KASHMIRI TERRORISTS - PAKISTANI OUTSIDERS?
--------------


6. (C) Gavai reported that over the past ten years, there
have been 65,000 terrorist incidents and 40,000 people killed
in Jammu and Kashmir. The terrorists have changed their
tactics, she noted, explaining that they are now more
risk-averse, and have taken to using IEDs and throwing
grenades in order to minimize their own casualties. There
were only five suicide bombings last year and two in 2006,
she said. "We believe there are only about 2,000 terrorist
foot soldiers on the ground," she shared, noting that some
terrorism, particularly grenade throwing incidents, is

NEW DELHI 00008356 003.2 OF 003


"outsourced", often to local children, for as little as
$20-40. She observed that the terrorists have been shifting
lately to softer targets, including individuals and tourists,
or shooting security officers in the back at close range.
"The tourists have fled," she lamented, adding, "tourism is a
life-line for Kashmir and the terrorists target it."


7. (C) Palmer asked if local Kashmiri businessmen and
hotel-owners protest or act against the terrorists who are
destroying their livelihoods. Gavai replied that they fear
reprisal too much, and don't want to become targets
themselves. She noted that there is a grave problem of
affluent local Kashmiris harboring terrorists, referring to
them as "overground workers" because they operate relatively
in the open. These sympathizers give safe haven and money to
terrorists, she indicated, but it is difficult to gather
enough evidence to prosecute them.


8. (C) Gavai outlined a comprehensive GOI strategy to
improve security in the region through increased police
presence, improved political participation (she cited the
effect of the successful 2002 elections),and bolstered
economic development. Rajagopal prompted Gavaitwice to
mention human rights and she indicated that the GOI was
dealing seriously with reports of abuses. Gavai noted that
her office has a strong dialogue with local political parties
and recently hosted a roundtable in the region. The
separatist groups did not participate, however, because
"Pakistan told them not to." The separatists have no real
local support, she asserted, but are completely funded and
controlled by Pakistan.


9. (C) "Indian Muslims have rejected terror outright,"
observed Gavai, noting that Pakistan is changing its tactics
now by no longer "infiltrating" solely through Jammu and
Kashmir, but also through Bangladesh and Nepal. The
Bangladeshi border is not sufficiently controlled, said
Gavai, adding "many Indian politicians want the border to be
porous in order to allow Bangladeshi Muslims to enter
freely." By sending terrorists to India via the Bangladeshi
border, Pakistan is enhancing its "deniability factor,"
argued Gavai, noting that Pakistan maintains terrorists who
enter by way of Bangladesh are not under their control.
Gavai suggested that Pakistan is trying to recruit young
Indian radical groups, especially students, so that they can
claim terrorism is a domestic Indian problem.


10. (C) Pressed by Palmer about the links between outright
extremist groups and local disaffected Indian Muslims, Gavai
acknowledged her concern about that potential, which she
thought was primarily fostered through contacts with Indian
expatriates in the Gulf.


11. (U) S/CT Deputy Coordinator for Counter Terrorism
Virginia Palmer cleared this cable.
PYATT