JAISHANKAR'S POST GAME ANALYSIS OF U/S EDELMAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 008277

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MASS ETTC KSTC KOMC IN
SUBJECT: JAISHANKAR'S POST GAME ANALYSIS OF U/S EDELMAN
VISIT AND INDO-US MIL-MIL TIES

REF: NEW DELHI 7661

Classified By: CDA Geoffrey R. Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (b and d)


1. (C) Summary: In a recent meeting with the DCM, MEA Joint
Secretary (Americas) Dr. Jaishankar provided his analysis of

SIPDIS
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman's November
visit. Agreeing that substantive developments occurred and
the ability of both sides to work collaboratively had
evolved, Jaishankar particularly noted increased Indian
levels of comfort in working with the USG. He pointed to
"big" progress since the November 2005 Defense Policy Group
(DPG) meeting and commented that Edelman's working style
provided a boost for high-level coordination. While there
remain minor turf issues within the Indian Ministry of
Defense (MoD) and hurdles before finalizing the multi-role
combat aircraft (MRCA) contract, Jaishankar and the DCM
agreed that our bilateral military-to-military relationship
continues to clip along at an ever increasing pace, and
possesses significant potential for both sides. End Summary.


Continued DPG Progress: Rising GoI Comfort Levels
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Jaishankar opefed the conversation by describing the
tangible progress, increased substantive bilateral
interaction, and improved collaboration that developed since
the November 2005 DPG meetings. Specifically, he felt that
the Indian side had learned how to quickly and clearly
articulate what they wanted, particularly in the areas of
end-use monitoring and Foreign Military Sales procedures, and
had communicated in more specific language instead of
ambiguous generalities. Jaishankar said that "this is an
evolution" and a "huge change at the bilateral level." In
the past, the Indian side simply ignored U.S. perspectives.
Now, there was a growing inter-agency effort in the GOI to
make sure to say exactly what it wants in open forums with
the U.S. side. The culture, emphasized Jaishankar, had
changed. Even the discussions on the Logistics Support
Agreement (LSA) and Communications Interoperability and
Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA),in his view, were
moving along smartly.

Taking American Intentions More Seriously
--------------


3. (C) Jaishankar told DCM that he also observed enhanced
cooperation after receiving a recent Letter of Offer and
Acceptance (LOA) with the standard U.S. language on end-use
monitoring (EUM) procedures. Jaishankar noted, with respect
to the difficult bureaucratic aspects of most U.S. positions
on procurements that, "normally, when we get letters of this
nature, we can't stop laughing for 72 hours. But now, we've
got General Kohler and two or three other people to sit down
with two acquisition managers and dissect the letter. In the
old days, we would have ignored the letter. Now, the general

NEW DELHI 00008277 002 OF 003


thinking is, If it's the US, let's negotiate."

Hurdles on Handling the MRCA
--------------


4. (C) Despite increased levels of comfort, Jaishankar was
still attentive to defense cooperation obstacles. He
reported that Indian Defense Minister A.K. Antony was forcing
a second round of clearances in the GoI interagency process.
In addition, Jaishankar commented at length about
discrepancies in U.S. and Indian understandings on how to
navigate through the competition for India's MRCA contracts.
For example, while U.S. companies tend to operate under the
assumption that they will negotiate specifics on the MRCA
contracts after their particular aircraft is selected, the
Indians feel that all price and offset negotiation must occur
before selecting an aircraft. Unfazed, Jaishankar waived off
the particulars as "a process challenge" that must be
synchronized. The Indians, he said, were now past the
generalities and were "transaction oriented," but there
needed to be a meshing process to blend rigidities on both
sides into a workable framework, given the gaps between the
U.S. side's LOA and the Indian side's RFP methods.

Urges U.S. Sensitivity on India's Views on Pakistan
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Jaishankar also described the importance of smaller
settings to conduct business and suggested improved GoI
coordination with the planners at CENTCOM. Jaishankar
expressed appreciation for Edelman's thoughtful assessment of
recent events in Afghanistan and Pakistan, acknowledging
India's displeasure with the Waziristan deal and implications
of suicide bombings, and appearing sympathetic to India's
precarious relations with its neighbors. In this context, he
warned that large U.S. defense sales to Pakistan continued to
pose a psychological hurdle to India procurement if major
defense systems from the U.S.

Making the Right Personnel Choices
--------------


6. (C) Jaishankar confirmed that Ministry of Defense Director
General (Acquisition) S. Banerjee is very positive on
Indo-U.S. ties, but warned DCM that the Indian Ministry of
Defense was worried about conducting dialogues with a
non-defense (State Department) lead. DCM assured Jaishankar
that the direct military-to-military channel is now more open
than in the past, adding that the addition of Deputy
Secretary of Defense Lawless would provide the MoD with a

SIPDIS
solid, capable interlocutor in OSD, but also underlined the
importance of State's Pol-Mil bureau and working group led by
DAS Suchan. Jaishankar agreed that such personnel choices on
both sides paved the way for excellent future interaction,
commenting that having a Joint Secretary-level officer as DAS
Suchan's counterpart on the Indian side provides the right
measure of seniority for handling tricky issues, and also

NEW DELHI 00008277 003 OF 003


gives him the necessary clout to involve the Indian DGMI and
DIA when necessary.

Comment: An Encouraging Report Card
--------------


7. (C) Jaishankar is a veteran of the DPG and his comments
underscoring progress in the military-military relationship
should be taken positively. His criticism of Pakistan arms
sales aside, for him to describe these meetings as an
"evolution" likely speaks for a majority opinion in the GoI
that the defense relationship is moving in the right
direction. Post assesses Jaishankar's comments as an Indian
endorsement of not only the 2006 DPG, but also the defense
relationship -- still with its problems, to be sure, but a
positive, integral part of the wider strategic partnership.
PYATT