Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NEWDELHI6230
2006-09-06 15:44:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

NSA NARAYANAN SUGGESTS SARAN-BURNS MEETING AS

Tags:  PREL PGOV PARM TSPL KNNP ETTC ENRG TRGY IN 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 006230 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DOE FOR U/S GARMAN, SHANE JOHNSON, TOM CUTLER, ADAM
SCHEINMAN
DEPARTMENT PASS TO NRC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM TSPL KNNP ETTC ENRG TRGY IN
SUBJECT: NSA NARAYANAN SUGGESTS SARAN-BURNS MEETING AS
ALTERNATIVE TO RE-STARTING 123 NEGOTIATIONS

Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 006230

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DOE FOR U/S GARMAN, SHANE JOHNSON, TOM CUTLER, ADAM
SCHEINMAN
DEPARTMENT PASS TO NRC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM TSPL KNNP ETTC ENRG TRGY IN
SUBJECT: NSA NARAYANAN SUGGESTS SARAN-BURNS MEETING AS
ALTERNATIVE TO RE-STARTING 123 NEGOTIATIONS

Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary. In a September 6 meeting with National
Security Advisor Narayanan, Ambassador Mulford urged India to
re-engage in negotiations on the 123 Agreement. Narayanan
would not commit India to doing so, but offered as a sign of
India's engagement to send Foreign Secretary Saran to meet
with Undersecretary Burns in order to discuss areas of
India's agreement and disagreement over pending legislation
on the civil-nuclear initiative. Narayanan explained that
the GOI doesn't see the value in discussing final details of
the 123 agreement prior to final legislation coming out of
Congress. Note: This conversation took place four hours
before the Ambassador and NSA Narayanan discussed these
issues with the Prime Minister (septel). End Summary.

AS EASY AS 1-2-3
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador met with NSA Narayanan on September 6 to
discuss progress in the civil-nuclear initiative and ways to
move forward. Citing Prime Minister Singh's effective August
17 speech to parliament as demonstrative of his commitment to
the deal, the Ambassador said the effort now must turn to
getting a final bill out of Congress to which both sides can
agree. The Ambassador pointed out that should legislation not
be passed by Congress during this term, it would have to
re-start from the beginning next term. To reach the goal
this term, dialogue should intensify to sort out as many
problems as possible prior to the bill going to conference.
In order proactively to address remaining issues and improve
the atmosphere of the negotiations as the Senate considers
its bill, India should re-engage on 123 Agreement talks.

Re-engaging on 123 is in India's interests as it would allow
it to demonstrate good faith toward the July 18, 2005
agreement, prioritize problems and shape the debate when the
House and Senate go to conference on a final bill, he said.

IN BETTER SHAPE NOW
--------------


3. (C) Narayanan admitted the delay in progress on the 123
Agreement was due to an Indian Parliament preoccupation with
the civil-nuclear initiative as a whole, and it was PM
Singh's August 17 speech which allowed the GOI to reach a
broad consensus on moving forward. "We have much better
support here now," Narayanan said. "The Prime Minister's
hand is much stronger across the board. We didn't want
people to say we were discussing final details of the deal
before the Prime Minister talked to Parliament."

WE NEED TO TALK
--------------


4. (C) The Ambassador said that while the USG was hoping to
return to 123 negotiations soon, the impression he received
from his discussion September 5 (note: reported septel) with
Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran was that India felt too many
problems remained in congressional amendments to the
legislation to discuss final details of the 123 deal. Saran
had offered instead to talk directly to his frequent
counterpart, Undersecretary Burns. While that would have

NEW DELHI 00006230 002 OF 003


value, the Ambassador argued, it would also be beneficial for
India to help along the U.S. system, and to re-start 123
negotiations with ISN/NESS Director Dick Stratford. The
Ambassador added he intended to encourage PM Singh, at a
meeting scheduled for later in the day, to endorse progress
in the 123 Agreement. (Note: PM Singh meeting reported
septel.)

A NERVOUS EYE ON THE HILL
--------------


5. (C) While the GOI recognizes the importance of being seen
as moving forward, Narayanan said, it remains unsettled as to
what will be the final shape of U.S. legislation, and
therefore does not want to get locked into any position in
the 123 Agreement which may later be changed or affected by
law. He said he and PM Singh were trying to put together a
negotiating brief to serve as the basis for discussion on
Indian concerns, but added it was difficult for India to
declare a position prior to seeing the final conference bill.
Rather, Narayanan proposed, India would prefer for FS Saran
to talk directly with U/S Burns to see what issues could be
resolved before Congress goes to conference. The Ambassador
noted that engaging in 123 negotiations now could help India
shape the outcome of the legislation without having to enter
into specific commitments, and explained that by waiting
until after the final legislation on the initiative the 123
Agreement could be less flexible once the law is in place.

A SARAN-BURNS MEETING?
--------------



6. (C) Unyielding, Narayanan said the Bush administration had
implied that it would try to persuade Congress to produce a
final bill that would be acceptable to India. Any agreements
made prior to final legislation may be changed by that
legislation, he claimed, and would give Indian opponents of
the deal the opportunity to claim that the U.S. was "shifting
goalposts." India would prefer for FS Saran to raise India's
concerns with U/S Burns, and to address the larger, political
issues rather than technical ones, Narayanan stated. He
offered to dispatch Saran quickly to meet with U/S Burns.

KEEP THE MOMENTUM UP
--------------


7. (C) Ambassador urged Narayanan to consider the technical
progress which could be made on the 123 Agreement which would
be separate from the policy concerns India has raised, and
asked Narayanan if India would negotiate those aspects of the
Agreement. By being able to tell Congress that, for example,
ninety per cent of the 123 Agreement had been negotiated,
Director Stratford would be able to show the progress India
has made, and perhaps some of what would be negotiated could
preempt pending amendments which India opposed. Engagement
now could resolve as much as possible and better define
India's objection to other areas. Narayanan agreed there
were several aspects of the 123 Agreement India could agree
on, and said FS Saran could discuss these with U/S Burns, but
added "India is not in a position to agree formally before a
final bill." Narayanan also agreed with the Ambassador's

NEW DELHI 00006230 003 OF 003


assertion that the Senate bill is unlikely to change during
floor debate, but maintained that India will not give its
final position until U.S. legislation is finalized.

HOLDING HIS GROUND
--------------


8. (C) Narayanan ended by saying India agrees that the 123
Agreement will be a most important part of the overall
civil-nuclear deal, and added that it does not see failure to
re-engage on 123 at this time as a sign that it is not moving
forward. The GOI will explain areas of agreement and
disagreement to U/S Burns, he offered. However, he said, "We
can negotiate 123 only when we know what the final bill is."
MULFORD