RGOB REMAINS COMMITTED TO REFUGEE RETURNS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 001572

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SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM PREF IN NP BT
SUBJECT: RGOB REMAINS COMMITTED TO REFUGEE RETURNS

REF: A. NEW DELHI 736


B. REED-PITOTTI EMAIL 2-16-06

Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: In contrast to Bhutanese Ambassador
Tshering's comments in Ref A that the RGOB my not repatriate

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any refugees, in a February 15 meeting with Poloff, Bhutanese
Second Secretary Karma Thinley (Strictly Protect) stated that
Thimphu remains committed to repatriating those in Category 1
and 4. However, he noted that Bhutan is concerned about
security and wary of allowing Maoist sympathizers into the
country. Thinley also expressed concern over where refugees
in other categories would end up. In a February 16 meeting,
representatives from the Netherlands, UK and Japan stated
that while their governments would likely be interested in a
joint visit to Thimphu to raise the refugee issue with the
King, they would first need to obtain approval from their
ministries. The Norwegian DCM argued on February 23 that
only India has the leverage to entice Bhutan to resolve the
refugee situation, but is not likely to force its neighbor to
act. End Summary.

Bhutanese Ambassador Speaks for Himself
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2. (C) Bhutanese Second Secretary Karma Thinley told Poloff
on February 15 that Ambassador Tshering may not have "clearly
stated Bhutan's position" regarding refugee returns (Ref A).
Thinley stated that, in contrast to Tshering's comments, the
RGOB position on accepting Category 1 and 4 refugees has not
changed, but security concerns remain. Thinley, citing a
conversation with officials in Thimphu, Bhutanese DCM Thinley
Dorji and the Bhutanese DCM in New York, noted that
Ambassador Tshering is a very senior member of the government
and, holding such authority, often expresses his personal
views without fear of reprimand from Thimphu. Thinley
proffered that the Ambassador's suggestion that the RGOB was
reconsidering the repatriation of any refugees is not
Thimphu's official position.


3. (C) Thinley reiterated that the RGOB remains concerned
about security and Maoist infiltration into Bhutan. Bhutan
does not favor allowing refugees with radical beliefs into
the country during the transition to democracy. Thinley
highlighted the fear that the advent of political parties
could allow radical groups easily to spread their extremist
views, and the government would be powerless to stop them.


4. (C) Regarding the repatriation/resettlement of refugees,
Karma expressed RGOB interest in the USG's willingness to
accept voluntary resettlement of the "people in the camps."
He inquired about next steps after the agreed-upon
repatriation of Category 1 and 4 refugees, specifically
referring to Category 2 and 3 refugees who do not choose
resettlement or local integration. Poloff remarked that the
international community has indicated a willingness to
provide financial support for the integration of these people
into Bhutan, however, a majority may opt for resettlement, if
it is an option.

New Delhi "Bhutan Watchers" Agree Pressure is Needed
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5. (C) PolOff met with representatives from the British High

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Commission, Embassy of the Netherlands and Japanese Embassy
on February 16 to discuss possible next steps regarding the
Bhutanese refugee problem. (Note: Representatives from the
Danish High Commission, Norwegian Embassy, and Austrian
Embassy could not attend. End Note.) PolOff outlined PRM's
six month strategy, stressing the need for Bhutan to deliver
acceptable terms and conditions for return and for Nepal to
allow UNHCR to begin surveying the camps, and expressed hope
that other interested governments would support the
initiative. Second Secretary Josephine Frantzen from the
Netherlands indicated her government would likely support the
plan and a joint trip to Thimphu to impress upon the RGOB the
need for action. Indicating that no single government, with
the exception of India, has leverage to force Bhutan to begin
repatriations, she remarked that a visit to Thimphu by
high-level representatives from the expanded Core Working
Group would be a good idea.


6. (C) British Third Secretary Caroline Wilson indicated
that the UK is currently not highly engaged in the Bhutanese
refugee issue, although it would likely support the PRM
strategy in whatever way it could. Acknowledging that her
government has a "minuscule" aid package in Bhutan of roughly
12,000 Pounds, she commented that the UK has very little
leverage in Bhutan. Japanese First Secretary Yuki Sakai
reported that her government also has a very small aid
program in Bhutan, which is shrinking, along with Japanese
aid programs worldwide. However, she indicated that the
Government of Japan is interested in helping the
international community engage Bhutan to find a solution to
the problem. (Note: Bhutanese Ambassador Tshering is also
credentialed to Tokyo, giving the Japanese here greater
access to the RGOB than they might admit. End Note.)


7. (C) All attendees agreed that Bhutan is unlikely to move
quickly towards a durable solution without pressure from the
international community, and a joint front would be more
effective in spurring Bhutanese action. Frantzen argued that
the main donor countries would all have to agree to make aid
conditional on the resolution of the refugee problem, in
order for the RGOB to take notice. Sakai initially indicated
that she thought that Nepal was responsible for the next
overture, mirroring the GOJ message in Ref B, but later
agreed with PolOff that Bhutan still must deliver clear
conditions for return.

Norway: No Movement Without India
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8. (C) Norwegian DCM Lasse Johannessen told Poloff on
February 23 that without stronger engagement by the GOI,
pressure from other state players is unlikely to succeed in
getting the Bhutanese to take action. He doubted that the
GOI would be willing to act against Bhutan, commenting "if
New Delhi has not taken action in Nepal regarding the Maoist
insurgency, do we really expect the Indians actually to do
anything on the refugee issue?" Poloff noted there might be
interest in a joint donors' visit to Bhutan, and Johannessen
indicated he would inquire as to whether Norway would
participate. He also asked if there was a plan to send a
joint delegation to Nepal to press Kathmandu to allow the
UNHCR survey to begin.


9. (C) Reporting on the visit of Bhutanese Foreign Minister
Wangchuk to Oslo, Johannessen remarked that the RGOB sounded

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cooperative and maintained its willingness to repatriate
Category 1 and 4 refugees. However, he stated that the RGOB
reiterated the demand that the GON agree in writing to the
plan and on modalities to deliver the information to camp
residents.

Comment: Take it to the King
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10. (C) The Bhutanese refugee problem continues its slow
march to an uncertain end. While meetings with our European
colleagues are useful to develop a joint strategy, it is
unlikely that a solution will be found in the near future
without a direct appeal to King Wangchuck. Post suggests a
senior level visit to Thimphu and in partnership with other
interested government, requesting that Bhutan submit to the
GON clear and acceptable conditions of return and agree to
the repatriation of Category 1 and 4 refugees and urging the
King to devote himself personally to the solution of this
impasse.


11. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website:
(http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/)
MULFORD