Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NEWDELHI1220
2006-02-16 11:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

EXPANDED CSLA SCOPE IS BLOCKING AGREED PROGRESS IN

Tags:  PREL ETTC ETRD KSCA TSPA KNNP IN OVIP POTUS 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 001220 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SECRETARY RICE AND UNDER SECRETARY BURNS
DEPARTMENT PASS USTR FOR AMBASSADOR PORTMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2015
TAGS: PREL ETTC ETRD KSCA TSPA KNNP IN OVIP POTUS
SUBJECT: EXPANDED CSLA SCOPE IS BLOCKING AGREED PROGRESS IN
SPACE

REF: A. NEW DELHI 1173

B. NEW DELHI 1063

C. NEW DELHI 357

Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 001220

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SECRETARY RICE AND UNDER SECRETARY BURNS
DEPARTMENT PASS USTR FOR AMBASSADOR PORTMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2015
TAGS: PREL ETTC ETRD KSCA TSPA KNNP IN OVIP POTUS
SUBJECT: EXPANDED CSLA SCOPE IS BLOCKING AGREED PROGRESS IN
SPACE

REF: A. NEW DELHI 1173

B. NEW DELHI 1063

C. NEW DELHI 357

Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: Approaching the President's visit to India,
we need action by Washington principals in order to
consolidate recent progress on civilian space cooperation and
disentangle this from our trade agenda. The original NSSP
goal to permit Indian launch of US satellites and foreign
satellites containing US components is in danger of being
stalled by the suggestion to expand the scope of a commecial
launch agreement to include satellite services, which the GOI
rejects as a unilateral change to the carefully negotiated
NSSP quid-pro-quos. Without action to put satellite services
on a separate track from our satellite launch agreement,
there will be no space-related deliverable for the POTUS
visit. Post strongly recommends that we allow the
NSSP-initiated space launch agreements to come to a
conclusion including the signing of the TSA and negotiations
on a CSLA that encompasses only satellite launch services, an
achievable goal before the President's arrival. We recommend
that we continue discussing satellite services with India in
other fora such as the Trade Policy Forum and the WTO/Doha
Development Agenda. End Summary.

ADDITION OF SATELLITE SERVICES THREATENS NSSP GOAL
-------------- --------------


2. (C) The NSSP narrative that then-DNSA Hadley outlined in
2003 called for allowing "Indian launch of foreign satellites
containing US-licensed components, and US satellites," once
we sign a space launch agreement. Successful negotiations on
space launch resulted in unprecedented speed in achieving US
and Indian agreement in January 2006 on a text for the
Technical Safeguards Agreement (TSA) (Ref C). We understand
that USG agreement on signing the TSA has now been linked to

agreement of a Commercial Space Launch Agreement (CSLA),
which includes not only launch services but also satellite
services. The GOI objects to this "moving the goalposts" for
concluding the agreed-upon roadmap for bilateral cooperation
in space launches.


3. (C) MEA Joint Secretary S Jaishankar told the DCM and
PolCouns on February 15 that the GOI's "final and official"
interagency perspective is that the CSLA we proposed in
January 2006 is "unnecessary" to fulfilling the space launch
agenda. Jaishankar said that the Indian Space Research
Organization (ISRO) is unwilling to even discuss the issue of
satellite services in this context, adding satellite launches
should proceed in a "market economy" like India's through
agreements between the satellite companies. He reiterated
the GOI view that a commercial satellite launch agreement
could be encompassed in a one paragraph description of market
principles. The US and India, he suggested, should focus on
signing the TSA during the President's visit to officially
open the satellite launch market, and address satellite
services through out trade dialogue. Post believes that
trying to add satellite services to the mix at this late date
is a bridge too far for ISRO, the GOI, and an economy that is
just now opening FM radio to private entrants.

GOI WANTS TO COOPERATE DESPITE HOSTILE MEDIA ATTENTION
-------------- --------------


4. (C) The GOI, led by MEA, has made substantial progress
since the commencement of the NSSP in changing the
fundamental culture of ISRO to reach the point where the TSA
negotiations took only a few hours of discussion. At a
recent seminar in Bangalore, ISRO Director G. Madhavan Nair
spoke enthusiastically about the partnership with the U.S.,
calling it central to India's international outreach. Since
the inception of the NSSP, reactionary holdouts within the
Indian space bureaucracy and in the media and policy
community have savaged the concept of greater ties with the
US, pointing to the progress that India's indigenous programs
made without assistance from the West. The legacy of
bitterness mingled with pride at US sanctions continues in
the present debate, with commentators frequently referring to
US actions to block the sale of Russian cryogenic engines in
the 1990s as proof that American interest continues to focus
on hobbling and/or displacing India's indigenous launch and
satellite capabilities.

US "INTRANSIGENCE" ON SPACE AS REASON TO DIG IN ON NUKES
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Critics of the July 18 President Bush-PM Manmohan
Singh joint statement have recently dragged ISRO's
willingness to engage with the US on space launch into the
debate on civil nuclear cooperation, and have used the same
language of "moving the goalposts" to oppose both tracks.
While proponents point to ISRO's pragmatism and scientific
openness (a point we endorse),opponents of the nuclear deal
have accused ISRO of selling out India's domestic prowess in
space launch vehicles and satellite construction in order to
serve the political goal of closer ties with the US. They
compare ISRO's "caving to political pressure" unfavorably
with Atomic Energy Commission Anil Kakodkar's public
statements (Refs A and B) drawing a red line on what India's
nuclear establishment would not accept under hypothetical
civil-military nuclear separation plans. If Washington is
unwilling to make commercial cooperation easier in the space
sector even after ISRO has made so many concessions, critics
ask, why should India be
willing to make concessions on its nuclear separation plan?

COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITIES COULD BE AT RISK
--------------


6. (C) A recent opinion piece by R Ramachandran argued that
while ISRO has willingly firewalled its military and civilian
programs, the US regulatory and licensing process remains so
cumbersome that the "big promise of Indo-US space cooperation
did not materialize largely due to Washington's
intransigence." He highlighted how Boeing abandoned plans to
cooperate with ISRO on 2-3 tonne satellites because of
burdensome licensing requirements, upon which the European
EADS swooped in to conclude an agreement on joint
manufacturing in that class. Europeans are also forging
ahead on commercial launches, with ISRO announcing in January
that Astrium and Arianespace had agreed to launch two 2.5
tonne satellites on ISRO rockets. In the meantime, the
Embassy has fielded inquiries from US-based companies asking
about progress in US-India commercial space cooperation, as
they too would like to establish a foothold in India.


RECOMMENDATION: MOVE AHEAD ON LAUNCHES, LEAVE SATELLITES OUT
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Ambassador strongly recommends that we use the
President's upcoming visit to New Delhi as an opportunity to
sign the TSA and a CSLA that will focus solely on launch
services, as agreed in the NSSP. It is clear that we will
not get an Indian agreement to add satellite services to a
process that was intended to clear the way for commercial
space launches before the President's arrival in New Delhi,
and maintaining their linkage will result in no space-related
deliverable for the President's visit to India. We should
continue to discuss satellite services, including
non-discriminatory treatment of foreign satellite service
providers, in appropriate fora including bilaterally in the
services focus group of the Trade Policy Forum, and
multilaterally in the Services negotiations under the ongoing
WTO Doha Development Agenda.


8. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website:
(http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/)
MULFORD